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DISSERTATION SUMMARY 
Diverse Styles of Islamic Reform among the Songhay of Eastern Mali. 
The general aim of the dissertation is to contribute to an 
understanding of Islamic reform in West Africa. To this end 
fieldwork was conducted among the Songhay of eastern Mali, a 
people who experienced a sudden rise in the popularity of Islamic 
reform in the early 1970's which divided many communities along 
religious lines. The term 'Wahhabiyya', often used to describe 
a trend in religious reform in West Africa which is inspired 
largely by the Saudi Arabian model of puritan Islam, is accepted 
by most members of this Songhay movement. 
In the region of Gao, in which this locally-based Wahhabi 
movement emerged, the situation is one in which Islamic reform 
among the village population is more 'radical' and uncompromising 
than among town dwellers. The central concerns of the disserta- 
tion are to compare the social backgrounds and religious orienta- 
tions of 'moderates' and 'radicals' and, in particular, to account 
for the strong appeal of Islamic reform among the villagers. 
In order to assess the impact of religious reform attention 
is paid throughout the dissertation to the social and. religious 
life of the non-reformist population. In tracing the background 
of the topic it was necessary to explore the history of the 
Songhay with specific reference to the introduction of Islam 
and its place in the 'traditional' religious complex as well 
as changes in the family, the economy and the politicaltostructure 
which have occurred since the advent of French colonization. 
These issues are set within a general comparison of the reformist 
and traditionalis-I cormmunities which includes consideration 
of the way Islam is observed, the place of leade-1--sh- -p and organi- 
zation, and the way Islamic eduCation is implemented. 
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Fieldwork for this study was undertaken in Mali from 
June, 1984 to April, 1985. The major part of financl-al support 
was provided by a Grant-in-Aid from the Wenner-Gren Foundation 
for Anthropological Research and by an IODE War Memorial 
Schoiarship. Other grants were provided by St. John's College, 
Cambridge, the Wyse Fund of Trinity College, Cambridge and 
the Richards Fund of the Department of Social Anthropology, 
Cambridge. T am very grateful for the support given from 
all these sources. St. John's College should also be mentioned 
as having supported a five-month stay in Paris, from January 
to May, 1987, for the purpose of conducting library research 
for this thesis. Another source of funding which was perhaps 
the most strategicaliy important came from my wife's parents, 
Qouglas and Beverly Bankson, who k. \iere Lhere to fiLl the gap 
in several moments of crisis. 
The first intor-mation on the development of the Wahhabiyya 
in Cao came from Tieb616 Dram& and Khadidia Bocoum of Paris. 
Their friends and relatives in Mali were instrumental in 
providing support and hospitality during the early phase 
of fieldwork. In Paris I benefitted greatly from discussions 
with Claude Meillassoux, Jean-Louis Triaud, Emmanuel Terray 
and Jean-Loup Amselle. M. Amselle, in Particular, has been 
a source of information on Islamic reform in Bamako and our 
conversations were a good way to correct or conf irm various 
ideas. The opportunity given me by Emmanuel Terray to present 
I \11 
some of my information to the Pcole des Hautes ýtudes en 
Sciences Sociales also helped solidify some of my thoughts. 
harlý,., in my fieldwork I was provided with introductions 
to people in Gao who were important Ifor the study by Mahmud 
Zouber of the Centre Ahmad Baba in Timbuktu. It is to him 
that I owe an effective entr6 into Gao society and an early 
start to the information-gathering process. One of my greatest 
debts is to -those many people in Gao who were wi Iling to 
provide information and discuss what were sometimes sens-itive 
i ssues. I was, in fact, refused only one interview and that 
was tortunately of only minor importance. 
To the Bocoum Family of Gao I am grateful for their 
astonishing generosity. 
In Cambridge I was encouraged and saqe-Ly advised by 
Martln Hinds, Jack Goody, my supervisor for the pre-fieldwork 
year, and Ernest Gellner, my supervisor both diiring and after 
fieldwork. Prof. Gelliner was remarkably conscientious in 
his replies to my letters from the field and in providLng 
judicious commentary on the dissertation as it progressed. 
At the School of Oriental and African Studies in London 
had the opportunity to present some of my information and 
ideas in the sem-inar series 'Islam in Africa' , -ýhaired by 
Louis Brenner. Donal Cruise O'Brien read the penultimate 
draft of the dissertation and provided vdludbie comments. 
Drs. Brenner and O'Brien were helpful in other ways, as 
suggesting relevant reading material, throughout. the cour'se 
of this pro-ject. 
V 
My final word of thanks is to my wife Barbro who has 
always been a source of support and encouragement, not to 
men . Lion an astute critic of my written work. 
This dissertation i-s my own work and is not the outcome 
of work done in collaboration. It is less than 90,000 words. 
The occasional use of material from my M. Phil. thesis is 
indicated in footnotes. 
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'NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY 
There is, as far as I know, no English cirammar of the 
Songhay language, and there are ý, Ade variations in French 
systems of orthography. I have, therefore, tried to present 
Songhay words in an English phonetic transcription as con- 
sistently as possible. The only sound in Songhay that T have 
transcribed which requires a special diacritical mark is 'iýV 
which is pronounced similar 
the 'e' in 'red'. 
to, but more emphatically than, 
In Arabic I have used a standard system of transliter- 
ation, with representing and h, 3 t, s, and d represenLing - 
-md , _ý 
respectively does not appear, 
in the tex t-1). The English plural is used for all foreiqn 
words (, Eýg. shaikhs, alfas, zonyos) to avoid confusion between 
word forms that are often very different. I have not used 
diacriticaý mtir-ks in proper names or place names. 
vi Ii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Islamic reform consistently upholds the claims of a 
final revelation and a last prophet. It has no place for 
radical innovation. Religious reform, with remarkable uniform- 
ity, involves an attempt to return to an earlier, 'pure' 
version of the faith. Those who claim a new interpretation 
of the truth or who express doubt as to the finality of the 
scriptural message are considered enemies of the religion. 
Islamic reform, even in the form of radical, enthusiastic 
uprisings, turns for its inspiration to the golden age of 
Islam, the time of the prophet and his companions, for guidance 
in life, for a code of behaviour that can be scrupulously 
followed with little margin for error or neglect. 
The Wahhabiyya is one of many Muslim reform 'movements 
which have as their goal the renewal of an earlier, uncorrupted 
version of Islam. In the Arab world, particularly Egypt, 
Lebanon and Syria, there are many contemporary movements 
whose shared aim is the full implementation of the sunna, 
the behavioural rules and guidelines recorded in the Quran 
and the traditions of the prophet (Iýadlth). The Takfir wa- 
Hijra (literally, atonement and migration), a major terrorist 
group of the 1970's, the Ikhwan al-Muslimi (Muslim Bretheren), 
and the Salafiyya (based on the root word salaf, meaning 
forefather or ancestor) are but a few of the reform VC- 
meW-. s which differ in their methods but which all seek the 
renewal of a faith which is perceived to have been corrupted 
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by those inspired by a western mode! of modernity. 
1 
However, in spite of a general similarity in terms of 
the goals of reform, and perhaps in approaches to such things 
as jurisprudence and eschatology, there is a range of possibili- 
ties in terms of the social settings of various reform move- 
ments, in terms of the social conditions which may encour-, -Iqe 
or hinder their development- In contrast to the wider rela- 
tionships between state politics and religious reýorm, the 
social settings of such movements remain little explored and 
therefore provide the anthropologist or sociologist with a 
wide arena for research. 
The word 'Wahhabiyya' comes from the Hanbali theologian 
and religious reformer Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703- 
87), a native of Najd in the eastern Arab Peninsula. The 
core of 'Abd al-Wahhab's teaching is the simple idea that-, the 
true Islam had been that of the first generation of Muslims, 
the prophet and his immediate successors, and that subsequent 
innovations had led to a neglect of the essence of IsLam: 
the worship of a single, all-powerful deity. Any oth(-, r (iod 
than God is to be rejected. The worship and veneration of 
idols and pious men must be avoided; even the will to perforin 
such worship constitutes a wrongful act of devotion. a misap- 
plication oil that which is due to God alone (. <; hirk). 
2 
For many reformers inspired by the teachings of 'Abd 
al-Wahhab Lhe use of the word 'Wahhabiyya' is in i t. se IId 
1. Cf. Sivan, 1985. 
2. Hourani, 1983: 37. 
3 
contradiction of their religious principles. 'Wahhabism' 
seeks to purge the religion of the inf luence of mediators 
between man and God. Man's role is that of believer and 
expounder of the faith. The elevation of men to any higher 
status, such as that of a 'saint', is considered inadmissable. 
Thus an adherent of Islamic reform might consider the word 
'Wahhabiyya' a contradiction of one of his fundamental tenets 
since it implies an elevation of 'Abd al-Wahhab to an unac- 
ceptably high position. The veneration of any man is an act 
which brings with it the risk of inadmissable sanctifica- 
tion. The members of reform movements inspired by 'Abd al- 
Wahhab themselves prefer the terms ahl al-Sunna, people of 
the sunna or, in the case of the West African reformers 
described here, ans5r al-Sunna, helpers of the sunna. In 
the region of the Niger bend where research for this study took 
place, however, popular usage has faded the pejorative implica- 
tions of the word 'Wahhabiyya'. I have used the word 'Wahhabi- 
yya' in reference to the reformist community because it has 
become part of the current usage and many adherents of this 
trend in Islamic reform have accepted it as an appropriate 
way of describing the source of their religious principles. 
In the late 18th century the reformist teacher 'Abd al- 
Wahhab joined forces with the princely warrior Ibn Sa'ud to 
rally the Bedouin into a powerful force that conquered much 
of the Arab Peninsula. It was the dynamic of 'Abd al-Wahhab's 
simple puritan teachings and Ibn Sa'ud's strong military leader- 
ship that gave this first Wahhabi conquest the strength it 
4 
needed to succeed. 3 
The Ottoman empire eventually dismantled this first Saudi 
empire but after several successes and reversals the royal 
house of Saud, still inspired by the teachings of 'Abd at- 
Wahhab, came to secure a stable position of power -in Saudi 
Arabia. This more definitive conquest which preceded the 
formation of the contemporary state was undertaken in the early 
part of this century by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud with the aid 
of the Ikhwan, a fanatical group of settled Bedouin which 
rigourously adhered to Wahhabi doctrine. The members of the 
Ikhwan ernestly believed that they would attain paradise through 
death in battle. With such strong religious conviction they 
set aside the traditional codes of Bedouin warfare, which 
minimized the toll ori 1-ife, and unleashed furious attacks 
against those whom they considered infidels, attacks which 
terrorized their opponents and eventua'Lly led to ibn Sa'ud's 
victory over Sherif Hussein in the Hijaz. After this success- 
ful conquest Ibn Sa'ud's warriors had to be subdued to pre- 
vent them from ignoring new national boundaries in their raids 
against 'infidels' and ultimately from turning against their 
patrons in power. 
4 In a more subdued form the teaching-, of 
'Abd al-Wahhab remain a strong ingredient in contemporary Saudi 
Arabia. 
With Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the Muslim place 
of pilgrimage, Islamic reform gained an important advantage in 
its promotion of change. In West Africa, as in other parts 
3. Cf. Philby, 1930. 
4. Cf. Habib, 1978. 
5 
of the Muslim world, we find the prestige of the Saudi state 
and the mechanism of travel and study in Mecca and Medina 
important ingredients in the spread of reformist ideas; import- 
ant enough, at any rate, for the term 'Wahhabiyya' and many 
of its associated teachings to be accepted by reformers in 
the tiinterland of IsIam. 
Wahhabism first developed as a movement in French West 
Africa during the 1940's and 50's. This development is discus- 
sed by Kaba in The Wahhabiyya. 
5 
Kaba places special emphasis 
on the political influence of Islamic reform in pre-independence 
politics. He points to two main sources of influence Ln the 
formation of the West African Wahhabiyya: the pilgrimage to 
Mecca and the return of African students from Al-Azhar Uni- 
versity in Cairo where they had been influenced by the teachings 
of a minority of reformist scholars. It was the return of 
these half-dozen students from Al-Azhar in particular which 
provided the Wahhabiyya in Bamako with leadership and direction. 
Leaders of the Subbanu al-Muslimi (Muslim Youth) inovement in 
Bamako consciously tried to avoid a hierarchical or authoritarian 
organization, but their association would have been ineffective 
without the guidance and organizational abilities of its educated 
leadership. Kaba stresses the place of the Wahhabiyya in opposing 
colonial rule and the cultural influences of the west. Thus 
his work is of particular interest to historians and Political 
scientists. He gives us little sense, however, of the social 
5. Kaba, 1974. Cardaire, 1954 and Chailley, 1959 cover some 
of the same material from the point of view of the French 
administration. 
6 
basis of the Wahhabi movement's appeal in West Africa. 
More light is shed on the problem of the social origins 
of Wahhabism in Bamako by Amselle in Wgociants de la Savanne, 6 
study of Kooroko traders in Mali and the northern Ivory 
Coast. Early in the colonial period the Kooroko were a caste 
or sub-group of blacksmiths and griots in Fulani society, 
but with the political stability brought about by colonial 
rule they became successful as traders between the Savannah 
and the forest regions of the coast, their specialty being 
the trade in kola nuts. The rise in the financial status 
of the Kooroko was accompanied by a strong adherence to Islamic 
reform. Wahhabism became, for many Kooroko traders, an import- 
ant part of their new social position. Lacking an avenue 
for social mobility in traditional West African society, the 
Kooroko turned to reformist Islam as the accompaniment to 
their material prosperity. 
Trading groups, of which the Kooroko were one of the 
most important, were central to the development of the Wahhab- 
iyya in West Africa, particularly in Bamako which was strateg- 
ically situated as a trading centre. Since independence, 
however, the appeal of Wahhabism has increasingly spread to 
other social groups including students and petty officials. 
This consolidation of Popularity is evidenced by a rapid 
increase in reformist mosques and madrasas, especially in 
urban centres. 
Also within the past decade there has been an increase 
in radicalization, such as in Bamako where a splinter group 
Amselle, 1977. 
7 
of young reformers, calling themselves 'La Renaissance de 
I'Islam', is taking an aggressive stand against those whom 
they consider non-Muslim. Their opponents include the more 
moderate Wahhabis whom the radicals insist are too compromi- 
zing in their approach to religious change. Evidence of recent 
radicalism comes in the form of an open letter entitled 'Notre 
appel ý la jeunesse Islamique du monde entier', of which the 
following is an extract: 
Jeunes musulmans du monde entier appretez-vous 
pour la defense de l'Islam contre ceux qui veulent 
transformer ou egorger la religion musulmane, que 
ceux-ci sachent qu'un sabre est apparu pour les 
egorger. Les ennemis de I'Islam doivent savoir 
qu'ils sont dans un pi6ge certain et qui va les 
detuire et ils n'auront pas d'6chappatoire. 
Ceux qui se vantent en se faisant passer pour 
champions de lIslam alors qu'ils ne sont m6me pas 
dans I'Islam, sont desormais connus. Tous musulmans 
qui ne se conforme pas A ia Sunna du Proph6te 
MOUHAMED (Paix et salut sur lui), suit le diable de 
Satan. 7 
The post-independence period has also seen the expansion 
of Wahhabism into the countryside. Within the Past several 
decades the Wahhabiyya has found a place in a number of agri- 
cultural villages including those of the Bambara and the Dogon, 
the latter being especially considered (particularly by promo- 
ters of tourism) to be stalwart defenders of animism. In' tfvý-, 
Gao region Islamic reform among the Songhay, the movement 
which we examine here, has both an urban and a rural appeal. 
It is not a unified movement. Most urban reformers, while 
7.1 am grateful to Jean-Loup Amselle for providing me with 
a copy of this document. More information on recent trends 
in Bamako can be found in Amselle, 1986. The original of this 
letter is in French. 
8 
stressing the need for change, are tolerant in their approach 
to non-reformist Muslims. Radicalism occurs primarily in 
the villages where those who do not belong to the reformist 
camp are considered infidels (kafir). 
Such rural reform movements have not developed exclusively 
in the recent past. The Kabbe movement among the settled 
Fulani of Futa Jallon and Upper Volta in the 19th and 20th 
centuries aimed to 'purify' and 'simplify' the teachinqs of 
Islam and to make them more accessible to non-literate Muslims. 
'Xabbe' is the Fulfulde equivalent of the Arabic word 'aqida'.. 
meaning 'article of faith', the article in question beinq 
the tawhTd or doctrine of the unity of God. This doctrine 
in the Kabbe movement became the platform of sectarian di,, tision 
in which, for example, only 'true believers' were qualified 
to slaughter animals. 
8 
Many similar examples of rural Islamic reform, however, 
are recent, a fact which suggests that the social factors 
stimulating rural Islamization have become more widespread 
and forceful of late. In northern Nigeria, for example, a 
rigourous interpretation of Islam is gaining acceptance among 
almost all social groups, but some of the most radical reform- 
ers are the tafsIr mu'allims of Hausaland. 
9 These are itiner- 
ant clerics who use the Quran as a basis for 'preaching' Islam, 
for interpreting the meaning of the text to those who are 
not 1iterate in order to encourage a greater committment 
to the faith. The full implications of the development of 
8. Brenner, 1984: 84. 
9. Jamal Abun-Nasr, personal communication, 1986. 
9 
this radical movement have yet to be understood--officiai 
secrecy arid distortions of events have made complete analysis 
impossible--but an uprising led by a tafs7r mti'ailim in Decem- 
ber, 1980 which resulted In the loss of many lives, points 
to the possible consequences of radical Tslamization arid 
ance to it by a non-reformist community and by the state. 
in Senegat an aqrictiLtural Muslim commiinity of Lhe Tijani 
order shows a similar stress on scriptural piety and a rigour- 
ous application of Muslim practices. 
10 The region of Madina 
Gun(is is the contemporary setting of a i: -ef orm movement among 
, unna the '-1alink-e dnd Fulani which strictly implements the S 
in every detail of daily life, the slightest transgression 
being severely punished. Leadership is centralized, with 
th(ý founder of the movement, Cerno Muhammad Sayid, acting 
not. only in a religious capacity but also exercising consider- 
(ible influence upon 
local administrative authorities. In 
spite of a nominal adherence to the Tijaniyya order there 
is 
a surprising similarity between this movement and the anti- 
Sufi Wahha'Div, ya of the Songhay, with its scrupulous applicaLion 
from the non-reformist of Muslim practices, its differentiation . 
community through such thinas as dress and prayer times, an(,. 
it's centralized network of village leadership. 
If we combine 
these two examples, trom opposite sides 
of West Afr-Lc(i, with the observation 
that. W-ahhabism has ver"', 
recently been accepted 
in a number of traditionally 'animist' 
societ, ies, the Bambara, the 
Dogon and the (-7)()nqhay, we must, 
10. Wane, 19A. 
10 
conclude that the Islamization of village societies is no 
, onger an infrequent occurrence. 
This trend towards the ruralization of reform has riot 
previously been isolated as a problem and in chosing to study 
a rural group with radical leanings I hope to bring more atten- 
tion to Islamic reform as a factor in social change in rural 
West Africa. 
There are special problems inherent in the close study 
of a 'community of conversion'--a religious community which, 
especially in its inception, recruits only those who have 
undergone a religious 'conversion'. This is true for the 
reform movement in Gao where we find that the older generation 
of Wahhabis, the shakers and movers of the movement, have 
undergone a change of religious values and belong to the group 
by virtue of a new committment to Islam. 
To some extent almost all societies are initially closed 
to the ethnographer's probings and only later accept him as 
a part of the local geography. In the community of coriver- 
sion, however, there persists an unbridgeable gap between 
the 'true believers' and the '-'Lnfidels'; and unless the ethrio- 
grapher wishes to feign adherence to beliefs he does not truiy 
hold, he remains outside the group. I was partiallý, accepted 
among the Wahhabis because of being perceived as a potenti. il 
convert. But there is a limit to 'the patience of members 
of a group which believe themselves to have access to the 
11 
religious truth toward those who do not have a similar enthu- 
siasm, however sympathetic they may be. The status of 'poten- 
tial convert', therefore, had its limits and one hurdle in 
conducting field research was to make the most of this position 
before a greater commitment was demanded. 
A particularly difficult situation in conducL, illg field 
research which arose from my position as a non-convert studying 
closed religious community was a reluctance on the part 
of the radical Wahhabiyya's central leadership to permit access 
to the villages whose inhabitants acknowledged their authority. 
This began as a suggestion on their part that I confine my 
enquiry to the capital of the rural movement, Dar al-Salam, 
that research in (Aher villages would not be as useful to 
me. I ignored this suggestion and made several trips to both 
the reformistc, and the traditional quarters of Berra, Bagoundie 
drid Magnadawe. 
11- When .1 
began making arrangements for trips 
to more distant villages the reformist leadership became more 
adamant and barred me from visiting any reformist community 
other than Dar al-Salam. Their opposition to my plans can 
be explained by a concern that in the villages I would find 
that religious practice was in some respects inconsistent 
with belief and that by welcoming me to Dar al-Salam they 
could control the kind of information I received and display 
the reformist community at its best. 
was important not to accept the invitation to stay 
for the duration of my field research in Dar al-Sal. am. This 
village has the status of 'capital' of the rural reform movement, 
11. See map, P. 117. 
12 
a position which is associated with greater control on t-, he 
Part Of the leadership and wiL--. h a more effective insulation 
from non-reformist villages and from the town. Staying in 
Dar al-, '-)alam would have greatly limited the q1-1aliuy ol-- the 
information I obtained since in this village my mobility and 
contact with the laity of the movement were restricted. it 
would also have led to a one-sided understanding of religious 
conflict. Wahhabism in Cao is accompanied by social tensions 
and conflicts which are important to consider for a picture 
of the social bases of reform to emerge. It was therefore 
necessary to avoid showing a bias in favour of either Wahhabis 
or traditionalists. To become a nominal inember of any one 
group would have closed down the flow of information from 
it-. s rival-; any outward show of sympathy towards one faction 
or the other would have been interpreted by some as a defection. 
It was surprising in reality how effective this balance was 
in obtaini. ng information. Each group was anxious to show the 
truth of its own position and the aberrance of its rivals'. 
Even in visits to Dar al-Salam, moreover, obstacles 
were encountered- -such as unexplained delays in receivinq 
replies to lett(,, -j-s written to arranqe trips and other deiays 
because suitable guides were supposedly not available- 
and ! was limited to 'L-. hree visits totalling two weeks dura- 
tion. The reformist leadership, it appeared, vJIS seckinq 
afuII commitment on my par r- to LtWLr r-eliqioUS pr-Ocjr., -IMMe 
arid some leadei-s wcre OPposed to iny visit_s '-o %- Dar tl-Salam 
because of my iinwillingness to remain Lher(ý on a pormarwriL 
13 
bas i s. 
These problems in gaining access to radical I.,. ahhabi 
villages would probably have prevented me from obtaining 
complete picture of the movement were it not for the 
possibility of contacting members of the reformist community 
on a daily basis in Gao-city. This contact took place 
at a lodge they had set up to accomodate members of the 
movement who needed to stay in the town, usually to do 
business in the market or occasionally to attend meetinqs 
of the leadership which were heid there because of lt, s 
central location in relation to the surrounding villages. 
Regular, informal visits to this lodge were a vitally impor- 
tant source of news and information from the villacies and 
a direct way to learn about the beliefs and pract-ices of 
the reformists. Here I was accepted without reserve and 
was able to talk with members of the Wahhabiyya who came 
to the town from many of the reformist villages. IL was 
here, too, that I occasionally met with Seydu Idrissa, 
the spiritual head of the village reform movement. I was 
especially welcomed to pose questions to him concerning 
the 'correct' practice of the religion and was also able 
to observe such things as his style of preaching and worship 
of others towards him. 11ý Lhis as well as the behaviou k 
respect the lodge in Gao was an important supplement 
to 
observations made in Dar al-Salam. I was also able 
to 
not e the daily activities of the Idity and in setting 
residence close to the lodge I could occasionally receive 
visits from members of the movement away from the scrutiny 
of village leaders. 
14 
By centring my research in Cao it was possibie to dis- 
cover the differences between the moderate and radical Wahhabis 
and to pose the questions that arose from these differences. 
Leaders of the Moderate Wahhabiyya were not only able to provide 
information on their own activities and beliefs but were also 
acquainted with important f igures in the radical Wahhabiyya, 
having collaborated with them before community divisions took 
place. Moderate reformers who acted as executive members 
of the Association Malien pour I'Unit6 et le Progr6s de I'Islam 
were also able to furnish information on the political ambitions 
and activities of the leaders of the radical movement. 
With this combination of difficulties and opportunities 
in conducting field research it was not advisable to attempt 
to gather detailed information on a particular village or 
community. Rather, I have tried to make a virtue of necessity 
in presenting a wider picture, a broad consideration of the 
origins of the Wahhabiyya and its effects on traditional Songhay 
society. 
These limitations aside, there remains something to be 
gained from attempting to study a reformist community from 
an anthropological perspective. There has been, first. ot 
all, a tendency in the ethnographic literaLure on agricultural 
societies in West Africa to minimize the presence or lsl(: Im 
in favour of the 'original' anim; LSt religions and systems 
of cosmology. The sLudy of an Islamic reform mov(ýmerjt if, 
a rural settinq redresses this ethriograptlic imbalance, showing 
not only how Tslam has Progressed in rural Africa, but also 
how its presence has been underestimated or ignored by earlier 
15 
researchers. 
Secondly, in the literature which starts from a wider 
perspective, historians and other specialists in African Islam 
have usually stressed the importance of nomadic societies 
and the urban environment as settings which favour religious 
universalism, the countryside being considered unfavourable 
to the genesis of a 'Purified' faith. In the not too distant 
past this was essentially true but the case presented here 
of radical reform in the countryside is an exception to this 
pattern of Islamization; it therefore gives us the opportunity 
to consider how rural participation in Islamic reform developed 
as well as to evaluate some theoretical approaches to the 
development of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. 
I will now elaborate these two points in trying to outline 
some of the previous scholarship to which the present research 
relates. 
1) To those familiar with the ethnographic material on the 
Songhay a study of Islamic reform, as. practiced by 
them., may come as a surprise since past research has focused 
overwhelmingly upon their animist or semi-Islamic practices. 
Islam, while not completely ignored, is glossed over in the 
ethnography. Only in tracing the history of the empires of 
the 16th and 17th centuries does the literature on the Songhay 
convey an impression of the firm presence of Islam. 
The Songhay are not the only social group in French West 
Af . rica whose religion has been presented in a misleading 
fashion, 
- whose re Iigi on has been 
'myst ifi ed' - Two other societies 
among which Islamic reform has recently developed, 
the Dogon 
1, ý) 
and the Bambara, have been central to the development of French 
ethnography and have been presented in a way that makes the 
contemporary appearance of reformed Islam an astonishing social 
transformation. The neglect of the wider religious context 
in which Islam has for centuries had a central place, among 
the Songhay as among other social groups, can be linked to 
the objectives and methods of fieldwork conducted among 'ani- 
mist' societies which may be unfamiliar to those steeped in 
the traditions of British social anthropology and which may 
be usefully summarized here. 
In France during the late 1920', cý and eariy 30's the first 
efforts toward the implementation of formal anthropological 
fieldwork were under way, motivated by several important fac- 
tors The professional or academic reason stemmed from the 
poverty of field information collected by amateurs, usually 
colonial officials, missionaries or explorers. Durkheim, 
for example, was the victim of a division of IlCabouu between 
the ethnographic collector and the savant (how different his 
theories of primitive classification would have been if he 
had conducted his own fieldwork among the Australian Aborigen- 
ies! ) It was this situation that Mauss, Levy-BrUhl and Rivet 
tried to remedy in establishing, in 1925, the Intitut d'Ethno- 
logie, an institution whose central goal was, in RiveCs words: 
"de donrier aux futurs maitres de l'ethnologie Uoccasion de 
compl6ter leur apprentissage th6orique par une in i tiation 
practique qui seriit pour eux aussi d6cisive que 1'est LI (-I)f (, uve 
. 
du feu pour le soldat. " 
8 
Cited in Jamin, 1984: 21. 
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Field expeditions were also encouraged by popular senti- 
ment. Such a sentiment was clearly evident in the inauguration 
of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition of 1931. Organized by the 
Institut d'Ethnologie and the Musöum Natural d'Histoire Natur- 
elle, the Dakar-Djibouti expedition was the first and most 
ambitious project in the history of professional French ethno- 
graphy. The very title given the expedition, 'mission Dakar- 
Djibouti', gives some idea of its scope: to explore the geo- 
graphic, linguistic and ethnographic background of sub-Saharan 
Africa from coast to coast. Most of the funding for the expe- 
dition came from the French government, but a significant, 
and for us a more interesting, contribution was also made 
by Alfonso Brown, a world bantam weight boxing champion of 
Panamanian origin who organized and fought in a boxing gala, 
the proceeds of which were given to the Dakar-Djibouti expedi- 
tion. As Jamin 9 points out, this was a symbolic act which 
brings into relief the popular appeal of this and similar 
projects: the idea of 'roots' had taken form. Al Brown gave 
the proceeds of his boxing spectacle so that the world of 
his ancestors would be better known, so that his black friends 
would be better respected. 
10 On the eve of the gala, Marcel 
Griaule, the scientific and administrative director of the 
expedition expressed the popular objective of the mission 
in an article in Paris Soir: "rendre possible entre les peuples 
coloniaux et les peuples colonis6s grace A une connaissance 
meillure des mentalites de ces derniers. une collaboration 
. plus feconde, s'exercant sur un plan moins 
brutal en m6me 
9. Jamin, 1984: 8. 
10. ibid. 
I 
UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY 
CAMBRIDGE 
N 
18 
temps que plus rationnel. it 
11 
Besides paying lip service to the expedition's potential 
contribution to harmonious colonization, it seems that it 
was above all the anti-racist mission of bringing to light 
the complexity and elegance of 'primitive' thought that led 
Griaule to initiate and direct the expedition and later to 
spend the rest of his professional life studying the Dogon, 
a society early noted by explorers and administrators as pos- 
sessing a rich religion and mythology. The Dogon, for Griaule, 
represented a misunderstood people, unjustly labelled 'savage', 
an opinion which, he writes, "est partag6e par centains Noirs 
musulmans qui, intellectuelement, ne sont pas mieux outill6s 
que les Blancs pour apprecier ceux de leurs freres fid6les 
aux traditions ancestrales. Seuls, les fontionnaires qui 
ont assumö la lourde tache d'administrer ces hommes ont appris 
"12 ä leur aimer. 
Behind Griaule's great love for the Dogon, especially 
for their colourful rituals and myths, lies what has been 
perhaps the most important and most understandable motivation 
behind African ethnographic research: the awareness that 
the ancestral traditions were fast disappearing under the 
pressures of colonial rule. Dieterlen, for example, mentions 
in the preface to her famous study of Bambara religion the 
sad and oft-noted fact that "nous avons devant nous le dernier 
6tat de cette religion. .. 
" 13 
11. In Jamin, 1984: 9-10. 
12. Griaule, 1939: 18. 
13. Dieterlen, 1951: xvi. 
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Ethnographic research on the Songhay, as for other socie- 
ties in French West Africa, became an effort to record for 
posterity the customs and practices that were so fragile in 
the face of colonial rule. Rouch, in La religion et la magie 
Songhay, 14while acknowledging the strength of Islam in certain 
regions, sees it as essentially complementing the animist 
religion. He leaves aside discussion of the place of clerics, 
Quranic education and the Muslim brotherhoods in Songhay society 
and contents himself with scattered references to Islamic 
influence in the traditional religious complex. 
Boulnois and Hama in I'Empire de Gao 
15 
pay even less 
attention to Islam among the Songhay. Their goal appears 
to be to uncover that which is most ancient in the history 
and customs of the Songhay, to glimpse the unadulterated culture 
before, it is implied, the clues to the past are lost. 
With this concern over the disintegration of 'ancestral' 
societies in mind, it is significant that the first expeditions 
conducted in French West Africa were associated with museums, 
especially the Mus6e d'Ethnographie du Trocadero (which in 
1937 became the Mus6e de I'Homme). The Dakar-Djibouti expedi- 
tion, in its mission to preserve ancient customs for posterity, 
was marked by a strong emphasis on collection. Over 3,000 
objects were collected during the course of the Project, inclu- 
ding puppets, masks and dancing headresses, scultures, boxes, 
stools, musical instruments, etc; 3,000 photographs and 1,600 
meters of film were taken; altogether 70 cases, representing 
14. Rouch, 1960. 
15. Boulnois and Hama, 1954. 
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more than 5 tonnes of material were returned to the Musee 
d'Ethnologie du Trocad6ro. 16 The relevance of this drive 
to collect material objects lies in the relationship between 
this activity and 'non-material' ethnography. The enquiry 
into African mentality became not only anchored to things- 
take, for example Griaule's Masques Dogon which principally 
explores the symbolic significance of these captivating ob- 
jects--but exploration into purely mental constructions such 
as myths took on the air of a collection for presentation 
to the public. The inevitable preference for beautiful or 
interesting objects (this in spite of Revet's and RiviOre's 
injunction that "Pobject devait moins plaire que rensigner" 
17) 
was paralleled by a preference for descriptions of colourful 
social behaviout- and systems of thought. 
Returning to the ethnography of the Songhay, we see that 
even today this trend is not altogether absent. In a recent 
book, Gu6risseurs et magiciens du Sahel, 
18 Gibbal discusses 
with unconcealed regret the disappearance of some aspects 
of the traditional Songhay religion. The heading he gives 
to this discussion is 'Les cultes Songhay face ý I'Islam' . 
Here Islam is not simply ignored (consciously or otherwise), 
it has become the enemy--just as wind and sand are the enemies 
of the archaeologist--the agent responsible for the erosion 
of traditional culture. 
Islam is excluded from the subject matter ostensibly 
because it is not part of the archaic essence of the local 
faith. Islam is not picturesque and is not fragile; as a 
16. Griaule, 1932. 
17. In Jamin, 1984: 60. 
18. Gibbal, 1984. 
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world religion it can be studied in other contexts and is 
therefore not so rewarding a phenomenon as the archaic pagan 
cults with all their local colour and exuberance. Islam for 
the ethnographer is like granite for the prospector; it is 
grey and ubiquitous. 
Thus we find that the orientations and methods of ethno- 
graphy undertaken among 'ancestral' societies in French West 
Africa, especially that of the colonial period, resulted in 
a selectivity of material which acted in favour of what was 
perceived to be ancient, timeless, indicative of a highly 
developed indigenous culture and against the full consideration 
of Islam, a 'foreign' intrusion. 
We do have some idea, however, of how far this selectivity 
has kept us from appreciating the diverse cultural influences 
L9 
operating in West Africa at the turn of the century. Marty, 
in his exhaustive survey of the extent of allegiance to Islam 
and the level of learning accompanying it in French West Africa 
undertaken under the auspices of the newly established colonial 
government, gives us an idea of the strength of Islam in rural 
societies not long before the arrival of the first ethnographic 
expeditions. 
The Dogon, while very strongly attached to their tradi- 
tional religion, had earlier undergone forced conversion in 
several villages under pressure from the neighbouring Islamic 
strongholds of Macina and Bandiagara. Having returned to 
their animist practices after French 'pacification #, te Dogon 
in some areas were being faced with peaceful efforts at 
19. Marty, 1920. 
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proselytization, with minimal results, it is true, but never- 
theless a process that has rapidly accelerated during the 
course of this century. 20 
The Bambara, considered another bastion of paganism, 
principally because of their resistance to the jih3d of al-Hadi 
Umar Tall, had long demonstrated a receptivity to Islam-- 
in some areas more than in others. The Bambara of Issa ber 
are described by Marty as having submitted to Fulani domination 
and converted to Islam, though their faith was at the time 
'luke-warm' and not without some vestiges of traditional prac- 
tices. 
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Among the Songhay, as we shall see, the presence of Islam 
is far more clear since the histories of the Mali and Songhay 
empires are testimony to its development for over nine centur- 
ies. We thus find that those investigating the Songhay religion 
consistently sidestep the Cao area and concentrate their re- 
search on the region downstream from Ansongo or southwest 
in Hombori where traditional practices remain more intact. 
In taking Islamic reform as my subject matter I too will 
be guilty of stressing one aspect of Songhay religion, but 
this is an aspect which is found most clearly in a group of 
specific villagers whose inhabitants distinguish themselves 
from their 'non-Muslim' neighbours. In considering this 
group of reformers I hope to balance the ethnographic Picture 
of the Songhay and to at least partially account for the fact 
that this picture is rapidly changing in the direction of 
20. Marty, 1920: 
21. Ibid: 
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greater Islamization. 
2) We might also be led to doubt the probability of Islamic 
reform in the African rural. setting because of the ideas 
expressed in works with a wider scope, which try to encompass 
a broad spectrum of Islam and the social order in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Most writers with this ambition have concluded, 
and not without some justification, that the Muslim faith 
in West Africa flourishes principally in towns and amongst 
nomadic tribes, while agricultural societies either resist 
Islam completely or adopt it only superficially, giving equal 
or greater attention to 'traditional' practices. Islam is 
thus often seen as being more static and less fully entrenched 
in the village setting. 
Couilly 
22 
gives us just such a general overview of 
Wegt African Isl. am--though he unforgiveably overlooks its 
urban growth--based largely on race and environment. 'Les 
Noirs' (a term which seems to be used more as a social than 
a racial category, referring to sedentary rural inhabitants) 
are seen to be endowed with a spontaneous character: jovial, 
indolent, without ambition, etc. Islam does not spread easily 
among them because they are too closely attached to the routines 
and necessities of agricultural labour. Nomadism, on the 
other hand, suits both in social te-nR, -rament and environment 
the original conditions of the development of ISIdM in the 
Arab Peninsula. 
22. Gouilly, 1952. 
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Froelich gives a somewhat similar view of the problem 
based upon the attachment of the African mentality to animist 
beliefs. Islam is easily introduced into the animist setting 
because of "sa souplesse et. .. la facilite d'adaptation dont 
il fait preuve a I'C-gard des moeurs et de la mentalit6 n6gro- 
africaine., ' 23 But in adapting to the animist setting the 
unity of the faith is destroyed. 
I'Islam a 6te contamin6 par les croyances anciennes 
qu'il a toler6es et avec lesquelles il a compos6; 
il a vu ses principes juridiques alt6r6s par la 
persistance des coutumes pr6-islamiques et par 
le desir, conscient ou non, des populations noires 
de ne pas laisser 6touffer leur 6thique par un 
droit qui n'a. pas 6t6 conQu pour elles; enfin, 
il na pas pu imposer, sauf d'une faQon superficielle, 
la culure et la civilization orientale. 
24 
Trimingham gives us an explicit and more stimulating 
formulation ui the saitm: generaiization: 
Islam spreads easily among townspeople. It is 
a civilization and cannot establish itself sotidly 
without a strong foundation of urban life... Islam, 
therefore, makes immediate appeal to the urban 
irtind, individualistic arid wide-visioned, yet li. mited 
by the interests of market and workshop. Islam 
also appeals to the nomad mind. It has no hierarch- 
ic priestty system, its method of worship is simple 
and free. and it makes no far-reaching demands 
for change of outlook and mode of life. In ol. -. her 
words it is a layman's religion ... On the other 
hand, 
23. Froelich, 1962: 102. 
24. Ibid. 
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appeal to the - rural mind whose centripetal outlook 
turns essentially upon the tending of life, crops, 
livestock, and children, is correspondingly weak. 
The farmer's religion harmonizes exactly with the 
interests of his daily life. Islam has no natural 
substitute for this integrated structure and is 
only adopted voluntarily after a religious vacuum 
has been created. 25 
Trimingham's observation is sound, at least for the long period 
from the first development of Islam to the early part of this 
century, but his explanation of it is lacking, having ultimate 
recourse, like Couilly and Froelich, to the nebulous relation- 
ship between 'mind' and environment. 
Towns, as centres of commerce, learning and administration, 
as points of contact between people of widely varying origins, 
have certainly been centres of gravity in the development 
of Islam. The historical record also gives the Moorish, Fulani 
and Tuareg tribesmen a prominent place in the 19th century 
revivals of Islam while the Islamization of village dwellers 
was correspondingly weak. It is not useful, however, to seek 
an explanation for this cultural distribution of Islam in 
differences between the 'urban mind', the 'nomad mind' and 
the 'rural mind'. The use of the word 'mind' here presumably 
refers to a relationship between man and his environment in 
a very general sense. There is, however, no convincing reason 
why the seasonal rhythms of tending crops, livestock and child- 
ren should be a barrier to Muslim expansion and an encouragement 
to the preservaLion of animist cults. 
25. Trimingham, 1959: 25. 
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What is the origin and nature of the 'vacuum' necessary 
for the development of Islam among sedentary peoples) 
It is not as profitable to link a religious 'vacuum' to 
a crisis in the 'rural mind' as it is to consider the social 
conditions that lie behind religious change. If we approach 
Islamic expansion and puritan reform as phenomena that 
are introduced and sustained by social arrangements we 
must look for a 'social vacuum'--for pressures and crises 
that encourage or accompany changes in the social order-- 
rather than an exclusively religious or ideological one. 
The social conditions behind the development of Islam 
26 in sub-Saharan Africa are considered more fully by Lewis.. 
and in doing so he is led to question the viability of 
a distinction between politically centralized and decentral- 
ized societies in terms of their acceptance or rejection 
of Islam. Lewis acknowledges that in West Africa "the 
history of Muslim penetration and expansion is, by and 
large, the story of the action and attitude toward Is'lam 
assumed by the rulers of the centralized or relatively 
centralized states.,, 
27 There is at the same time "a marked 
lack of response to Muslim influence evinced by uncentralized 
agricultural tribes in the interior of Guinea and the Ivory 
Coast. t, 28 However, taking a wider range of examples- 
the Muslim Somali, the Muslim Gaila and a number of Islamized 
yet decentralized peoples in Eritria and the eastern Sudan-- 
we are forced to conclude that "... the distinction between 
centralized and uncentralized traditional political systems 
26. Lewis, 1966. 
27. Ibid, P. 32. 
28. lbid, P. 33. 
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is not one which is crucial for the diffusion of ! slam., ' 29 
Lewis considers, through comparison between a wide 
range of African societies and instil %, utions, the compat 
bility between Tslam and 'traditional' social systems in 
order to explain, not whether Islam will or will not be 
influential in particular societies, but rather in what direc- 
tions Islam will evolve once it has gained a foothold. This 
element of compItibility is examined in terms of the relation 
between Islam and tribal politics, between Islamic law and 
customary law and between Islam and traditional belief and 
ritual. 
'Faking TSIam and tribal politics as an example. Lewis 
concludes that selected features of Islam are readily assimi- 
lated in tribal societies lacking any single font of politi- 
I cal author;,. Ly for it serves to buttress "traditional senti- 
ments of ethnic exclusiveness and superiority. "')0 Such 
societies of ten emphasize the outward aspects of Islam, the 
'five pillars', while rejecting the minutae of Islamic Ic1w. 
It is in state societies, on the other hand, where the detailed 
prescriptions and proscriptions of the Shari'a are more often 
acceptable and in such conditions "as the process of 1slami- 
zation gathers force and momentum there should develop a 
selective bias toward the application of the more 
formally 
31 
legalistic elements of Muslim Law. ", 
Lewis describes a process of Islamization in which tribes- 
29. Lewis, 1966: 33. 
30. lbid: 34. 
31. Ibid: 34-35. 
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men and state societies are the main carriers of Tslam but 
the possibility of fervent belief among agricultural peoples 
is never excluded. There is in his analysis of the social 
conditions which effect the direction of Muslim expansion 
more room than vie f ind in most other analyses to accomodate 
the development of puritan Islamic reform in a rural agri- 
cultural setting. 'The changes introduced by colonial govern- 
ments and the independent nation states have a central. place. 
in Lewis' overview of African Islam, thereby giving more 
weight to the argument that modern African Islam is in a 
process of change, of adaptation to the imposition of western 
ideas, technology and institutions. 
32 
It is under the impact of such changes that a 'puritan' 
interpretation of Islam, once more common in states or cities 
and in the simplified religion of the tribal brotherhoods, 
has recently developed in rural African society. Given the 
historical predominance of reform in urban centres and among 
nomadic groups, t%.. he problem which lies behind the present 
investigation is, briefly, to determine why radical Islamic 
reform has developed in an agricultural society which, until 
recently, has been portrayed as having a vital system of' 
animist worship and only a peripheral adherence to Islam, 
while an urban reform group in the same region has expressed 
a more moderate approach to religious change. Mthough 
Songhay Islam has developed into radical reform only within 
the past several decades, it is important to ask in addition 
32. This aspect of Lewis' arqument is discussed more fully, 
below: P. 72. 
J 
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what factors have enabled the movement to survive in the 
face of opposition from the majority of the Songhay population 
and restrictions imposed by the Malian government. 
T THE SETTING 
The Wahhabiyya in Gao, besides being part of an inter- 
national movement, att least in terms of the communication 
of religious ideas, has both an urban and a rural appeal 
and is set, within economic and political systems that must 
be considered, together with the specifical. ly religious 
issues, in order for a complete picture of the social forces 
affecting the reform movement to be presented. Before one 
can fulL "y understand the advent of Wahhabism in the SonghaY 
mi. Lieu, therefore. it is first necessary to examine the wider 
physical and social geography in which the reform movement 
emerged. 
In outlining the rural and urban setting of the Gao 
region, ecological marginality and isolation stand out as 
features which must have a bearing on any explanation of 
the local reform movementý. As we shall see in more detail 
below, Wahhabism in the rural surrounds of Gao developed 
most quickly, and in a rigid 'radical' direct-lion, during 
the period corresponding with the 1973-74 drought and. less 
dramatically, during the preceeding years of poor harvest. 
It is possible that this is an historical coincidence 
but 
we are nevert-he less 'Left with the suggestion that 
drought 
and its consequent hardship had some place 
in the acceptance 
of reform. How, more precisely, might this 
have occurred? 
Barkun, I if we follow the general direction of 
*. 7- arqu- 
ments in his analý, sis of disaster and millenarian movements, 
1. Barkun, 1974. 
30 
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would suggest that rural life during extreme hardship suffers 
an acceleration of the disintegration of old values, that 
the 'collective stress experience' enhances suggestibility. 
that in response to this situation religious extremism conso- 
lidates community solidarity and facilitates the break with 
the past. This view which gives disaster 
2a 
very important 
place in a wide range of religious and totalitarian movements, 
fails to take into account both the importance of social 
responses to the 'stress experience' and their wide variations. 
it describes 'irrational' religious behaviour as a social- 
psychological insanity without explaining in any detail the 
actual sociological bases of the religious response to 
'disaster 0. 
The ý-. Aew to be taken in this study is that economic 
marginality may be rel-evant for the account of Islamic reform 
in two ways: firstly, environmental disaster was used by 
reformists ( and by more Islamized traditionalists) as a 
reason for abandoning the worship of local deities, showing 
them to be ineffectual in assuring prosperity. Drought was 
probably not a direct reason for the development of reformism. 
Similar hardship had occurred before and during colonialism 
without a corresponding 'purification' of Islam. 
Rather, 
drought was used by reformists as a proof of God's omnipotence, 
as a reinforcement of their religious convictions. 
2. In order to accomodate the wide variety of settings 
in 
which millenarian movements can occur, Barkun 
is forced fto 
adopt an extremely vague definition of 
'disaster': it a severe, 
relatively sudden, and 
frequently unexpected disruption of 
normal structural arrangements within a social system 
or 
subsystem resulting from a 
force 'natural' or 'social', 'inter- 
nal' to a system or 'external' 
to it over which the system 
has no firm 'control' is (Sjoberg cited 
in Barkun, 1974: 51). 
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Secondly. economic hardship was part of a situation 
in which Islamic reform could act as a social network of 
support in ameliorating the effects of this crisis. It is 
important to consider the drought in so far as it enhanced 
the organizational appeal of the Wahhabiyya. 
A similar justification could be made for underlininq 
the significance of geographical and political isolation. 
Gao's distance from trade centres and the administrative 
capital and the difficulties of transport to the reqion combine 
with ecological marginality to create a situation marked 
by a lack of local integration into national politics. This 
absence of integration is associated with the development 
of political dissatisfaction which lacks an effective outlet 
in practical action. In describing these elements of isola- 
tion the way is prepared for later discussion of the political 
implications of the reform movement. 
The rural setting. 
Cao and its sur. rounding villages are situatled on the 
eastern portion of the Niger bend on one of the northernmost 
latitudes of the Sahel in which aqriculture is Possible 
(161 16'). The fertile ribbon of ýhe Niger River is the 
source of livelihood for most of the sedentary Peoples in 
the area. Having its source in the hills or Futa Jallon, 
the Niger feeds the basin of the Mopti region before running 
into a single channel south of Timbuktu, which reaches 
just 
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below the Sahara, then turns south, eventually reaching 
the coast in Nigeria. 
Agriculture is mainly limited to the soils of the Niger 
floodplain. The river in the Gao area is surrounded by 
plains of sub-desert steppe which, in ordinary circumstances, 
are suitable for livestock. Here, when rains are p. 1entiful, 
there are abundant pastures which make cattle raising the 
principal economic activity. Further north, towards the 
desert, cattle cannot survive and the nomads are limited 
to camels and goats. 
The combination of environments suitable for sedentary 
agriculture and transhumance has greatly affected the region's 
history and has contributed to its ethnic diversity. The 
population is roughly 50 per-cent sedentary and 50 per- 
cent nomadic or semi-nomadic. 
3, rhe main ethnic groups in 
the countryside are: Tuareg (including the Bella), Moors, 
Fulani, and Songhay. 
The Tuareg are the largest nomadic group in the Gao 
area, inhabiting both the arid regions north of the Niger 
bend and the Gourma--the region in the berid's interior. 
They are primarily cattle herders, but in the Saharan waste- 
land they become camel nomads. In social structure they 
are loosely grouped into federations of tribes under a nominal 
3. A survey done by the colonial administration in March, 
1956 for the population of the cercle of Gao shows the fol- 
lowing: Songhay and Armahs, 44.2 %; Tuaregs and Bellas, 
40.4 %; Moors, 8.5 %; Fulani, 5.0 %; other, 1.5 %; 'E, uropeans. 
0.3 % (office of the Commandant de Cercle, Gao). 
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chief (amenoka). A class system divides the tribes into groups 
of nobles (imoshar), pastoralist vassals (imqh5d) and clerical 
clans (ineslemen, meaning 'Muslim') as well as artisan castes. 
The ineslemen are similar in their way of life to other Tuareg 
except that their status has traditionally been one of social 
inferiors and they do not bear arms. 
4 The Bella were formerly 
a slave caste of the Tuareg. Their 'manumission' under French 
colonial rule in the 1930's was accompanied by a great deal 
of confusion and conflict about livestock ownership. Today 
they are independent herders. 
The Moors, another nomadic group, are a minority in the 
Cao area, but they warrant consideration because of their import- 
ance in the development of Islam in the Sudan, particularly 
in the 19th century. Ilost of them beLong to the Kunta tribe, 
the origins of which are in the western Sahara. The ýassaniyya 
dialect of Arabic is spoken by most Moors, but they are not 
socially homogeneous, having various combinations of Berber, 
Arab and Negro ancestry; and, like the Tuareg, they have a 
complex, hierarchical social organization. At the top is the 
noble, warrior class of relatively pure Arabs. The zwaya clerical 
tribes are tributary to Arab classes, tending herds for them 
but remaining nevertheless aristocratic grc)ups. Lower in the 
hierarchy are the zanaia, or Berber tributaries who traditionally 
5 
paid the Arabs 'feudal' dues. 
The Kunta were a key group in the introduction of the 
4. Trimirigham, 1959: 11. Also see Ibrris, 1975. 
5. Trimingham, 1959: 135-36. 
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Qadiriyya brotherhood (tariqa) in 16th century West Atfrica 
through the efforts of Sidi 'Umar al-Bakai (d. 1553). They 
also had a central place in the revivals of the Qadirivya in 
West Africa during the late 18th and early 19th centuries and 
developed a high levej of jurisprudential scholarship. The 
revivals of the brotherhood were -Iarqely inspired by the Kunta 
jurists Sidi al-Mukhtar (d. 1811) and Shailkh Sidiyya al-Kabir 
(d. 1868). With their close links with the Berber and Arab 
traditions of North Africa, Kunta iuýts are largely responsible 
for the dominance of Maghribi influence throughout West Africa. 6 
The Fulani are composed of diverse groups which share 
a common language. The majority of Fulani are sedentary agri- 
culturalists, while the remainder are lighter-skinned pastoral- 
ists. The major settlement of Fulani in the Cao area is f-ound 
between Cao and Ansongo, in a group of villages caiied Gabero. 
The inhabitants pr,, -)bably came to the region at the time of 
Usman dan Fodio's iih5d, or 'holy war', as a spLn-off from 
the central area of conflict which lay to the southeast. As 
Trimingham points out, the association between holy war and 
Fulani settlement has happened elsewhere. 
The day comes when a Negro Puto cleric proclaims 
* iih5d. They rise, overwhelm the pagans and Cound 
* state.. . As a result of 
Lhis reversal of fortune 
the leaders of the jih: jd become an aristocracy, and 
4 
the conquered Negroes fall into varLOUS social strata. 
Settled Fulbe become negroid arid acquire new social 
attitudes dnd economic values centred on agriculture 
though continuing to manifest ethno-religious pride. 
6. Cf. Stewart, 1973. 
7. Trimingham, 1959: 12. 
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In the Gabero area, clerical families and traders belong 
to the nobility, while former slaves and tributary groups 
comprise the larger body of agriculturalists and herders. 
The Songhay are a sedentary people who occupy the Niger 
River area from Jenne to northern Nigeria. Approximately 
100 km south of Gao, the Songhay culture changes, both in 
language and in customs, into a sub-group known as the Zerma. 
In northern Nigeria and Dahomey the Dendi form another sub- 
group. 
Although fully integrated into the Malian state, Songhay 
villages in the Gao area are politically and economically 
largely independent from one another. As will be seen in 
more detail below, chiefs are the most important viiiage 
leaders. They are often members of the Armah nobility, 
a social class that claims descent from the Moroccan invaders 
of the Songhay empire in the 16th century. They exercise 
power as local representatives of the state, particularly 
the Ministe-re de l'Int6rieur. Chiefs are elected on the 
basis of the support given to them by village elders who 
represent the political alignments of village 
families. The 
candidate for the chiefdom who has the support of elders 
representing the majority of adult village members 
is suc- 
cessful in the elections. Candidates are usually cl. hosen 
from amongst those men who can trace their 
descent from 
a previous chief or important village 
leader, although the 
candidature is officially open. 
Thus, the chief usually 
represents the conservative element 
in Songhay society. His 
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obligations as intermediary between the village and the 
state includes settlement of land disputes, the maintenance 
of census information, and tax collection. 8 The Songhay 
Muslim cleric, or alfa, does not usually hold an important 
political place in the village. He is above all the teacher 
of rote Quranic learning, a manufacturer of amulets, a ritual 
functionary.. and occasionally a settler of domestic disputes. 
9- 
In years of plentiful rain, the economy of the Songhay 
centres upon the staple crops of millet and sorghum and 
is sometimes supplemented by rice and vegetable gardens. 
Fishing and animal husbandry are also significant productive 
activities in most villages. 
The agricultural syste4o is regulated by two major 
seasonal cycles: the alternation of the dry season and 
the rainy season as well as the rising and falling of the 
river. Rains usually begin in June, reach their peak in 
July and taper off in August. From October to February 
(during a 'cool' season) the river rises, and from March 
to April the river recedes. 
When the first rains come, sorghum is planted on the 
higher ground that is first exposed by the 
lowering of the 
river, and millet and sorghum are planted on 
land not i-eached 
by the river. The main agricultural season usually ends 
8. See below, pp. 179-184 
9. See below, pp. 80-', -15 
- 14-24 provides an account 10. Olivier de Sardan, 1969: 
of the agricultural system of the 
Wogo of Niger. In terms 
of labour organization and the 
level of productivity, however, 
the Wogo are not a typical Songhay group. 
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at the beginning of the cool season with the harvest of 
mi I let. 
Drought has devastated this system of millet monoculture 
and has increased reliance on the otherwise supplementary 
crops of rice and vegetables. Rice is usually planted as 
the river recedes on the same land which earlier produced 
the sorghum crop. It requires a high river level for the 
sustained period of irrigation necessary for the crop to 
mature. In 1984-85 the water level was abnormally low and 
little rice was planted. Of that, most was cut down, unma- 
tured, for animal fodder. 
In villages located near the market towns of Bourem, 
Gao and Ansongo, gardens are both a minor source of income 
and a supplement to an otherwise undiversified diet. Most 
garden vegetables, such as carrots and lettuce, probably 
came from the French, while other products, such as hot 
peppers, a widely used spilce, were in use much longer and 
came from North Africa. Women traditionally participate 
more in gardening than in other agricultural labour, and the 
selling of vegetables in the markets is the exclusive occupa- 
tion of women. The usual items planted are lettuce, tomatoes, 
carrots, and melons. Gardens are most frequently planted 
near the high water mark of the river and are manually irri- 
gated when water is easily obtainable. 
Prior to colonization a socially exclusive Sonqhay 
group, the Sorko, lived mainly 
by huntinq hippopotami, croco- 
diles, and aligators. Their exclusiveness was not 
based 
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solely on economic activity; they lived seperately from 
other Songhay villages and held a special r-eputation as 
Ma. gicians, being considered specialists in ritual communica- 
tion with Dongo, the god of thunder and lightning. Irre- 
sponsible hunting by Europeans undermined the economic founda- 
tion of the Sorko; the hunting of hippopotami has been out- 
lawed ever since a ban by the French administration. Most 
Sorko have since become agriculturalists. 11 The Sorko are 
sometimes referred to as 'fishermen', but only occasionally 
would they harpoon fish. Today fishing is not a specialized 
activity among the Songhay; and a variety of methods, such 
as lines, nets and traps, are used in most river villages. 
Cattle are imporLant in many villages as a source of 
milk, meat and income. Sometimes they are loaned to Fulani 
herdsmen to maintain. i'llore commonly they are herded by 
older children during the rainy season when pasture is avail- 
able arid are kept in vil'Lage compounds or in larger herds 
near the viilage in the dry season when grasses must be 
cut an brought to them. 
The traditional productive system of the Songhay in 
the Gao reg on is extremely fragile. Large hydraulic systems 
do not exist. Subsistence depends ultimately upon the success 
or failure or' the millet crop and this in turn 
depends upon 
the extent and regularity of the rains. 
11. Rouch, 1954: 23. 
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Climactic disaster is therefore an ever-present possibi- 
lity. Famines, both local and widespread, have been a common 
occurrence and a major source of mortality. The St--dan in 
general has undergone an irregular pattern of feast and 
famine which can be summarized as follows: 
1880-1890: 
1881-1900: 
1901-1910: 
1911-1.914: 
1915-1927: 
1928-1930: 
1931-1939: 
1940-1943: 
1944-1960: 
1961-1967: 
1968- 1975: 
1976-1982: 
1983-1986: 
drought 
high rainfall 
uneven rainfall 
severe drought 
regional high rainfall 
drought 
regional high rainfall 
drought 
high rainfall 
uneven rainfall 
severe drouqht 
uneven rainfal 
severe drought. 
Before the colonial et-a the response to drought was 
retrenchment in the villages and an exploitation of whatever 
resources were available. With the peace established by 
submission to the colonial powers, migration became a more 
common alternative strategy for men. The first major wave 
of migration to the coastal towns took Place during the 
drought of 1911-14.13ý Younger men have, since the beginning 
of the colonial era, migrated to Lhe coastdL towns in pursuit 
of prestige and adventure. In times of hardship these voyages 
became more of an economic necessity. 
14 
12. Based on Callais, 1977: 227. 
13. Sidikou, 1977: 153. 
14. Migration is discussed further below, pp. i03-112 and 206- 
2-1--1 
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The past two decades in the region of Gao, as in the 
rest of the Sahel, have been characterized by urieven rainfall 
and drought. The occurrence of two major droughts within ten 
years suggests that the Sahel is undergoing an unprecedented 
environmental deterioration. 
Besides the grim toll on human and animal life, one of 
the most dramatic consequences of the lack of rain is the 
frequence with which 'black' storms sweep in from the desert. 
'These storms, which bring no rain, completely block out 
daylight for 15 to 30 minutes; then, as the fine dust clears, 
the sky turns red, then orange and finally the pale yellow 
of a normal dusty wind. These dense sand storms are rare, 
occurring only in times of severe drought. One or two such 
storms occurred in 1974, but in 1984 there were five. The 
first storm in the rainy season of 1984 brought with it 
a wave of near panic, both in the villages and in Gao. but 
after the second or third time prople were less fearful 
and young men sometimes affected an unconcern and could 
be seen standing casually outside in the orange haze as 
the storm dispersed. 
In the villages, two successive years of little rain in 
1983-85 meant the complete failure of cereal crops upon v., hich 
they depended for subsistence. For, the Sonqhay who did 
not migrate, this meant a heavy reliance on food aid brouqht. 
north from Bamako and the coastal cities. Most 1 ivest-o,: * 
were butchered or sold and an effort was made in mo-; t tu-eas 
close to the river to plant vegetables during the short 
gr-owing season. Even with these efforts there were many 
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deaths from hunger and sickness as the dry season progressed, 
especially among infants, young children and the elderly. 
The villages surrounding Cao are linked to the urban 
economy -in a number of ways, linkages which have increased 
in importance with recent droughts. Produce can be sold 
in the markets for cash which can then eventually buy such 
necessities as agricultural implements, utensils and grain. 
Crafts, using readily avail-able materials, are another source 
of cash. Village women weave large straw mats and fans 
for which there is a great demand. Many of the mats Found 
in the Cao markets are made by Wahhabj- village women and 
are sold by the men. Due to the restrictions imposed on 
Wahhabi women in terms of labour outside the home, one of 
their only ways of contributing to the family income comes 
from working on such crafts. 
One of the mainstays of both the rural arid urban econo- 
mies has been the livestock trade. Before the drought ill 
the early 1970's, which decimated the region's herds with 
at least 80% mortality, cattle were sold in Gao's livestock 
market and trucked to the coastal countries, especially 
Nigeria and Chana, where environmental conditions prevent 
livestock production. With drought and trade restrictions 
imposed by the Nigerian government, the price of cattle 
fell dramatically; a cow selling for 150,000 francs CFA in 
pre-drought times later sold for 5,000 to 7,000 CFA. 
In 1983-85 the nomadic groups established larqe camps 
on the outskirts of Gao where they 
have been dependent upon 
, 15 
emergency aid. While transportation has improved with the 
construction of a new 'drought road' from Mopti to Cao, 
many trucks carrying emergency aid were unable to cross 
the river at the small ferry south of Gao and were forced to 
take the circuitous and hazardous route along the northern 
part of the Niger bend. The food aid reaching the camps and 
many of the drought stricken villages was insufficient and 
mortality in the refugee population was high. 
Another important feature of Gao's countryside is its 
political marginality. The nomadic groups, fiercely proud 
of their ethnicity and their sherifian ancestry, consider them- 
selves superior to the black administrators from the south 
who came to dominate them through a set of historical circum- 
stances that they do not fully acknowledge. In 1963 the 
Malian government tried to settle the nomads in villages, an 
action that sparked a revolt amongst the Tuareg of the Adrar 
des Iforas, the desert region north of Gao. Troops were 
sent from Bamako to suppress the revolt and order was restored 
only when the Tuareg found that they could escape accross 
the Algerian border, well into the inhospitable desert. 
1[j 
Mali's present government, which took power in 1968, has 
had less trouble with the nomads, largely because the drought 
has limited their mobility and strength. This government 
has been accused of profiting from the drought situation to 
bring the nomads under political control by limiLiing the 
distribution of international aid which had been given for 
15. de Lusicinan, 1969: 2-15. 
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16 
their benefit. 
The Songhay, a sedentary and unwarlike people, are more 
easily controlled by the state, but to some extent they 
share the mistrust shown by the nomads and do not always 
place their sympathies with the state leadership from the 
south. Domination is perhaps the best word to describe 
the mechanism for establishing political stability in the 
Gao region. 
it is only through comparison with other regions of 
Mali that the political and economic positions of Gao can 
be appreciated. In order to illustrate the specific place 
of the northern regions, Gao and Timbuktu, in relation to 
the rest of Mali, i will summarize the state administrative 
structure of -the country. 
On the national level Mali is poor, with international 
trade limited by its landlocked position in the Sahel. 
Foreign policy is opportunistic, with France. the L)'nited 
States, China, the USSR and, more significantly from our 
point of view, Saudi Arabia, being the more important states 
contributing to Mali's 'development'. Saudi petrodollars, 
while not a mainstay of the Malian economy, have been accom- 
panied by diplomatic and cultural ties between donor and 
benef iciary. 
At the same time as it depends upon apparently incom- 
patable sources of aid, the Malian government struggles 
tomaintain its independence and intecirity. Its close allies 
have had little opportunity to determine Mali's Politicdl 
Decraene, 1980: 8-5. 
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structure or policies. The Marxist-Leninist inspired regime 
led by Modibo Kieta, Mali's first independent government 
which came to power in 1960, was anxious to lead the country 
into complete independence, not just political independence, 
from the wealthy 'colonial' powers. This regime was control- 
led by a highly centralized one-party system with power 
concentrated at the top, in the hands of the president and 
his cabinet. This government's economic policies, such 
as the creation of the Malian franc and its separation from 
the French franc zone, were the main source of political 
instability which led to the military coup in 1968. Serious 
economic difficulties led, in 1967, to a 50 % devaluation 
of the Malian franc in response to a national debt of seven 
billion Malian francs. Despite French and other international 
financial intervention, an economic and political malaise 
had made the government unstable. 17 
The government, led by Moussa Traore, which took power 
in 1968, remains in place. In 1974, after six years of 
military rule, a new constitution was implemented which 
re-established a one-party sv-stem but which forbade partici- 
pation in the government of any former members of the previous 
regime; and in spite of reforms to the one-party system, 
such as the creation of the Union Democratique du Pe. uple 
Malien (UDPM) in 1979, power rema-*Lns largely in the hands 
of the military. The administrative structure, dominated 
hv the military, with its hierarchy of reqional governors, 
17. Decraene, 1980: 71. 
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commandants de cercle, and local chiefs, is, in practical 
terms, the most important decision-making body. 
This administrative structure is organized in 11-he form 
of a national division into seven administrative regions: 
18 
1. Kayes, 2. Bamako, 3. Sikasso, 4. Segou, 5. Mopti., 6. 
Timbuktu, and 7. Gao (see map, P. 3-3). Each of th(ýsv_, regions 
has at its head a governor who is concerned with its economic 
and administrative functions. The regions are subdivided 
into cercles (administrated by a commandant de cercle), 
arrondissements and, the smallest political units, villages. 
Nomadic populations, in place of arrondissements and villages, 
are structured into tribes and fractions. 
When we consider the land mass of the seven reqions 
as well as their population distribution we see that the 
norther regions, Cao and Timbuktu, are possessed of vast 
territories with low population density (see table I, P-49 )- 
These two regions are alone -in Mali in adminisLrating large 
tracts of desert wasteland. 
This large proportion of non-arable land is refiected 
in the measured volume of agricultural production for the 
staple food crops, millet, sorghum and rice (table 2, P-49 )- 
These production f igures show that, although nomadic groups 
bear the brunt of climactic disaster, agriculture is also 
badly affected by poor rain and even in good years remains 
marginal. The near-equal balance in the northern regions 
18. On 12 July, 1977 a government ordonance reorganized the 
administrative division of Mali by splitting the 
immense 
region of Gao into two parts, giving Timbuktu the status 
of the 6th region (adding to it the cercle Of Niafunk6 which 
until then belonged to the 5th region). The new 
7th region, 
Gao, consists of the cercles of Ansongo, Bourem, Cao, 
Kidal 
and MinnAkIA (A, Marty, 1985: 107). 
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Region Surface Area Population 
Km 2 50, no. of inhabitants 
Kayes 119,813 9.7 738,202 14.4 
Bamako 90,100 7.3 958, '76 7 18.8 
Sikasso 76,480 6.2 948,513 18.6 
Segou 56,127 4.5 842,827 16.5 
Mopti 88,752 7.1 1012,780 19.8 
Cao 808,920 65.2 606,667 11.9 
Table 1. Surface area and population of administrative reqions. 
(source: Marty, 1985: 86, after DRPS, Gao: Annuaires statisti- 
ques, 1974,1975 arid 1977, p. 30. ) 
Millet and Sorghum Rice 
Region 
Sikasso 
Bamako 
Segou 
Kayes 
Mopti 
Gao 
1966-67 
1971-7ý 1972-731 
. 
1966-67 1971-72 1972-1, J 
138,864 220,000 1.60,000 23,650 12,500 15,000 
194,724 180,500 160,000 1: 5,209 5,5,, ) 0 1,410 
1,18,887 139,000 104,000 68,996 40,000 -- 
89,120 41,000 il, 000 5,546 630 10 0 
139,968 195,000 kM, 000 24,694 115,500 9,000 
57,800 20,000 20,355 11,100 -- 
Table 2 Production in tonnes by region in Mali. 
(Source: Callais, 1977, after Rapport deinitif le 1'enquete 
aqricole 1966-67. Republique du Mali. Service de la SLatistique. ) 
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between nomadic and sedentary Populations is accompanied 
by an economic division between reliance upon livestock 
and reliance upon agriculture. In the 'Aace of environmental 
disaster nomadism is most drastically effected--high livestock 
mortality dramatically diminishes economic viability- 
19 
Agricultural production, however, shares much of this economic 
marginality since, even in the best of years, production 
of staple crops barely meets the needs of the village popula- 
tion. It is because0f this agricultural poverty that the 
regions of Cao and Timbuktu have been exempted from taxes 
imposed by the state company Office du Produits Aqricoles 
du Mali (OPAM), a fact which in itself testifies to the 
20 
extreme indigence of the northern regions. 
The urban setting. 
Gao was largely built under French rule and the restilts 
of European expertise are wide streets constructed on a 
grid pattern similar to many modern towns. These sandy 
streets are often flanked on either side by crumbling walls 
and flat-roofed houses which deteriorate and need repair 
after every season's rain. Gao has none of Timbuktu's ancient-, 
narrow, labyrinthine streets and corridors and it therefore 
has less appeal to the tourist, less 'mystery'. 
Timbuktu has been fabled, not soley for its place as 
a centre of Muslim Learning- -cities equally and more 
developed 
19.90% of those lodged in emergency centres in Gao 
in 1973 
and 74 were nomads (Marty, 
1985: 107) 
20. Ibid: 305 
k 
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in terms of Islamic culture are found in North Africa- 
but rather for the fact that this place of learning is located 
in such an isolated and inhospitable region. Cao is far 
less noted for its Islamic scholarship, thouqh it is con- 
sidered by those further on the margins of Islam as a strong- 
hold of the faith. However, it shares with Timbuktu a desert 
or semi-desert setting and a similar position of physical 
isolation. As an entrep6t between North Africa and the 
West African Savanna, Cao is situated at a d;. -stance 
from 
the administrative centres of both regions. 
Geographical isolation seems to have had some effect 
upon Gao's cultural makeup, acting, at least to some extent, 
as a barrier to the penetration of f westernism'. The ii-ihabi- 
tants of Gao, for example, prPfer by an overwhelming majority 
tjý, A. Ltional to western dress, the latter being status -enhanc i ng 
only for young men. It is still frowned upon for women 
to appear in the streets wearing 'short', western-stvie 
clothes in place of the traditional 'bou-bou' or the wrap- 
around skirt. 
In spite of this ge. nerdl conservativism, elements of 
western culture have a wide appeal. Football has a remark- 
able popularity and qaines on the town's large sports field 
are attended by enthusiastic crowds. The town's cinema, 
when functioning, usually shows karate films or [ndian romance 
films, while for wealthy families video machines are operated 
by gas-powered generators. Radios and casette players proli- 
ferate. 'Youth culture I has found a definite place in Gao 
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despite the town's economic and political marginality; and 
it is this trend in the contemporary urban society that the 
Wahhabis in the countryside find especially offensive. 
Gao has undergone a very rapid rate of growth over the 
past decades, largely because of economic deprivation in 
the countryside. In the early 1960's the population was 
roughly 10,000. In 1980 a government census showed a popuia- 
tion of 37,000.21 This has since increased by an influx 
of about 15,000 refugees. 
This growth in population has occurred at the same time 
as many of the municipal services have declined. Electricity 
over the past decade has gradually become irrequldr until, 
in 1984, it was available only to administrative buildings. 
Garbage was rarely collected and lay in ever-growing piles 
beside some of the wider secondary streets where it was browsed 
through by children and goats. 
Cao-city's POPUlation is mainly Songhay, but, as else- 
where in West Africa, all ethnic groups of the countryside 
are found in increasinq numbers in the urban environment. 
In Cao there are 'foreign' populations of Arabs from Algeria 
as well as Bambara and other groups from the south. The 
Arabs are mainly independent entrepreneurs who use Cao as 
a base for trade between Algeria and cities of the savannah 
region to the south. This Arab minority is a possible channel 
for cultural influence from North Africa. Such inf Wence, 
21. Information provided by the Mairie of Gao. 
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however, is lessened by the fact that the Arabs keep their 
contact with the black population to a minimum. 
Though the volume of trade in Gao appears to be compara- 
tively light (an accurate measure is impossible due to the 
extent of black marketeering) its position ol, the northern 
frontier of black Africa gives it a great deal of economic 
diversity. Trade links exist with Algeria through the trans- 
Saharan route, with the coastal countries, and with the 
capital city, Bamako. In trans-Saharan trade, the principal 
activities are exporting sheep and importing dates. rhe 
southern coastal cities, being the avenue for commodities 
from all over the world, are sources for trade in numerous 
luxury goods manufactured in the west as well as canned 
food and grain. With the near completion of the road linking 
Gao with Mopti and Bamako, trade has begun to increase in 
this direction. A journey which once required four days 
to a week of hard driving can now be made in two days with 
less risk of dama(;. e to vehicles and their contents. When 
the river is high Passenger boats travel from Bamako to 
Cao, a journey taking about two weeks. These boats also 
carry carqo, especially fruit, and every year in October 
the arrival of the first boat is anxiously awaited. 
The most profitable Lrade activities are undertaken 
by wealthy traders who can afford to buy both commodities 
in bulk and the trucks to transport them in. Many goods are 
also transported in buik by SOMIEX, the government co-oper- 
ative. The original supply of goods 
in the town Provides for 
a large number of secondary traders: shopkeepers 
'For whom 
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buying and selling in small quantities is a major source 
of income, 'tabliers' who sell cheap goods such as cigarettes, 
dates, sugar, powdered milk, etc. in their own neiqhbourhoods, 
as well as petty traders in the markets who deal in almost 
every small item available. In spite of busv markets and 
the visibility of independent trade, avenues for wealth 
in Cao are very limited. Most of those active in the markets 
are supplementing the family income and the genuine 'grand 
cornmerQant' is a rarity. 
Another source of livelihood in the urban setting is 
derived from employment in Mali's vast public sector, the 
city being the capital of a large administrative region. 
Public sector employment provides a measurp of s, -curity, 
often not so much from the salary, which is smalt arid often 
arrives irregularly, as from the opportunity of qaininq 
'extra' money from clients who are in a hurry or need special 
favours. Not every job provides such opportunities. Teaching 
is a less desireable occupation in this respect while the 
jobs mostin demand are those in the customs office. Isolation 
and difficult living conditions make Gao an undesireable 
place to work and some civil servants from the southern 
towns who are in disfavour with the central administration 
are sent to the region as a form of semi-exile. 
Physical removal from administrative and cultural centres, 
difficulty of transport, e,,, onomic marginality punctuated 
by upheavals of environment, il and economic disaster, all 
contribute political 
inferiority in to Gao s situation ol 
comparison with other administrative regions of 
Mali. This 
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marginality is expressed both in the minimal revenue the 
region brings to the government (it is exempt from agri- 
cultural taxes) and in the minimal services the state provides 
for the region. It is in this general setting that religious 
reform developed an organLzational structure jr,, which opposi- 
tion to the state was an important inqredient, even 'Chough 
such opposition was often thinly disquised as an advancement 
of religious principles. 
Another important aspect of the organization of the 
rural Wahhabiyya was the development of a more effective 
response to environmental marginality and disaster than 
that available in the traditional- village structure. A 
more productive organization of labour, a greater willingness 
to experiment with agricuiturai techniques dnd a more solid 
village-based system of mutual did and cooperdtion are some 
of the significant features of Lhe village reform movement 
that are to be described in more detail below. 
Ill. THE TRADITIONAL RELIGION 
The development of Islam among the Songhay has occurred 
in the midst of an animist religion which has had a great 
capacity, at least until recently, to absorb elements of 
Islamic worship while maintaining the essentials of animist 
belief. In the past the ability of the Songhay to combine 
universalist Islam with animist practices led to a 'syncre- 
tist' religious complex, but more recently this syncretism 
has proven unequal to the challenge of scripturalist reform. 
The history which I deal with here is not intended 
to be exhaustive but rather includes only the background 
necessary for a more complete understanding jr1c, --ppraisal of 
the contempordry situation. 
The Islamizdtion of the Sorighay. 
According to oral tradition, the area now occupied by 
the Songhay was once inhabited by two main groups: the 
I masters of the soil' and the 'masters of the water'. 
The 
first Songhay inhabitants of the Niger were the Sorko who 
probably originated from Chad. 
1 They began their settlement 
at Kukiya, then I. ocdted near the rapids of 
Labbezanga, sup- 
planting the original 'masters of the wat-ec'. 
At roughly 
the same period and in the same general r-(., oLon, another 
SonghdY group, the Gow hunters, supplanted the 
'mas,, ers 
of the soil' - 
1. Rouch, 1954: 3-9; Hunwick, 1966: 124. 
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Around the 7th century A. D. a Berber, Za Alyomen, assu- 
med control of the chiefdom of this early settlement after, 
it is said, having killed a river monster which terrorized 
the Songhay. A migration followed in which the Songhay 
came to occupy the shores of the river as far as Mopti where 
they found Bozo fishermen already in place. Gao was founded 
during the course of this gradual migration. 2 
By the 10th century, Cao had become an important meeting 
point of the salt trade from the west and the trans-Saharan 
trade route from the northeast. The Songhay dynasty in 
Kukiya moved to Cao in 1009. By this time Islam had been 
3 
adopted by the rulers of the emerging 'Songhay empire' . 
In the 13th century, Gao was annexed by the empire 
of Mali, but this lasted only a decade before a Songhay 
prince, Ali Kolon, revolted and established himself as the 
king of the Songhay or 'Sonni'. 
4 This marked the beginning 
of the Sonni dynasty. The most important ruler of this 
dynasty, Sonni Ali, took power in 1464. In keeping with 
the dominant tendency among the rulers of the Sudanic empires, 
Sonni Ali was nominally a Muslim. Islamic historians, however, 
have remembered him as a cruel king who made enemies of 
the Muslim leaders and who practiced black arts and sorcery. 
2. Cf. Rouch, 1953. 
3. Hiskett, 1984: 33. 
4. ibid. 
58 
His adoption of IsIcam seems to have been superficial for, 
as Hunwick writes, 
his prayers would have been hatil by the standard 
of any Muslim jurist--he often said all five daily F 
prayers at one time in the early hours of the 
following morning, sitting in the -11. ashahhud posture 
and inclining his body forward to indicate the 
riiku' and sujtid and contenting himseif merely 
with repeating the name of the prayer he was inten- 
ding to prc-. iy instead of recitl , rig the Fatiha and 
other suras. ý) 
Before his death (probably by drowninq) Sonni Ali exten- 
ded the Sonqhay empire in the west to include Timbuktu and 
T Jenne and southeast to include the original Songfiay settie- 
inenL at the rapids of L, abbezanqa. Upon his death a civii 
war broke out which wcis resolved in favour ot Muhammad Ture, 
one of Sonni Ali's generals. Muhammad Ture took Lhe Lit-lie 
of 'Askia' , thereby 
becomin-g the founder of the Askia dynasty. 
Askia Muhammad was a more Fervent 'l-luslim L. han Sonn i Ali 
and under his leadership Islam developed a greater respect- 
ability than it had possessed previously. From 1495 to 
1-497 Askia Muhammad made the pilgrimage to Mecca, during 
the course of which he was given the title 
'Caliph of the 
Sudan'. With his authoril-\, 1, and prestige thus 
firmLy esta- 
blished he consolidated and extended the boundaries of the 
empire. from Segu to Air. He led a 
Jih, 5d agains4k-, the Mossi, 
a major opponent of' the Sudanic FtaLes. 
He ý, s ilso knm-. in 
to have consulted two outstandincl intellect. ua 
ls ot' his da., 
al-Maghili from North Africa and al-Suyuti 
troll' E(JYPt, as 
to the best way to govern his st,.; ite in accordance with 
tile, 
5. Hunwick, 1966: 130. 
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laws of Islam. 
6 
Al-Maghili, besides encouraging the develop- 
ment of a more 'orthodox' observance of Islam, appears to 
have introduced, or at least promoted, the idea of the 'mui- 
addid', the 'renewer' whom God sends once in every century 
to prepare the way for the Mahdi and the Final Judgement. 
7 
A parallel idea finds expression in the Tarikh al-Fattash 
with its description of the virtuous Khalif: "iI trouvera 
la religion etiente, et il sera comme Vetincelle de braise 
qui tombe sur Pherbe seche. Dieu lui donnera la victoire 
,, 8 sur tous les paiens et les h6r6tiques... It was this ideal 
to which Askia Muhammad seems to have aspired. 
In spite of this apparently more sincere practice of 
Islam among the leadership of the Songhay empire, however, 
the indigenous religious system, centred upon the propitia- 
tion of jinn, sacrifice to ancestors and spirit possession, 
remained dominant in the countryside. As Hunwick writes, 
"Islam had little popular support and remained largely an 
alien religion of foreign and &lite groups, though this is 
not to ignore the Islamic elements, which may already by 
this time have become thoroughly integrated into Songhay 
religion itself. " 
9 
After approximately twenty years of rule, Askia Muhammad 
became blind and his sons vied to take over power. In 1529 
6. Kati, 1913: 15. 
7. Hiskett, 1984: 36. 
8. Kati, 1913: 19. 
9. Hunwick, 1966: 142. 
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his son Mussa deposed him and exiled him to an island in 
the Niger. He died in 1538. Askia Muhammad had many sons 
and his deposition was followed by over 50 years of instabi- 
lity. The Songhay empire was stili, however, the strongest 
state in the Sudan when the Moroccans invaded in 1591. 
The Moroccan Sultan, Maulay Ahmad, styled himself as 
the Khallf , the supreme ruler of Islam. Besides seeking 
personal power in his invasion of the Sudan, he was also 
after gold, not only for his personal projects, but also 
to finance resistance to the Christian invasion of Spain. 
The Moroccans -took over Jenne, Timbuktu and Gao, but failed 
to maintain stability in the annexed territory. The Songhay 
empire became essentially a Moroccan province with a puppet 
Askia as administrator. Moroccan int. erest in the Songhay 
colony waned as it appeared less wedlthy than had been presu- 
med. As the territory became more dut. ononious, rivalries 
between the AskLa princes led to a parcelling of power and 
the establishment of numerous petty staLes. Throughout 
the former empire power was eventually taken by chiefs 
who only casually adhered to Islam. This led to a decline 
in learning, especially in Timbuktu which was renowned for 
its Islamic scholar-hip. The Moroccan shurafj' replaced 
the more scholarly 'ulamd and with them came a more popular 
version of Islam based on magic, 
divinaLion and mira(. -le. s. 10 
Although this made Islam less scholarly, 
it probably 
10. Hiskett, 1984: 155. 
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contributed to its spread and to the adoption of Islam in 
fanimist' societies, as occurred among the rural Songhay. 
On the other hand, as Hunwick points out, the Moroccan inva- 
ders destroyed the remaining religious and political equi- 
librium of the Songhay empire and with them Islam became 
associated with a "tyranical alien ruling group. "" 
The Moroccan invasion had three major effects upon the 
Songhay social order which have a bearing on the contemporary 
situation. First, the invaders, especially in the Gao area, 
integrated into Songhay society and their descendants, the 
Armah (a corruption of 'Ruma', the term given to the Moroccan 
musketeers) often assumed local power, forming an elite. 
In Timbuktu the Armah retained a more seperate identity, 
while to the east they eventually became less distinguishable 
from the rest of the Songhay population. 12 Today most Songhay 
of the Gao area can assert some identity with the Moroccan 
invaders, but leading village families, especially the fami- 
lies of chiefs, make the claim of Armah descent more forcefully. 
The Spanish mercenaries who formed the bulk of the 
original invading forces were only 'luke-warm' Muslims, 
and their descendants were, on the whole, even less devout. 
Marty says of the Armah of Timbuktu that, "les geris les 
11. Hunwick, 1966: 142. 
12. Saad (1983: 171) writes that 
claimed a Ruma identity by the 
is misleading. Citing Barth in 
to the truth: "There was a ten( 
the Niger east of Timbuktu to be 
"at Gao all the inhabitants 
nineteenth century. " This 
a footnote he comes closer 
Jency for many Songhai along 
identified as Ruma. " (1983: 
2eg ff -)- 
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appellent les francs palens. Ils ne practiquent g6n6ralement 
pas le salam, Wont aucune instruction religieuse, et s'en 
tiennent en fait de culte islamique A quelques manifestations 
ext6rieurs et rares.,, 13 
Secondly, the invasion increased social and religious 
differences among the Songhay as a whole. In very general 
terms, the Songhay of the north.. particularly near the -towns 
of Timbuktu and Gao, have been more influenced by Muslim 
penetration than those in the south. 14 This situation came 
about originally as a result of resistance to Moroccan rule 
which was undertaken by the more independent populations 
of the south. 
Finally, the polLtical fraqmentation left the Songhay 
open to invasions from the Tuareg, which continued until 
colonial rule, and, in the south, from the Fulani at the 
time of Usman dan Fodio's jih5d. The Armah failed to provide 
a unified and permanent leadership, and the regular plundering 
by nomadic tribes further exacerbated political and religious 
differentiation. Thus, in the Gao region and the rest of 
the north, while adherence to Islam is generally greater, 
the particular elements of Islamic or pagan worship that 
became part of the religious complex have varied from one 
village to the next. In the south, on the other hand, where 
opposition to Tuareq and Fulani invasion was (nore unified, 
the religious system has been more uniform and the variations 
13. Marty, 1928: 7. 
14. Rouch, 1960: 16. 
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from village to village less apparent. 15 
The Fulani invasion was important for additional reasons. 
The Fulani eventually established a small number of settle- 
ments in the Cabero area between Gao and Ansongo. These 
formed a small enclave in which Islamic learning was stronger 
than in the surrounding Songhay villages. As we shall see, 
the impact of this enclave upon the Songhay religion was 
probably minimal, but much later, in the 1940's and 50's, 
a number of Songhay clerics went there for their initial 
training. 
In a less direct way, the jih5d of the nineteenth century 
which had its nucleus in northern Nigeria, as well as other 
jih5ds of the same period, provided an indirect source of 
inspiration for some reformists in the twentieth century. 
While the call to the sword in more recent times has, because 
of modern political conditions, been impracticable, the 
startling success of some of the jihids enhanced the prestige 
of Islamic learning as well as the puritan model of worship 
and reform. 
It should be stressed that puritan Islamic reform, 
of essentially the same nature as contemporary Wahhabism, 
has been an ever-present possibility and a frequently recur- 
ring phenomenon in the history of West African Islam. The 
occurrence of reform movements is closely associated with 
fluctuating levels of Islamic learning; the direct historical 
15. Rouch, 1960: 16. 
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connection between reform movements, often tenuous or non- 
existent, is of secondary importance. 
Movements of pilgrims, raiders and traders were all 
significant in the spread of Islamic learning in West Africa, 
but of these, the influence of traders was the most important. 
Muslims established a trading monopoly in which the produc- 
tion of 'passports' and the exchange of letters made it 
possible only for co-religionists to travel great distances 
with valuable goods in their possession. This trade network 
was responsible for the establishment of Muslim communities 
throughout the Sudan, the larger of which could maintain 
contact with the more important Islamic centres in North 
Africa and the Middle East. Gao was one such trading depot. 
The significance of this contact between trading towns and 
religious centres in the mainstream of Islamic learning 
was that Muslim scholarship was capable of revival, through 
the education of Muslim clerics from the Sudan in these 
centres and their return to their places of origin where 
they would preach the 'true' way of Islam. This potential 
often lead to revivals in Islamic learning, even if compara- 
tive isolation eventually lead to 'backsliding'. 
16 
The sufi brotherhoods, particularly in the 19th century, 
were often a strong presence in the trading communities 
and were also responsible for the creation, particularly 
in North Africa, of Muslim centres known as z5wiya, -: ý, 
or lodges. The brotherhoods began to be 
influentiij in 
16. Goody, 1968: 200. 
Also cited in Niezen, 1983. 
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the post-classical period (after the 12th century, A. D. ) 
when the faith had found a secure place in social groups 
which demanded a less rigid form of clericalism than that 
expounded by the 'orthodox' 'ulami and encouraged a more 
popular form. of religious organization which gave religious 
specialists an important place in 'backward' communities. 
The Qadiriyya, one of the oldest and largest brotherhoods, 
was founded by the Baghdad jurist 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani 
(d. 1166). Soon after its establishment in the 12th century, 
it was introduced to Morocco by a disciple of al-Jilani, 
Abu Midyan al-Ghawth (d. 1198), 17 and, along with other 
brotherhoods, came to dominate the religious life of North 
Africa. The Kunta became the first custodians of the Qadir- 
iyya in West Africa, spreading adherence to the order, and 
at the same time strengthening adherence to Islam, through 
much of sub-Saharan West Africa. This dissemination of 
the Qadiriyya was continued in the jih5d of Usman dan Fodio 
and the foundation of the Sokoto empire. 
The Tijaniyya, founded in Fez by Ahmad al-Tijani in 
the 18th and early 19th centuries, has become one of the 
most dynamic and popular brotherhoods in contemporary West 
Africa. It owes much of its success in West Africa to al- 
Hajj 'Umar Tall who claimed to be the leader (j<jjajjf, 3D of 
the brotherhood and waged a iih5d against the Bambara of 
Segu and the Muslim empire of Macina. 
18 Umar Tall kept close 
17. Abun-Nasr, 1965: 2. 
18. See, for example, Abun-Nasr, 1965; Martin, 1976; Robinson, 
1985. 
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ties with Muhammad Bello, the Khal7f of the Sokoto empire 
and through this association it became accepted by many 
Hausýj as well as the ruling Fulani elite in northern Nigeria. 
The nature of the interaction between Muslim centres 
and rural societies has led to a mutual process of cultural 
modification. In the case of the Songhay this interaction 
occurred primarily between the town as a bastion of Isli-amic 
learning and a vessel into which the 'pure' Islam of the 
northern centres could potentially be received, and the 
mainly animistic or, at most, I mixed Islamic' coutryside 
of sedentary villages. Cao, Timbuktu and Jenne were Muslim 
towns situated in regions occupied by the Songhay. The 
element of Islam most easily accepted by the animistic society 
has been 'Islamic magic' while, in the opposite direction, 
the effect on the Muslim centres in this relationship has 
been the incorporation or retention of 'traditional' el. ements 
of religion which resulted in a divergence from the 'true' 
Islam, or possibly even apostasy. 
With regard to literacy, a sympU)in of this regr, r, ssion 
has been the increasing value of the written word for iLs 
magical qualities: "the art of writing, if it is not lost 
completely, becomes an esoteric possession of a clique which 
is feared ralther than respected. A Qur- 'a-n may become regar- 
ded as a sacred object in its own right, no loncAer r-ead 
but worshipped and perhaps. 
once in a yeai,, " 
1c) 
only exposed to publiý- view 
19. Wilks, 1968: 1'12-93. 
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Islamic reform in West Africa has usually been a response 
to regression and the assimilation of 'pagan' elements in 
the Muslim community. It is acounteraction to 'backsliding' 
through a renewal of knowledge of Islam as it was practiced 
in the 'golden age' of the prophet, his companions and his 
immediate successors. 
Prior to colonialism, then, a situation prevailed in 
West Africa in which a small minority of people who could 
read and write at a basic level in Arabic were scattered 
thinly in the rural population, in which literacy and Muslim 
'orthodoxy' were precarious and subject to relapses into 
f paganism' and 'idolatry' but in vlhlý,, h the existence of pre- 
dominantly Muslim towns and communities with connections 
with centres of Islamic learning in North Africa and the 
Middle East sometimes allowed for a reinvigouration or renewal 
of the faith. Amongst the Songhay the most important of 
such renewals occurred under the impetus of Askia Muhammad 
who was inspired by his contact with the jurist al-Maghili 
and his travel to Mecca. Askia Muhammad's purification 
of Islam did not last long after his death. Later Askias, 
such as Askia Dawud (reg. 1549-83) may have supported the 
I ulam5 but did so with 'bribery' to secure a place 
in para- 
dise. on sending a hundred slaves to al-'Agib, the Qadi 
of Timbuktu, Askia Dawud is reported 
to have said: "T(Al 
him to buy my portion of paradise from God; he will 
be my 
intermediary with God to obtain this. " 
20 
20. Kati, cited in Hunwick, 196,1: 1-11. 
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This process of regression and renewal is similar to 
that described by Gellner when he points to the fact that 
tribal societies cannot accomodate or use the learned scribes 
of orthodox Islam and so turn to other anchorages for reli- 
gion, such as holy lineages or ritual and devotional enthu- 
siasm. There is, he suggests, within almost all Muslim 
societies, a permanent tension and opposition between two 
basic styles of religious life, and an oscillation between 
them through the processes of reform and regression: on 
the one hand the style which emphasizes the puritanical, 
unitarian, individualist and scriptual ideal of a single 
deity which has disclosed its final message in a Revelation; 
on the other hand the version of the faith which incorporates 
a religious hierarchy, which institutionalizes intermediaries 
between man and God into the sociai structure where they 
play a key role as unifying agents in segmentary tribal 
societies and which adapts Muslim practices and beliefs 
to the pagan setting. 
21 
The potential for Islamic reform was therefore widespread 
and frequently realized in West Africa. The Songhay were 
not conspicuous participants in reform largely because there 
was no reliable process through which Islamic learning could 
penetrate to the villages. The Songhay, as will 
be seen, 
did not have a strong adherence to the sufi 
brotherhoods 
and therefore lacked access to puritan Islam 
through the 
network of lodges and their connections wit-h centres ot- 
21. Gellner, 1981: 159. Also see Niezen, 1983. 
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learning. The administrative centres of the Songhay empire 
were largely seen as oppressive and the impact on the country- 
side of the renewal adopted by the king and the royal power 
structure was blunted by the division and tension between 
the Muslim elite groups and the ruled who remained largely 
animist. It was not until late in the colonial era that 
Islam became a rallying point for political opposition and 
a ? return to the sources' of Muslim knowledge became distinc- 
tly possible, perhaps even inevitable. 
French attitudes toward Islam in the early stages of 
colonization, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
lacked consistency. On the one hand there was a republican 
influence in French culture which led many to look tolerantly 
upon Islam. Bonaparte, as Hiskett reminds us, was captivated 
by Islam during the occupation of Egypt and many Muslims 
thought him ready to convert. 
22 The intellectual heirs of 
the revolution, "having no religious beliefs of their own 
did not judge non-Christian religions by comparing them 
unfavourably with Christianity.,, 
23 
On the other hand, we find the more familiar orientation 
of the French middle class and the Catholic Church which 
tended toward greater hostility--the rhetoric of the period, 
in reference to Islam, seasoned generously with words 
like 
'idolatry', 'barbarism', and 'fanatacism'. 
22. Hiskett, 1984: 211. 
23. ibid. 
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in the field, both of these attitudes found expression, 
but the colonial authorities in French West Africa tended 
to be pragmatic, dealing with Islam in terms of its useful- 
ness for, or hindrance of, French goals, Individual clerics, 
or groups of clerics, therefore, came to be evaluated accor- 
ding to their degree of 'co-operation' with or 'opposition' 
to the colonial presence. Such evaluations were often infu- 
sed with a fear of armed opposition to colonial rule under 
the banner of Islam. 
The effects upon Islam of colonial rule in French West 
Africa were relatively uniform throuqhout the occupied ter- 
ritories. It reduced the quality of Islamic learninq by 
proscribing the activities of many prominent clerics and 
by limiting the effectiveness and importance of Islamic 
centres of learning. At the same time, however, it stimula- 
ted an increase in the number of Muslim adherents, mainly 
by improving avenues of travel, migration and inter-ethnic 
contact and by placing Islam in the role of a 'religion 
of resistance'. 
When the French authorities were working to 'pacify' 
the colony they were often compelled to deal respectfully 
with Muslim leaders. Arabic was adopted as the official 
language of correspondence with African rulers because 
Arabic scribes were more widely available than French ones. 
2.1 
When, in 1911, it was decreed that all offiCial correspon- 
dence, including judgements in the native couits, was to 
24. Brenner, 1984: 36-37. 
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be in French, the only official Position the Muslim literati 
could acquire in the colonial or-der had been eliminated. 
25 
Under colonial rule the level of Islamic learning went into 
decline. In Guinea, Johnson finds that a contraction of 
Quranic education was most apparent at the major Islamic 
centres. 
26 Timbuktu had gone into decline before coloniza- 
tion, especially in the 19th century, with the reduction 
of trans-Saharan trade, - and the weakening of its nobility, 
including its Muslim scholars, continued, perhaps accelerated, 
under French rule. 
27 Whether or not the economic decline 
of the towns in the Sahel dependent upon trade with North 
Africa made its first impact before or during French rule, 
the colonial occupation was marked by a restructuring of 
the economy in favour of coastal trade, one of the consequen- 
ces of which was that the Muslim rulinq elite was either 
no longer in power or was riot able to support religious 
schools, and many Muslim clerics found it necessary to dban- 
28 don their studies and support themselves in other ways. 
At the same time that the quality of Islamic learning 
declined, the numbers of adherents to Islam greatly increased 
under colonial rule. French policy was often, especially 
during the earlier phase of colonization, concerned with 
the potential threat of Islam, but local French officials 
were not prevented from reaching a practical understanding 
25. Brenner, 1984: 37. 
26. Johnson, 1975: 226. 
27. cf. Saad, 1983: 168. 
28. cf. Brenner, 1984: 37. 
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with their Muslim subjects which led ultimately to a tolera- 
tion of t1he expansion of Islam. 29 This expansion was not 
simply due to the most obvious factor, that Christianity 
was associated with colonial oppression and Islam thus had 
the appeal of a religion of resistance, especially for those 
already living in a partly Islamized milieu. It has also 
been the case, as Lewis points out, that Islam was always 
most successful in times of social change, economic expansion 
and ethnic interaction. 
Increased travel and trading activities, migrant labour and movement, the development of administra- 
tive and commercial towns, all these played a 
vital part in throwing together Muslims and non- Muslims of dif Iferent origin and ethnic groups in circumstances in which co-religionists displayed 
an impressive solidarity despite their differences 
of origin. 30 
These kinds of factors were important Foc the Sonqhay among 
whom migration had an important place in the strengthening 
of adherence to Islam. 
Another unintended consequence of colonial rule was 
increased contact of sub-Saharan Muslims with their Middle 
Eastern counterparts, largely through an improved infrastruc- 
ture of transportation and communication. In pre-colonial 
times the pilgrimage involved a lengthy and hazardous journey, 
usually undertaken on foot. Plany pilgrims perished or esta- 
blished settlements in Chad or the Sudan, never to return 
29. cf. Lewis, 1966: 78-79. 
30. ibid: 81. 
31. See below, pp. 103-. 112. 
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to their places of birth; and even those that did arrive 
at their destination and return, having undergone lengthy 
studies in the Middle East., often did little to change the 
practice of Islam in their places of birth. With the con- 
struction of roads and, later, the possibility of air travel, 
the pilgrimage became a much simpler undertaking and reform- 
ist ideas from the Middle East began to exercise more of 
an influence in West Africa. It was especially in the later 
phase of colonization and since independence that pilgrim 
traffic increased and gave more 'ordinary' worshippers, 
those who were not specialists in Islamic learning, a taste 
of 'pure' Islam and inclined a wider spectrum of the Muslim 
community in the direction of reform. 
Traditional Songhay religion. 
The animist or 'non-Islamic' religion of the Songhay 
is composed of a diverse array of beliefs and practices, 
only the most important of which can be summarized here. 
Even the most 'Primitive' or seemingly pristine elements 
of Songhay religion are interwoven wit nine cen uries or 
more of contact with Islam. This influence is perhaps most 
apparent in the realm of metaphysics. Cod (irkoi, meaning 
'our Master' is the creator of the world, is all-powerful, 
and is beyond the reach of man--a remote 
deus absconditus. He 
is without form and is commonly believed 
to reside in the 
seventh sky above the world. 
32 There is no survival of 
"132. Rouch. 1954.60. 
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any 'pre-Islamic' worship of God. 33 The seventh sky is pop- 
ulated with the souls of men and is overseen by angels (maleka). 
Satan and demons (Iblis and seytan) are fallen angels who 
have become agents of evil. 
Jinn (zin) were the first inhabitants of the world. 
When men were created the jinn became invisible but continued 
to live in specific locations: rocks, trees, termite mounds, 
etc. The worship of jinn is local and is addressed to the 
'masters of the soil' or the 'masters of the water'--the 
first occupants of the Niger who made pacts with the new 
Songhay inhabitants to cede their terrestrial domain in 
exchange for religious recognition. The 'priesthood' of 
jinn worship, which has only minimal social significance, 
is hereditary. The ritual of the cult of jinn consists 
of sacrifices. An animal is sacrificed at a particular 
time of year. The 'priest' recites a formula in uninteligi- 
ble archaic language which is said to renew the alliance 
between men and jinn for the coming year and which will 
protect the village from misfortune. 
Another local cult centres upon ancestor worhsip. 
The worshipped ancestor is usually considered to have been 
the founder or first occupant of a village or, less frequ- 
ently, a particularly influential and revered forefather. 
Often the cults of ancestors are confounded with those of 
the jinn since they are similar in many respects. 
34 The 
33. Boulnois and Hama, 1954: 14. 
34. Rouch, 1954: 61. 
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Opriest' is usually the head of an extended family which 
traces its descent from the ancestor. In the month preceding 
the rainly season, he makes a sacrifice at the altar of 
the ancestor. This is often the ancestor's burial place, 35 
but it is also frequently a natural location similar to 
those associated with jinn. The priest addresses the ances- 
tor, asking his protection, not only for the family but 
for the entire village or community. 
Important traditional families (chiefs, Sorko fishermen, 
magicians) often have private ancestral cults. These protect 
only the family of the priest rather than a wider community. 
When these ancestors are especially sated with sacrificial 
blood and prayers they are said to manifest themselves in 
the altar. The place of worship then becomes endowed with 
a more autonomous spiritual 
aid to magical practices. 
36 
quality which may become an 
It is worth stressing that the worship of jinn and 
ancestors is socially limited. While the cults often have 
a perceived importance in helping to ensure plentiful harvests 
and the over-all prosperity of the community, the 'Priests' 
of these cults do not gain a very high status through the 
religious office and the spiritual entities 
themselves only 
have an ef f ect on a particular f ami ly or 
local community. 
37 
An element of the animist religion that 
has a much 
greater significance is the spirit possession 
dance or cuit 
35. Rouch, 1954: 61. 
36. ibid. 
37. Rouch, 1960: 177. 
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of the holle. The holle have become, to the detriment of 
other spiritual beings in the animist religion, the true 
masters of the earth and the world of men. They are belie- 
ved to have vanquished the jinn and to have mastery over 
them so that the jinn, and to some extent the ancestor, 
can be considered 'local representatives' of the holle. 
38 
The holle were created similar to men but are invisible, 
immortal and can travel instantly from one location to ano- 
ther. They were created, according to Songhay legend, from 
among the forty original children of Adam and Eve. When 
God commanded Adam and Eve to bring him their children, 
they tried to conceal twenty of their favourites in a cave. 
God witnessed this and as a punishment placed a barrier 
between Adam and Eve and their twenty children by endowing 
the latter with special powers and making them invisible. 
The world of the holle is almost identical to human reality 
and the behaviour and lives of the holle are fundamentally 
similar to those of men. 
39 
As opposed to the worship of jinn and ancestors, the 
possession dance involves most of the adult members of the 
animist community. Most villagers belong to the 'congrega- 
tion' of the dances. 
themselves by means 
of the dancers are 
bodies, making them 
38. Rouch, 1960: 22. 
39. Boulnois and Hami 
The dancers are recruited by the spirits 
of spontaneous possession. The souls 
believed to temporarily vacate their 
the 'horses' which the holle 'mount' 
31,1954: 75. 
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to communicate with the world of men. The dancers are train- 
ed and initiated by zima priests who also organize the 
ceremonies. The zima attain their status solely through 
religious and social merit. The 'femmes tranquilles' 
;0 
are women who help in the organization of ceremonies and who 
assist dancers through their crises of possession. Musicians 
play 'viol i-ns' and calebashes during the ceremony and also 
recite ritual songs. Sorko priest-'fishermen' are traditional 
specialists in using the holey to contact Dongo, the god of 
thunder and lightning who controls rain. 
When musicians, dancers, 'femmes tranquilles', zima 
priests and congregation are assembled, the dance begins. 
The zima exhort the dancers to keep up the pace of their 
movements. After several hours one of the dancers will 
exhibit signs of being possessed: usually he (or she) will 
stop, fall on the ground, shout and tremble. After several 
convulsions the 'horse' of the holle becomes calm, usually 
with the aid of the 'femmes tranquilles'. The dancer is then 
dressed in the traditional costume of the holle who has 
possessed him. The officiating zima, or another priest, 
interrogates the holle. The spirits reply, often for a 
half-hour, about the affairs of the village or the needs 
and wishes of the spirits who oversee it. The voice of 
the holle eventually changes, becoming more spasmotic and 
distant. The dancer then falls to the ground trembling. 
40. Rouch's term (cf. 1954 and 1960). 1 am riot aware of 
an indigenous word, nor does Rouch provide us with one. 
r7-8 
He is helped to his feet by the 'femmes tranquilles, the. 
holle having left and been replaced by the normal spirit 
of the dancer. 
41 
Possession dances take place weekly in Cao-city, usually 
every Sunday at the compounds of zima priests. In the vil- 
lages where the dance is still practiced ceremonies take 
place before the rainy season, at the end of harvest, in 
the middle of the dry season, on the occasion of the sickness 
or death of a village member and at the time of the initia- 
tion of a new dancer--on average every two weeks to a month. 
From the mid-1920's to the 1940's the holle cult became 
the medium of an 'enthusiastic' response to the colonial 
presence through the development of a new 'race' of spirits, 
42 the hauka. These spirits were modeled on the administrative 
and military hierarchy of the French and., in Ghana where 
the hauka developed among migrants, English colonial powers. 
When this cult flourished, dancers were no longer possessed 
by the descendants of Adam and Eve's invisible children, 
nor by the holle Dongo., the spirit of thunder; they were 
possessed by such spirits as the 'Minis-de-ger' (Ministre 
de la guerre) or the 'Komandan' (commandant). Like the 
holle dance as a whole, the cult of hauka spirits was very 
diffuse, lacking a strong leadership to channel social unrest 
into effective action. The cult of hauka spirits spread 
throughout Songhay society in response to the helplessness 
of the indigenous population in the face of colonial rule. 
Thus, in common with other 'religions of the oppressed', 
41. More complete descriptions of the dance are found in 
Rouch, 1954 and 1960. 
42. Cf. Rouch, 1960: 73-74 and Olivier de Sardan, 1980: 280-85. 
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it sometimes used the themes that express, or perhaps compen- 
sate for, a situation marked by pessimism and powerlessness: 
the imminent departure of the whites, the ineffectiveness 
of their weapons (guns will shoot water instead of bullets), 
the victory of the faithful. The cult of hauka spirits, 
therefore, thrived on colonial oppression. As this oppression 
waned, the hauka were assimilated into the pantheon of holle 
spirits, an incorporation which brought about the end of 
the hauka as an 'enthusiastic' religious movement. 
In addition to the worship of jinn, ancestors and holle 
spirits, magic has an important place in Songhay society. 
Most men who may be considered 'priests' of the various 
cults also practice magic. This usually involves controlling 
or mastering spiritual beings with the aid of magical sub- 
stances (special bark, herbs, etc. ) and oral recitation. 
These practices are considered dangerous and are rarely 
completely mastered. The sohantye are the most formidable 
magicians. They claim descent from Sonni Ali and believe 
their magical powers to be inherited from him. The powers 
of the sohantye are inherited matrilaterally or 'from the 
mother's milk'. These magicians are very small in number 
43 
and are limited to areas where traditional practices are 
widely observed, such as Hombori--a Songhay enclave northeast 
of Mopti--and probably some villages in Niger. Despite 
their small number, however, the sohantye have a very high 
reputation. In Ghana, Rouch reports, they supplanted the 
43. Rouch (1954) estimates that only about 20 sohantye fami- 
lies exist. 
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Ashanti 'medicine men', 
clients. 
44 
taking from them most of their 
In contrast to this specialized, high prestige magic 
are practices which are more accessible and widespread. 
One such practice, used to bring rain, involves tying a child 
to a tombstone and leaving him (or her) alone overnight. 
The tears of the child are associated with rain. 
45 The traditional Songhay cleric, or 'alfa',, is very 
often involved with magical practices which are similar to 
those elements of 'Islamic magic' found almost anywhere in 
Muslim Africa. The most common practice is the writing of 
amulets, or gri-gris, which consist of Quranic verses sewn 
into a pouch which is worn around the neck or on the arms. 
Most commonly they protect the wearer front illness, but they 
have a wide variety of other uses such as by Prostitutes 
as contraceptives or by students for success in examinations. 
The cleric is the village member most commonly recognize- 
able for his duties in teaching the Quran, that is to say, 
in taking village students as far as they are able or willing 
to go in memorizing the sacred book by rote. When the student 
succeeds in reciting the first quarter of the Quran his Parents 
present a small gift to the alfa. It could be, according 
to their means, a small suln of money, a chicken Or' a cake 
made from millet flou-j. A similar gift is usually made when 
44. Rouch, 1954: 62. 
45. An adaptation of the Arabic word al-Fakih, 'jurist'. The 
term alfa is applied by the Songhay to anyone who is literate 
in Arabic. cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1982. 
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the student memorizes half, three-quarters and the totality 
of the Quran. The cleric does not earn his livelihood from 
such 'payments' but more commonly from the labour students 
provide working in his f ields and gardens. Students engaged 
in memorizing the Quran, therefore, spend the major part 
of the day working in the master's fields with recitation 
taking place in the morning and evening. 
Village Islam among the Songhay is associated with a 
compC-2ratively loose adherence to the Muslim brotherhoods, 
the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya. Loysance, writing of adher- 
ence to the brotherhoods amonq the Songhay of the central 
subdivision of Niamey in the 1950's. notes that "I' immense 
majorit6 d'entre eux West affili6 d aucune, confrerie et 
souvent I'liabitant ne comprend m6me pas la question qui lui 
est pos6e, a ce sujet; beaucoup repondent simplement "c'est 
I'affaire de Dieu. "" 46 In Gao where there is both stronger 
adherence to Islam in general and greater influence from 
the nomadic groups with strong loyalty to the Qadiriyya or 
the Tijaniyya, we stmuld expect a greater awareness of the 
Islam of the brotherhoods among the village Population, but 
this is not to say that. the brotherhoods are a potent force 
in village life. On the contrary, it is usually the case 
that those who call themselves members of the Sufi orders 
cannot explain why they perform their prayer in the way requi- 
red by their adherence to the brotherhood. 
47 They are, as 
46. Loysance, 19 : 42. 
47. This is generally the case in spite of local exceptions 
such as the Hamaliyya movement in the village of 
Wani. S' ee 
below, pp. 90--97. 
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Loysance observes, often satisfied to remark: Le marabout 
pr6s duquel j'6tais m'a appris cette formule. C'est lui 
qui m'a ensigne a r6citer ainsi mon chapelet., 
48 
Traditional Songhay clerics, unlike many of their coun- 
terparts among the neighbouring Fulani, Tuareg and Kunta 
groups, have minimal reputations for learning, piety or 
holiness. In general, their influence is limited to the 
village in which they live, work and teach. Although there 
are come who excel ., even these 
have rarely, if ever, achieved 
the status and renown of, for example, a sohantYe magician 
or a famous Tuareg 'saint'. 
Nominal adherence to the brotherhoods and a low level 
of religious scholarship are key inqredients in the composi- 
tion of the traditional religion of che Songhay of the Gao 
region, a composition, however. which has changed with the 
introduction of reformist Islam. It is likely that this 
loose adherence to the brotherhoods and low level of learning 
are important elements of the social conditions in which 
reformist Islam could develop a following. This conclusion 
is reinforced by a brief comparison between the religious 
and cultural settings of Gao and Timbuktu. 
It will have been remarked that Timbuktu shares with 
Cao the economic deprivation as well as geographical and 
political isolation common to most towns on the northern 
frontier of the Sahel. Timbuktu is also noteworthy for its 
position as a religious centre, for its remarkable 
history 
48. Loysance, n. d. : 42. 
8? 
of Islamic cultural achievement, especially in the 15th and 
16th centuries, followed by the Moroccan occupation, political 
fragmentation and decline. Yet Timbuktu, perhaps more than 
any other region in Mali, is untouched by the contemporary 
movement toward Islamic 'purification'. The town of Dir6, 
southwest of Timbuktu, has a small community of Muslims who 
model themselves after the Wahhabi ideal, but their approach 
to religious change is tolerant and has not been accompanied 
by an effort to 'convert' other Muslims to their form of 
worship. Consequently, their appearance on the scene has 
not been associated with any significant controversy. 
49 
The strong position of the brotherhoods in Timbuktu 
is the most likely factor behind this weak adherence to the 
anti-Sufi Wahhabiyya. The political and economic decline 
of Timbuktu after the Moroccan occupation was associated 
with cultural stagnation, yet the islamic brotherhoods remained 
a vital part of the religious setting. In the periods of 
political fragmentation during the 18th and 19th centuries, 
religious scholars and holy men played an important role 
as arbiters between opposing factions within nomadic tribes. 
These factions were often in competition for Political influ- 
ence and for the economic benefit they derived from the extor- 
tion or pillage of merchants who continued to deal in goods 
that followed the tr3ns-Saharan trade route. The intervention 
of Muslim notables, the 'Shurfa', the Imams, the Qadi arid 
the more accomplished and respected pilgrims, contributed 
49. Personal communication, Mahmud Zouber, 31 July, 1984. 
f. 
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to the continuation of a strong Tslamic tradition, though 
one that had fallen far from its former level of accomplish- 
ment. 50 
One of the most important developmentS during the period 
of political fragmentation was the drawing away of Islamic 
scholarship from the town into the tribes of the periphery. 
51 
Sidi al-Mukhtar and Sidiyya al-Kabir of the Kunta are examples 
of Islamic scholars and reformers from this period of political 
decentralization who achieved a high level of jurisprudential. 
scholarship from within a tribal society, a society in which 
the Qadiriyya had (and continues to have) a central place 
as a religious and social institution. The influence of 
the North African, particularly Moroccan, Islamic tradition 
upon these scholars was especially strong. Their promotion 
of this tradition is a reason for the contemporary strength 
of Maghribi influence in Timbuktu and its environs. 
The strength of adherence to the Sufi orders in Timbuktu 
is a barrier to the development of Wahhabism. This is not 
simply because the reform movement is strongly opposed to 
the beliefs and practices particular to the brotherhoods 
and would therefore meet with strong resistance from establi- 
shed religious notables, but also because the brotherhoods. 
are associated with religious structures that are strongly 
integrated into the social systems of both urban and rural 
society. The place of clerics as mediators between conflicting 
50. Cf Saad, 1984. 
51. Abitbol, 1982: 'preface'. 
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tribal groups is an example of such religious-social integra- 
ti on. It is true that such conditions might prevail less 
in Songhay village society but the strength of the brotherhoods 
nevertheless constitutes an important factor in the resistance 
to the Wahhabiyya or similar anti-Sufi styles of reform in 
the Timbuktu region. 
The level of Islamic scholarship in Timbuktu is another 
factor in the resistance to Wahhabi reform. Dupuis-Yakouba, 52 
writing in 1921, observes that there are many inhabitants 
in Ti-mbuktu with a minimal literacy in Arabic but that there 
are only a few clerics who continue to teach grammar, theology, 
law, etc. and few among them who have attained a high level 
of instruction. A similar situation is found today with 
the difference that the increased availability of studY dbroad 
may have improved the highest levels of Islamic scholarship. 
Government support of Timbuktu's Islamic her-i-taqe, for example 
in the Centre Ahmad Baba and in the Lyc6le Franco-Arabe (in 
which students can pursue a baccalaureate in bilingual French- 
Arabic education), is also partially responsible for a higher 
level of Islamic learning than that evident among the Muslim 
clerics of Cao. Wahhabi reformers in Timbuktu would therefore 
not have the advantage of being able to display a superior 
jurisprudential knowledge to their traditional counterparts. 
In the region of Gao, however, such superiority was a key 
element in the process of 'conversion' to Islamic reform. 
. L. 52. Dupuis-Yakouba, 
1921: 180-161 
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*** 
Until the advent of Wahhabism, Islam in the Gao region 
enjoyed a relatively pec-teful co-existence with the belief 
in ancestral spirits, jinn and holle. Many villagers adhered, 
and some continue to adhere, to both belief systems. The 
holle dance, in the few places where it still takes place, 
is attended, even participated in, by those who believe 
themseives to be Muslims. Rouch summarizes the place of 
'syncretism' in Songhay religion when he writes: 91 I'Islam 
apparait moins, au Songhay, comme la religion dominante que 
comme un 6lement essentiel d'un complex religieux... auquel 
il s'est, plus ou inoins profondement, amalgam6., 153 
In the Gao region today the dominant religious complex 
is the opposite from -that which Rouch describes. Whi le 
taking into account local variations, it can be stated that 
in Gao, even in most traditional villages, Islam is of greater 
importance than any form of animist worship. Where Lhe 
animist religion survives it is deeply penetrated by Islam. 
The prevailing approach to religion, even by those who still 
maintain animist practices, places Islam in the forefront. 
The holle spirits themselves are believed not to prevent 
adherence to Islam; and often the worship of holle spirits, 
even for adherents of the cult, is secondary: "il faut 
suivre ld voie de Dieu et satisfaire les demades de g6nies. " 
1ý11 
In the Gao area the non-Islamic elements of religion 
53. Rouch, 1960: 17. 
5'1. Gibbal, 1984: 157. 
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are easily noted, and even relatively 'orthodox' Muslims 
still often admit to the efficacy of magic or the mystery 
and power of the hoLle, 
5 5 but animist practices appear 
to be on the decline. Many villagers, not just Wahhabis, are 
accepting the tenets of Islamic reform. r1he puritan faith 
has, at least in principle, gained a wide currency. The 
holle ceremony is no longer practiced where zima priests 
had once been strong. In several of the villages surrounding 
Gao the holle cult had disappeared in the 1940's or 50's 
with the death of the last influential priests. Amulets 
are no longer worn by many who once depended on them. This 
decline, by no means total, has gone hand in hand with the 
development of Wahhabism and the increased prestige of the 
all-powerful God. 
In Bagouridge, a large village about 5 km south of Gao, 
for example, the impact of the Wahhabiyya has been especially 
strong; and even those who remain 'traditionalist' have 
abandoned most of the animist practices. "When the Wahhabis 
came, tt a villager explained, 
they taught us that we must believe in nothing 
except God. The alfa cannot help man. The tree 
[jinn] cannot help man. Only God. 
Famine has been a major factor in weakening the prestige 
of the traditional religion. Localized deprivation, common 
in an area where rain can fall heavily in one area and not 
in another, could at one time be attributed to the spiteful- 
C- V, 
. i)D. Greenberg 
(1946: 68) notes that the Hausa Mallams who 
condemn the bori cult still believe in its effectiveness 
in curinq: of The person recovers", one Mallam said, "but 
God does not like it that way. " 
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ness of jinn, but for everyone in the Cao area there is no 
doubting the idea that the recent drought, unlike anything 
they had ever experienced, is an act of God. Part of this 
conviction, again expressed by a villager of Bagoundje, arises 
from the fact that traditional magic has been of no effect 
in ending the drought: 
We consulted the tree [jinn], we consulted the holle, 
we consulted the alfa [all without success]. We know 
that God is unique. 
With the failure of traditional methods to bring prosp- 
erity, it became clear to many that God must be appeased. 
This declining trust in the value of traditional methods 
occurred at a time when reformers were preaching a return 
to 'Pure' Islam and the dangers of 'polytheism'. 
Despite this discrediting of traditional 'magic', drought 
does not in itself explain the weakening of traditional Islam. 
Widespread famine had taken place before without greatly 
changing customary religious practices. Perhaps the greatest 
challenge to traditional Islam came, and continues to come, 
from the vigourous and regular penetration of reformist Islam 
and. in another direction, the impact of western education 
which draws young people away from the traditional miiieu 
and scorns the 'superstitions' of the village people. Reform- 
ist Islam, which reacts against both traditionalism and west- 
ernization, is emerging the victor in contemporary Songhay 
society. 
IV. PRECURSORS OF THE GAO WAHHABIYYA 
The precursors of the Wahhabi movement which began 
in Gao in the early 1970's were of two kinds. One was a 
small, ecstatic Sufi movement which made use of an elaborate 
dhikr, or group recitation, and which venerated its leader 
as a 'saint'. The other started when Songhay of the same 
general area began to accept the ideals of a puritan, scrip- 
turalist interpretation of Islam which aimed at purging 
the religion of the mediation of saints and of the reliance 
on miracles and magic for prosperity and security. This 
puritan trend was promoted by pilgrims who had studied in 
the Middle East and by Songhay migrants in Ghana who were 
integrated into fully Islamized urban communities. 
The Wahhabism which later developed in the villages 
of the Cao region incorporated the general orientation and 
goals of the scripturalist trend but at the same time, as 
will be seen, it possessed some elements of Sufi reform, 
such as a veneration of its leadership and an emphasis on 
communal worship. Both the saint oriented and the puritan 
precursors of Wahhabism brought from outside the traditional 
ambience a 'new' form of Islam that unified the community 
of believers and set it apart from the surrounding groups. 
This element of 'uniqueness' was the common denominator 
of several strategies of reform which the Songhay developed 
in response to oppression and social disunity. 
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The Songhay mahdi (11949). 
Two manifestations of Islamic reform in its enthusiastic 
form, expressed singly or in combination, are derived from 
the concepts of jihffd and mahdi. A participant in the jih5d, 
or holy war, has been regarded as a reformer, or mujaddati. 
in the sense that he opposed the 'backsliding' of the ruling 
classes. 
' Such reform has also been expressed in opposition 
to perceived pagan abuses, as in the Fulani jihids of the 
19th century. The leaders of the iih5d have usually been 
regarded as being orthodox Muslims and the legitimation 
of reform has been conceived in terms of a return to an 
earlier form of the 'true' Islam. This formulation of the 
concept of jih5d is probably the most widely current because 
the successful jih5ds fit this description. Some jihdd 
leaders larqeiy owed their success to an identification 
with 'orthodoxy' and to the fact that their opponents were 
a corrupt, disintegrating ruling class or a militarily assail- 
able pagan or semi-Islamic society. 
The abortive jih5d to be described here had none of 
these qualities. It was undertaken by a group of Hamallists 
who held unusual beliefs--in spite of their own assertion 
of orthodoxy--and was directed, suicidally, against the 
much stronger French military. Movements termed 'jih5ds' 
by historians were almost all in some ways 'successful', 
even to the point where significant historical impact has 
1. Paden, 1973: 70-71. 
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become a necessary definitive feature of the jih5d. Despite 
its marginality and lack of success, however, the 'jih5d' 
of the Songhay was motivated by the same Muslim principles 
as the more historically significant holy wars of, for exam- 
ple, 19th century West Africa. 
The classic formulation of the concept of the mahdI 
comes from Ibn Khaldun's 13th century 'sociological' treatise, 
the Muqaddimah: 
It has been well known (and generally accepted) 
by all Muslims in every epoch that at the end 
of time a man from the family (of the prophet) 
will without fail make his appearance, one who 
will strengthen the religion and make justice 
triumph. The Muslims will follow him, and he 
will gain dominion of the Muslim realm. He will 
be called the Mahdi. Following him, the Antichrist 
will appear together with all the subsequent signs 
of the Hour... 2 
The concepts of jihdd and mahd! were disseminated in 
West Africa largely through the medium of the Sufi brother- 
hoods. An important source of 'ecstatic' religious practices 
which made use of these concepts was the Tijaniyya brother- 
hood. The Tijaniyya clearly represents an enthusiastic 
expression of Islam with its emphasis on the miracles of 
holy men, the power of amulets, visions, and group recitation 
(dhikr). These 'ecstatic f features of Islam are perhaps 
more strongly represented in the Tijaniyya than in the Qadir- 
iyya, especiallY the group recitation which, in Sokoto at 
least, was a distinguishing characteristic of the Tijaniyya: 
"Unlike the Tijaniyya, the Qadiriyya as found in Sokoto 
2. lbri Khaldun, 19t)7: 156. 
1 
tends to be individualistic and does not practice group 
recitations. Thus there is less community of feeling demon- 
strated among Qadiris. " 
3 
The Hama IIi , Yya, which emerged from the Tijaniyya in 
West Africa in the 1930's, became, for a short time, a medium 
of the expression of the 'ecstatic' trend in Islam among 
the Songhay. A definitive history of the Hamallist movement 
in French West Africa, from which the mahdist Songhay upri- 
sing emerged, has not yet been written. largely because 
much relevant material in the Bamako archives remains inacces- 
sible to researchers. Nevertheless, a general outline of the 
movement can be derived from existing published sources. 
I 
Hamailism did not initially develop as a unified expres- 
sion of Islam. Jts exponents included both the saintly, 
introverted Cerno Bokar of Bandiagara5 and the radical 
mahdist leader of the Songhay 'jihad', Musa Aminu. Elements 
that are common in descriptions of the movement, however, 
are the emphasis on the holiness of the founder, Sheikh 
Hamallah, and the attribution to him of miracles as well 
as an importance given to the 'correct' version of the Tijani 
wird, or recitation after prayer. 
in describing the origins of Hamallism, Hampate BA, 
himself a Hamallist, uses the 'miraculous ' hagiographic 
style. He describes the search of Muhammad al-Akhdar, a North 
3. Last, 1967: 216. 
4. Cf., for example, Abun-Nasr, 1965; Alexandre, 1970; B-A, 
1980; and Brenner, 1984. 
5. Cf. B. A, 1980 and Brenner, 1984. 
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African Sherif, for a leader to Promote a rý. torm of the 
Tijaniyya brotherhood. His search ends 1: n Nyoro, south 
of Mauritania, when he sees the young Sheikh Hamallah and 
asks: 
--Qui est le p6re de ce fils de noir? 
--Ce n'est pas un noir r6pondit Sidi AbdallAh: 
ctest un Cherif, un descendant du Proph6te. C'est 
le Cherif Hamallah, fils de Sidna Omar... 
Cheikh Muhammad Lakhdar garda un moment le sil- 
ence. Puis il dit: 
--Son pied est plac6 tr6s haut par rapport a 
la terre. 
Tous ceux qui &taient pr6sent rencherirent: 
Ce n'est pas 6tonnant. De tout temps, i1a 
6merveiII6 les gens. 11 a m6me fait des miracles b 
sans Pavoir recherch6 et sans en tirer vanit6. 
Sheikh Hamallah eventually gained a wide following 
and became the leader of a Tijani reform group whose central 
doctrinal difference from the mainstream African Tijaniyya 
was the recitation of a rosary with eleven prayers instead 
of twelve. Thus they became known by the French as the 
f onze grains'. 
This difference between the Hamallists and the main 
body of the Tijaniyya was the cause of a great deal of 
hostility between the two groups. Hamallah himself was 
a retiring f igure who did riot wish to become involved in any 
controversy either with rival brotherhoods or with the French. 
His followers were often more defensive, having received 
frequent harassment from their main rivals, the Tenwajib, 
a Moorish tribe in the Nyoro area which supported the 'ortho- 
doxl Tijaniyya. In August, 1940 the commandant of Nyoro 
6. BA, 1980: 66. 
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was informed that a Hamallist band, led by three of Sheikh 
Hamallah's sons, had attacked the main TenwajJLb camp, massa- 
cring more than 400 people. Thirty-three leaders of this 
attack (including Hamallah's sons) were secretly executed 
by the French, and 600 others were imprisoned. Hamallah, 
despite his innocence in the affair, was deported, first 
to Algeria, then to Vals-les Bains in France where he died 
in 1943.7 
Rather than eliminate the Hamallist problem, the French 
suppression scattered leaders and followers of the movement 
throughout West Africa. This opened the door to a wide 
range of doctrinal interpretations and, as Alexandre descri- 
bes, eruptions of messianic enthusiasm: 
The executions and Hamallah's deportation had 
been carried out with the utmost discression: 
the families refused to mourn the dead and instead 
spread the rumour that they had fled to Syria 
or Mecca and would eventually come back with the 
Shaykh as a Mahdi ... in the sahil the Hamallists 
were adopting queer and spectacularly unorthodox 
practices: shouting prayers instead of chanting 
them, tattooing their cheeks with the shaikh's 
cattle marks, lateron organizing orgiastic sessions 
with group fornication and sodomy. 8 
This kind of radical enthusiasm began to wane after 1946, 
possibly because it lacked centralization or because French 
power and oppressiveness had changed with a new constitution. 
The mahdist uprising among the Songhay in 11)49 was one of 
the last outbursts of messianism in this phase in the history 
7. Alexandre, 1970: 505-6. 
8. ibid. 
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of the Hamallist movement. 
Monteil, in ý'Islam h0jr, provides aq the Ilimpse into 
personal history of the Songhay up-rising's leader, Musa 
Aminu which I have supplemented witti oral accounts gathered 
in Gao. He claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad and 
styled himself Sheikh Musa ibn Muhammad al-Amin. He was 
born around 1906 in the village of Wani, south of Bourem. 
In true Songhay fashion, he traveled to Ghana in 1919. 
His Quranic studies were mainly undertaken in Dori, a town 
now in Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), before he traveled 
to Nyoro in 1940 to be initiated into the reform movement 
of Sheikh Hamallah. This was only shortly before the massacre 
of the Tenwajib and Hamallah's subsequent exile. The year 
of Musa 's return to his natal village of Wani is uncertain, 
but he probably left Nyoro at a time when the French were 
sti II actively hosti le toward the movement, within a few 
years of Hamallah's exile, staying first at Dori before 
moving to Wani. Upon his return to Wani he gained a wide 
reputation as a man of learning and holiness. His claim 
of descent from the prophet was widely believed and some 
also thought he was the successor of Sheikh Hamallah to 
the leadership of the brotherhood. 
In the presence of a loyal following and in the glow 
of admiration lie must have received in his home village, 
combined with continued harassment from the French, Musa 
Aminu developed a heroic self image which culminated in 
visions of himself as the mahdi. A number of his followers 
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also had visions of him as a saviour-. His record of these 
dreams and visions%,. as found by the French in his home after 
his death. Excerpts from this record were translated by 
Captain saint-Gratien and later published in Monteil's l'Islam 
noir, of which the following are examples: 
Vai vu the Cheikh Hamallah, et il Wa dit, "Tu 
es le Mahdi Muhammad, Wen doute point! " 
Vai vu le proph6te assis dans son temple, entour6 
d'une foule ennombrable. Je courus de lui saluer. 
Il se leva, me donna la main, m'embrasser et me 
sourit, puis il me suspendit un sabre A 1'6paule. 
Il me fit alors asseoir sur un estrade et m'ordonna 
de lancer la guerre sainte (jih5d]. 
Une Voix, venue de Dieux, me r6jouit en citant 
ce verset: "Ies derniers des malfaisants seront 
extermin6s. " Dieu soit lou6! 9 
In 1949 the visions of Musa Aminu as the mahdY seemed 
to have led to a feeling amongst his followers that they 
were invulnerable and could defeat the French in a j. ih5d. 
The administration in Cao was warned by a French supervisor 
of road construction near Wani that the Muslims there were 
acting strangely. A French officer who was sent to investi- 
gate the situation was wounded. This was an unexpected 
turn of events but, seeing that retaliation from the French 
was inevitable, Musa Aminu mounted a white horse and began 
to prepare an attack. A force from the French garrison 
in Cao was quickly organized and sent to Wani to quell the 
uprising. Eight of the rebels were killed. Musa Aminu 
himself was seriously wounded and died the following day 
after having been transported to Cao. Numerous arrests 
9. Monteil, 1964: 296. 
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were made of Muslims in the surrounding area suspected of 
complicity. Hamallism was so thoroughly suppressed in the 
Gao region at the time of the mahdist uprising that today 
it appears to have few, if any, adherents. 
Early reformers: Abdullahi ag Mahmud and 'Abd al-Rahman 
al-Ifriqi. 
At the same time as the enthusiastic expression of 
Hamallism had found a place among the Songhay of the Cao 
region, the first representatives from West Africa of a 
very different kind of Islamic reform had begun to influence 
the practice of the faith. Two of the early West African 
puritan reformers, Abdullahi aq Mahmud and 'Abd al-Rahman 
al-Ifriqi, originated from the Gao area. 
Kabalo gives Abdullahi ag Mahmud the status of an early 
pioneer of Wahhabism in West Africa who paved the way for 
the later activity of the Association of Young Muslims (Sub- 
banu al-Muslimin) in Bamako. Ag Mahmud does not, however, 
seem to have made much contact with reformists elsewhere 
and the ties between his efforts and those of the Bamako 
Wahhabis were probably very indirect. 
Abdul lahi ag Mahmud belonged to a Cao-based Tuareg 
group, the Kel es-Souk. A report by Governor Beý-riesllstates 
that he accompanied his father on pilgrimage to Mecca where 
10. Kaba, 1974. 
il. Cited in Kaba, 1974: 70. 
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he is said to have stayed for 30 years (probably an exagger- 
ated claim). fie would have been very young at the time 
and it is also Possible that his f, i,, -rier married in the Middle 
East and that ag Mahmud was born there. In Saudi Arabia 
he was given a thorough Islamic education and he accepted 
many of the tenets that later became identified with West 
African Wahhabism. He returned to Cao in 1938 with the 
aim of preaching the reformed faith. 
His reforms were directed against many of the pv! --tices 
associated with the S uf i orders. He was opposed to the 
invocation of the prophets or the 'saints' in prayer, the 
manufacture or use of amulets, and the attributing to 'mara- 
bouts' of holiness which gives them the status of intermedi- 
aries between ordinary worshippers and God. He encouraged 
Muslim clerics to work rather than live from the trade of 
amulets; he recommended that the four successors to the 
prophet be followed only when their judgements accord with 
passages in the Quran and he recommended individual interpre- 
tation of the Quran (. ijtih, 5d) in the case of someone who 
had done serious studies in philosophy (luga literally 
0 language'). 12 
Abdullahi ag Mahmud is remembered, not so much for 
his ideas as for the patience and committment with which 
he taught them. There is no evidence that he attempted to 
open a Quranic school, probably because of limil-tations placed 
12. Beyries, cited in Kaba, 1974: 30. 
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on Islamic teaching by the colonial juthorities. He taught 
the new doctrine principally by 'I-iis own example, by reading 
and explaining the Quran and bY leading his audiences to 
discover for themselves the problems inherent with tradi- 
tional practices and systems of Muslim leadership. i3 
The limited gains he made in promoting reform seem 
to have been among groups who adhered to the Qadiriyya bro- 
therhood. His influence extended to Timbuktu where some 
members of the Kunta tribe accepted many of his ideas. 'rhis 
tribe had followed the Qadiriyya order for centuries and 
ýilready tended towards a more puritan practice of the faith. 14 
Through oral testimony from a number of ag Mahmud's 
admirers I am able to evaluate more precisely the impact 
of his teaching. The area where he concentrated most of 
his effort was between Cao and Markoy (in Burkina Faso) 
where he practiced trade. In this area the Fulani of Gabero 
were receptive to his teachings but they, too, were loyal 
to the Qadiriyya brotherhood and remained so despite ag 
Mahmud's promotion of reform. Among his own tribe, the 
Kel es-Souk, which adhered to the Tijaniyya, he had little 
success, and one of his principal detractors was its leader, 
Sheikh Hamada. There is no sign that Songhay of the villages 
were very receptive to ag Mahmud's reforms. The Songhay 
have always preferred their own Muslim clerics, however 
13. Kaba, 1974: 31. 
14. Cf. Stewart, 1973. 
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inferior in learning they may be to those of neighbouring 
groups. But his ideas must have circulated to some extent 
and may have indirectly clear(-,, i the way for later reform. 
Abdullahi ag Mahmud died in 1952. In the period follow- 
ing his death he was not succeeded in his campaign for reform 
by anyone in the Cao area. In Markoy, however, a relative 
of his, Agoda ibn Baza, having returned from pilgrimage, 
continued the effort for reform. He does not appear to 
have progressed much further than his predecesor before 
his death in the late 1950's. 
Triaud, in an unpublished paper, "'Abd al-Rahman I'Afri- 
cain (1909-1957) Pionnier et Precursor du Wahhabisme au 
Mali", describes the career and influence of an early Wahhabi, 
'Abd al-Rahmal al-Ifriqi. We are not told whether his ethnic 
background was Songhay or Fulani, but it was probably the 
former. He was born in the village of Fafa, near Ansongo, 
in 1908 or 1909. As a boy he was sent to French school; 
the colonial authorities having demanded his attendance 
against the will of his parents. He did well in school 
and upon completion of his studies began work as a teacher, 
and later was employed in the meteorological service. In 
spite of a stable career in the civil service, he gave up 
his job and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. 
15 After completing 
' (8 ' tual he went to Medina where he 
becian his pi, lgrimage ri 
15. The date of this decision is unknown. Cf. Triaud, 1983. 
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education in Islamic studies. He eventually became a pupil 
at the Dar al-Hadith, a school oriented specifically towards 
adults, especially Africans, who have insufficient knowledge 
of Arabic for more advanced study programmes. During this 
early period of Islamic study he came under the influence 
of Wahhabi ideas. He went ori to attain a position of teacher 
(mudarris) in the Dar al-Hadii-. h and was used by the director 
of the school as an interpreter. The Second World War caused 
the temporary closure of the school and 'Abd al-Rahman was 
assigned to teach in Yanbu' al-Nakhl, an oasis north of 
Mecca, as a missionary in the service of the Saudi state. 
In 1945 he returned to teach at the Dar al-Hadith, iargely 
because of requests that he do so by the students there. 
His reputation subsequently grew and in 1952 he was given 
a position in Riadh in the Ma'had Al-Ilmi (Institute of 
Knowledge), a school of advanced Islamic learning. He died 
of an unspecified illness in 1957 in Beiruit, having been 
sent there for hospitalization. 
'Abd al-Rahman did not leave behind a significant body 
of work, but he did write a number of short essays destined 
for wide distribution which give us a glimpse into his ideas 
and the way in which he may have been influential. The 
most important of these was entitled Kit5b al-Anwar al- 
Rahman-Lyya li-hidjyati al-Firqa al-Tijanlyya (Book of 
the Merciful Light to Show the Way Concerning the Tijaniyya). 
This book, printed in brochure form and distributed to pil- 
grims, denounces the Tijaniyya as well as other Sufi orders. 
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In West Africa, the Tijaniyya and Idahhabiyya are adversaries 
and 'Abd al-Rahman's pamphlet is part of this conflict. 
Thdt which comes especially under attack is the perceived 
exorbinant claims of the Tijanis who assert that membership 
in the brotherhood is a guarantee of salvation. Such claims 
are described by 'Abd al-Rahman as unacceptable innovation 
(bid'a). 
Another work by 'Abd al-Rahman, Jaw5ban li-IfrTq-Lyyin 
(Reply to an African), is a simple outline of the main judi- 
cial schools (mathhab) in Islam for use by the (African) 
layman. This brochure qives a brief history of the four 
main judicial schools and ends with a summary of the Wahhabi 
position, that is, an avoidance of any excessive deference 
to the positions of the 'four imams': Abu Hanifa, Malik 
ibn Arias, Shafii, and ibn Hanbal. 
The f inal work brought to our attention by Triaud is 
Tawd1h al-Haii wa-l-'Umra (Explanation of the Pilgrimage 
and the ' Umra). This is simply a guide for use by pilgrims 
in Mecca. its significance lies in the indication it gives 
of a close relationship between 'Abd al-Rahman and pilgrims 
from West Africa. As Triaud says, "des qu'un Africain arri- 
vait A Medine, 'Abd al-Rahman s'en occupait. " 
16 It is prob- 
able that he paid particular attention to those origindting 
from his natal area, Ansonqo, and that he made an indirect 
contribution to the later development of Wahhabism in this 
region thr-ough his teaching and writing in Medina. 
16. Tri, md, 1983: 10. 
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Migration and Islamization in Ghana. 
Seasonal movement of men to southern towns, particularly 
those in present-day Ghana, has been an essential feature 
of Songhay Islamization, especially since the Second World 
War. This migration has been undertaken for a number of 
reasons. Forced labour and conscription in French West 
Africa led many Songhay to seek temporary refuge in the 
comparatively liberal territories under English rule. 17 
Economically, the movement is encouraged by the long period 
of' non- product ivi ty in the region of the Sahel during the 
dry season. Migratory employment has also been a source 
of support after poor harvests. 
There is thus what can be described as a 'dual economy' 
among the Songhay in which young men, after the harvest, 
travel south to engage in farm tabour and more exclusively 
urban occupations such as petty trade and work as 'latrine 
boys' or porters. Work as porters, or kaya-kaya, in the 
markets and busy streets of Kumasi and Accra has been almost 
completely monopolized by Songhay from the Gao region. 
Migrants usually return home after seven or eight months 
at the beginning of the agricultural season. 
For young men the migration has also been a source 
of adventure and prestige; it is undertaken in order to 
become a 'man'. often it has been the prestige-seeking 
17. Olivier de Sardan, 1984: 176. 
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rather than the economic motivation that lies behind the 
decision to migrate. Rouch indicates this in a description 
of a returned 'Cold Coastier': 
Tous les parents et amis se groupent devant la 
case de laquelle 6merge le Cold Coastier dans 
ses plus beaux atours. Les griots chantent ses louanges et recoivent le de I'argent. On ouvre 
les baggages, en grande pompe, et la distribution 
commence. Toute la journ6e le Cold Coastier est 
le roi de son village. 18 
In the cities of Ghana, particularly Kumasi and Accra, 
the immigrant populations, of wide ranging origins (Yoruba, 
Mossi, Hausa, etc. ), live in large, ethnically heterogenous 
neighbourhoods known as zongos (a Hausa word meaning 'stran- 
ger community'). In an urban milieu where animism and Chri- 
stianity are the majority religions, Islam became the princi- 
pal means by which immigrants found an identity within the 
zongos. 
Songhay adherence to Islam in the zongos was largely 
a defense against submergence into the 'alien' cultures 
of the coastal peoples. The animist practices of the Asante 
were dreaded. Many migrants believed that human sacrifices 
were still being practiced and that they, as strangers with 
few ties to the dominant local society, would be the first 
victims o'f blood rituals. 
19 Besides the perceived threat 
from local culture, the predominance of Christian education 
in schools presented a more tangible threat to the migrants 
18. Rouch, 1956: 79. 
19. ibid: 166. 
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the loss of their identitk-y Most Songhay, as k,, ith other 
migrant groups, thought of themselves cis Muslims and, even 
though Songhay childron were very few in number in the ze-, ongo 
communities, the pervasive influence of Christianity invited 
not submission and integration but defense and a solidifi. - 
cation of Islam. 
Although its adherents were a small minority of the 
total population of the Ghanaian cities, Islain in the zongo 
communities had a dynamic of its own. The Hausa, though 
not. always pious Muslims, were important in providing a 
model of scriptural observance which was largely incorporated 
in the immigrant communi ties. 
20 
The pilgrimage and other 
forms of contact with "liddle Eastern centres of learning 
were sources of prestige for more affluent migrants. 
Rouch has remarked that in the 1950's the Islamization 
of Songhay migrants hcid become common: "Le migrant, parti 
souvent anlmlste. rentre, au but de quelques ann6es musul- 
mall. "21 The 'Juke-warm' Muslim often became, in the Ghanaian 
zongos, a more committed believer. Daily Prayers were perfor- 
med with care, the Friday prayer united almost the entire 
community and Lhe Muslim festivals took place in large gath- 
22 erings. 
Contact with Muslim centres was not the most significant 
aspect of Islam in the 'sturzinger communities' in Chana. The 
Muslim societies of the Sahel also placed great value on 
20. Schildkrout, 1976: 90. 
21. Rouch, 1960 b: 376. 
22. Rouch, 1956: 172. 
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the pilgrimage, on study in Islamic centres and on visits 
from learned Arabs. The importance of the zongos lies in 
the fact that they were closed Muslim communities, the members 
of which perceived themselves as defending their faith and 
their culture in an alien environment. 
Tt-ie Songhay migrants, while fully participating in 
the inter-ethnic Muslim observance, were not on the whole 
as fully integrated into the zongo communities as most other 
groups because of the relatively short and irregular periods 
of time spent by them in Ghana; but this qave them a large 
degree of ethnic solidarity. In the 1940's the Songhay 
migrants, especially those in Kumasi, demonstrated a unity 
which was to prove an aid in their trade activities. Songhay 
petty traders, for example, were the only 'stranciers' able 
to break a monopoly of the Asanti 'mammies' in the central 
market by largely taking control of the yam trade. In 1949 
the Kumasi Town Council tried to control this incursion 
by removing 35 'Gao' (i. e. Songhay) traders from the central 
market. This resulted in a great deal of tension between 
the Songhay and the Asanti. The Songhay were also resentful 
of the involvement of Hausa leaders in the action of the 
Town Council. The dispute culminated in a series of violent 
incidents in 1949 and it was not until 1951 when a dozen 
stands were returned to the 'Gao' that peace was re-establi- 
stied. 
23 
In the 19,50's the zongo communities became actively 
23. Schildkrout, 1974. 
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involved in national politics. This increased involvement 
was introduced in 1953 with the foundation of the Moslem 
Association Party (MAP) which became the major alternative 
to the Convention People's Party (CPP) in pre-independence 
politics. Of the two parties the MAP was the more conserva- 
tive, representing the interests of 'chiefs' and traditional 
authorities. The MAP derived much of its support from the 
zongo communities. Most ethnic groups, in the wake of this 
politicization, became divided along party lines. Both 
parties had significant support from young men called 'action 
troopers' who, as Schildkrout puts it, it were willing to 
take to the streets to fight party battles with intense 
religious fervor.,, 
24 
The Songhay were no exception to this division. Itiner- 
ant migrants who tended to be less integrated into zongo 
political and -religious organizations generally supported 
the CPP. More settled Songhay migrants, however, who had 
greater adherence to Islam, tended to support the MAP. 
The political division of the Songhay followed the division 
between Muslim an-3 non-Muslim or nominally Muslim migrants. 
Short-term migrants, while generally becoming more Islamized 
through their experience in the zongos, were not fully inte- 
grated in the religious and political organizations. Longer- 
term migrants who often engaged in comparatively more lucra- 
tive economic activities or who had positions as Muslim 
24. Schildkrout, 1974: 120. 
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clerics, had a greater committment to Islam and were more 
receptive to the example ol scriptural piety which was the 
ideal in -'Lhe zongo communities. These migrants were to 
become committed to puritan Islamic reform by the end of 
the 1960's. 
The CPP came to power with independence in 1958 and 
the MAP was officially disbanded. A number of MAP leaders 
were jailed or left the country and it was not until the 
coup in 1966 that many of these leaders returned to their 
former positions. 
In the Cao area the effects of returned migrants upon 
the practice of Islam was, in the 1940's, 50's and 60's, 
relatively mild. While those who left to work in Ghana 
for less than a year at a time may have brought back a recep- 
tiveness to the ideas of Islamic reform, they did not them- 
selves generate an enthusiastic wave of committment to a 
puritan expression of the faith. The 'hard core' of Songhay 
'Wahhabis', therefore, remained largely isolated from Gao 
and its environs. It was not until the- GlIanaian government is 
expulsion of many settled migrants in 1969 and '70 that 
these committed reformists returned to Gao and Wahhabism 
began to develop there in ernest. 
Nevertheless, the Islamization of Songhay migrants 
in the zongos, especially since the Second World War, was 
a significant prelude to the development of Wahhabism in 
the Sahel. The experience of living in largely insular 
Muslim communities almost certainly prepared the way for 
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the establishment of the Wahhabiyya in Cao, even if it did 
not 'convert' all temporar, -, migrants to a scripturalist 
interpretation of the faith. 
In the 1940's and 50's in the Cao region there were 
two currents of religious reform. Each had a different 
origin and took on an entirely different expression of the 
Islamic religion. Hamallism was brought to Cao from the 
original nucleus of Sheikh Hamalla's devotees in Nyoro. 
It was, under Musa Aminu's leadership, enthusiastic and 
millenarian. Sheikh Musa legitimated his position of leader- 
ship through a claim of descent from the prophet--by establi- 
shing himself as a 'saint'. 
Abdullahi ag Mahmud and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Ifriqi were 
teachers and 'missionaries' rather than 'saints'. Their 
leadership was based upon literacy dnd a comprehensive under- 
standing of the Quran and other texts rather than upon desc- 
ent, miracles or visions. A similar scripturalist trend 
was also developing among the immigrant communities in Ghana. 
At roughly the same time that Musa Aminu's visionary mahdism 
arose in Wani, the Songhay in other areas were beginning 
to accept a more scripturalist manner of reform. 
The 'ecstatic' reform of Musa Aminu, in essence, took 
the model of Islam as practiced by the brotherhoods and 
exaqgerated it. Rather than content themselves with a 
'saint', 
a venerated holy man, the Songhay followed a saviour and 
practiced a devotional excess that is common to messianic 
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movements. The 'pedantic' mode of reform, exemplified by 
Abdullahi ag Mahmud and 'Abd -il-Rahman al-Ifriqi, modeled 
itself more on the scripturalism of the puritan reformer 
who stresses a return to 'pure' Islam and bases this return 
on an understanding and implementation of the original sources 
of religious inspiration. 
In spite of their almost overwhelming differences, 
the 'ecstatic' and 'pedantic' modes of reform among the 
Songhay had some general characteristics in common. Both 
were 'newt to the Songhay. The veneration of saints was 
not new, but the Hamallist expression of this tendency was 
original enough to distinguish it from all other groups 
or movements. Similarly, Wahhabism had been in existence 
for several centuries and had influenced Usman dan Fodio 
and other iih5d leaders of the 19th century, but its dissem- 
ination was only just beginning to gain new momentum and 
few of the tribal or ethnic groups neighbouring the Songhay 
in Gao had been significantly changed by it. 
Thus, another similarity between the two expressions 
of reform is that they could, in a limited sense, be called 
tunique' to the Songhay. Neither Hamallism nor Wahhabism 
had a place in the Islam of the Kunta, Tuareg or Fulani. 
In the Ghanaian context this relationship between reform 
and ethnic solidarity took the form of an integration into 
the zongo communities. Both kinds of reform, therefore, 
were suited for a solidification of the ethnic boundary. 
I By setting themselves apart in this way, particularly from 
their former nomadic oppressors, the Songhay could call 
1.1 1 
upon religious reform as an affirmati, I)n of equality, or 
even superiority. 
Abdullahi ag Mahmud is si. -Mificant, when considered 
together with the later development of Wahhabism in Gao, 
principally for the fact that neither he nor his teachings 
appealed immediately to the Songhay. Several decades after 
his death, however, Songhay clerics preaching much the same 
message were far more successful. In the interim there 
were two developments that are worth stressing: 1) an increase 
in Islamic learning among a number of Songhay clerics which 
gave the message of reform more of an ethnic appeal; and 
2) a drive toward western education and 'modernization' 
on the part of the new nation state which weakened adherence 
to traditional values but which failed to provide a viable 
alternative moral order. 
V. MODERATES AND RADICALS 
In this chapter I elaborate on the distinction between 
two groups of Wahhabis: moderates and radicals. This is 
intended as an outline of some general themes, such as the 
rivalry between religious factions and the centralization 
of radical Wahhabi villages, which are dealt with in more 
detail in later chapters. In introducing these groups I 
focus upon the leadership since the leaders provide a model 
of attitudes and behaviour for others to imitate and because 
a summary of their social backgrounds provides a basis for 
understanding the development of the Wahhabiyya in Gao which 
is treated below. 
Introduction. 
The ordinary townspeople of Gao are aware of the exist- 
ence of Wahhabism in their city and of the fact that it 
is a recent phenomenon, but often this is the full extent 
of their knowledge of the matter. They identify a Wahhabi 
by his manner of dress: a white brimless cap, a head scarf 
instead of a turban, a full length shirt (chemise Arabe) 
instead of the traditional 'boubou ', and sometimes a Middle 
Eastern-style cape. Of the ideas of Wahhabis. however, 
they often know little. That which is niost clear to them 
is the f(ict that Wcihhabi ideas are not the same as everybody 
- else 9s and that, in the common view, they tend toward an 
1 12 
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I unnecessary' rigour in their practice of Islam. Some are 
defensive and see this rigour as an attack on cherished 
traditional beliefs and Practices, and in this respect the 
outward sign of religious differentiation--the crossed arms 
in prayer of the Wahhabis as opposed to the arms held at 
the side--is sometimes a strong factor in generating ill- 
feeling and religious rivalry. 
Wahhabism in the Cao area, however, is not unified 
into a single community of believers. In general they are 
divided into what may be called 'moderates' and 'radicals'. 
The moderate Wahhabis generally maintain the attitude 
that there are reforms to be made in the practice of Islam 
but that nothing is to be gained by forcing change too strongly. 
The essential thing is for the Wahhabiyya to provide an 
example of the correct practice of the faith which others, 
'God willing' will follow. Some moderates stress the unity 
of the community of Islam and, while admitting to differences 
in practices and knowledge, will deny or try to minimize 
the existence of dissention between believers. 
The radicals generally maintain the attitude that they 
have discovered the Truth. In their view, others, including 
many who believe themselves to be Musims, have been offered 
access to this Truth but have refused it and are therefore 
'infidels' (k5fir) or 'polytheists' (mushrik). Their main 
complaint with the moderate Wahhabis is that the latter 
have compromised with those who are more obviously 
'i"fidels' 
and, therefore, share in the general trend of 
the non-observance 
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of Islam. Thus, for the radical Wahhabis, the moderates 
are murtadd Capostates'). Secondarily, the radicals point 
to details of Muslim practice that the moderates are said 
to do incorrectly, such as the failure to seclude their 
wives and to have them 'properly' dressed outside the home. I 
The radicals, therefore, in their observance of the Truth, 
place more demands upon the worshipper in the practice of 
Islam. 
The radicals, who call their organization of villages 
the Jama'a Ansar al-Sunna (Community of the Felpers of the 
Sunna), reinforce the distinction between themselves and 
the moderates within the sphere of social behaviour and 
religious practice. They will not, for example, eat meat 
from animals slaughtered by other Muslims in the Gao area, 
including moderate Wahhabis. They consider the slaughter 
to have been done by a non-Muslim and therefore the meat 
is forbidden (ýarjm) to them. They also distinguish them- 
selves by their greetings. Most Muslims, including moderate 
Wahhabis, greet one another with 'al-Sal5mu alaikum', 'peace 
be upon you'. Radical Wahhabis always greet one another 
with the much lengthier formula: 'al-Sdlamu alaTkum wa- 
I-Rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu wa ma! ýfiratuhu', peace be 
upon you and the mercy of God and His blessing and His for- 
giveness'. It was explained to me several times by radical 
Wahhabis that 'anyone who does not use this greeting is 
a mushrik. Some moderate Wahhdbis consider this an unaccept- 
able innovation (bid'a) since the word 'maqfiratu' has rarely 
1. See below, pp. e)14-, '--'2. 
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been used in a Muslim greeting, even in the lengthy prefaces 
of letters. 
Another difference between the moderate and radical 
Wahhabis is in their spatial distribution. The moderates, 
on the whole, are to be found in the towns. Of the three 
towns, Bourem, Gao and Ansongo, the latter two have the 
largest Wahhabi communities. I cannot accurately estimate 
the number of adherents in Bourem or Ansongo, but the number 
of Wahhabi men in Gao is not much more than 300; if their 
wives and children are included in this estimate (even though 
they are not always identifiable as Wahhabis) the number 
comes to approximately 1000. There are a number of except- 
ions to this urban orientation, for a number of villages 
have small moderate communities. Forgho, for example, is 
a large village betwen Cao and Bourem which has a number 
of wahhabis who do not belong to the radical group. it 
seems to be a trend that the few villages with moderate 
wahhabi communities also have radical communities which 
oppose them. 
The radicals shun the town, associating it with 'un- 
Islamic' influences. Only one radical Wahhabi, a clerk 
in the Mayor's office, lives permanently in Gao. Several 
others live in the town on a part-time basis, but in each 
case keep their wives and children in the villages. In 
general, only those who are fully steeped in Islamic learning 
or advanced in age are considered able to withstand the 
U6 
corrupting influence of the town. 
Within the village context, the radicals remain aloof 
from their non-Wahhabi (and moderate Wahhabi) neighbours 
and. wherever possible, have established septicate villaqes 
and communities (see map, p. The population oý' radical 
Wahhabi villaqes varies from those with three or four famil- 
ies to large villages with 500 or more inhabitants. The 
total population or radicals in the Gao area is, at a rough 
estimate, 4,000. 
The fact that the moderate reformist community is centred 
in the ',, --. own while the -radicals i-ire anchored to village life 
is reflected in the modes of livelihood practiced by the 
male members of the two communities. To present this dif- 
ference with as much precision as possible a census was 
taken of the occupation of students' fathers in the followinq 
schools: 1) the. two madrasas established by leaders of the 
moderate Wahhabiyya; 2) a large traditional Quran school 
in Gao; and 3) the 'radical' madrasa in Dar at-Salam. 
It should be stressed that the census is not. entirely 
representative of the occupatiolls of Gao's reformists because 
a child can formally be enrolled regardless of the religious 
tendencies of his or her narents. It is likely, therefore, 
that in this part of the sample the information on fathers' 
occupation shows us the social background of those sympa- 
thetic to a 'comprehensive' knowledge of Arabic without 
--u 2.1 was told that nine years of Islamic si., dv are required 
before a young man brought up in the village environment. 
can travel to Gao. This injunction seems to be applied 
with some consistency only in the Wahhabi capital, Dar al- 
Salam. Fitness to travel to the town, it appears, is deter- 
mined by the village imam. 
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2 
occupational 
category 
moderate Traditional Dar al-Salam 
madrasas Quran school madrasa 
no. of % no. % no. % students 
civil 47-- 25.00 ' 16 21.92 
servant 
artisan 
43 22.87 1 25 34.25 
trade 31 . 16.49 
8 1-0.96 
18 9.57 15 20.53 transport 
religious 
7 72 1- 1.37 
functionary 
farmer 42 22.34 8 10.96 186 100 
Table 3: Occupations of students' fathers. 
necessarily identifying completely with the reform movement. 
The traditional Quran school is represen"Lative of the tradi- 
tionalist community since it would not attract members of 
the reform movement, this kind of school being a vehicle for 
the style of religious learning to which the reformers are 
opposed. 
In Dar al-Salam a different problem was faced, namely 
that students were instructed by the leadership to indicate 
I peasant' (fatah) . This is significant 
in that even those 
whose fathers are in t. he southern cities edrnirig a temporary 
2. Some of these cateqories may require examples: 1) civil 
servants: all salaried government workers--clerks. military 
personnel, teachers, etc. ; 2) artisans: masons, carpenters, 
boat builders, etc.; 3) trade: those who sell in the market., 
shop owners, minor traders and, rarely, long-distance traders; 
4) transport: drivers and mechanics; 5) religious functionary: 
clerics and teachers in madrasas. 
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live. "Lihood from trade or salaried labour are considered the 
sons of 'farmers'. The radical Wahhabiyya clearly places 
great value upon the modes of livelihood associated with vil- 
lage life. 
Returning Lo the tirban madrasas we see a more or less 
even distribution of civil servants, artisans and farmers 
with slightly fewer traders and the lowest percentaqe found 
in the more specific categories of 'transport' and 'religious 
functionary'. The high percentage of farmers requires explana- 
tion. In the second moderate madrasa sampled the head -instruc- 
tor was from Forgho, one of the villages in which the moderate 
reform movement has a significant following. Some parents 
who are sympathethic to the moderate reform movement, or who 
simply wish their children to receive better instruction in 
Arabic than that available in traditional Quran schools, send 
their children to the town, usually lodging with relatives, 
4- 
L. o attend the madrasa. 
Another surprise in the results of the census is the 
fact that 'civil servant' is the most common occupational 
category among the fathers of children in Cao's madrasas, 
a result which contrasts with the traditional Quran school 
where 'artisan' is the [lost common category. This is surpri- 
sing since in the West African context government employees 
have been those most exPosed to western education and western 
values. Kaba 
3 
describes the Islamic reform movement in Bamako 
during the 1940's and 50's as being opposed by those sectors 
3. Kaba, 1974. 
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of society with French education, particulary government em- 
ployees. Their involvement in, or sympathy with, Islamic 
reform in Cao is evidence of dissatisfaction with the results 
of their education, of their employment, and an attraction 
to their Islamic heritage, seen, perhaps, as being the 'true' 
tradition of Africa. In the context of the moderate reform 
movement this Islamic tradition becomes more adaptable to 
the wider experience of those exposed to western influence 
than traditional Islam with its emphasis on 'Islamic magic' 
and the veneration of holy men, the human carriers of sacred 
power. The stress on literacy, on an 'understanding' of the 
sacred text and on simple obedience of divine prescriptions 
and proscriptions makes the reformed faith more compatible 
with scientific knowledge, technology and bureaucratic order. 
A los-s obvious difference between the two groups of 
reformists lies in the nature of their leadership. The leader- 
ship of the moderates is more diffuse than that of the radicals. 
A number of men share the leadership responsibilities and 
no one individual seems to take a preeminent position. The 
authority of tnese leaders, moreover, is usually based upon 
their position in the 'nobility' or their position as wealthy 
traders rather than upon any specific talents. 
In contrast to the moderates, the leadership of the 
radicals is focused upon one man, Seydu 1drissa, who may 
be considered the 'founder' of their local expression of 
Islamic reform. This reinforces the closed nature of the 
movement since it is implicitly understood that aI qood 
Muslimt is one who acknowledqes the leadership of Seydu 
12 1 
Idrissa, the head (ra'Is) of the radical Wahhabiyya. He 
defines the political boundary b., =. ýtween 'we' and 'they', 
even if his influence in remote Wal-habi villages is negligi- 
ble. He is the ultimate authority on matters pertaining 
to religious practice and acts as a focus for collective 
un i ty. He is said to have a modest family background, his 
parents being 'simple village folk', and this makes him 
ideally suited to his place as the leader of a rural move- 
ment. Other radical leaders have sometimes come from fami- 
lies with members in leading village positions, such as 
chiefs and clerics, but 'charisma' in the sense of the term 
used by Weber, meaning "specific gifts of the body and spi- 
rit... believed to be supernatural, not accessible to every- 
body ,3 is more applicable to the leadership of the radicals 
than to that of the moderates. Both the moderate and the 
radical leadership, however, are to some extent based upon 
'traditional' authority, upon the "piety for what actually, 
allegedly or presumably has always existed.,, 
4 
The use of Weber's 'ideal types' of charismatic and 
traditional authority clarifies, but at the same time exag- 
gerates, a difference between the two grouPs of reformists 
which is actually more subtle. The radical leader, unlike 
a more typical possessor of charisma, does not perform 'mir- 
acles' to legitimate his authority, and will usually deny 
3. Weber (Gerth and Mills, trans. ) 1948: 2,15. 
4. ibid: 296. 
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that there is any difference in terms of piety or 'holiness' 
between himself and any other ardent believer. He is admired 
by his followers, not because he is a 'saint' and can perform 
superhuman feats, but because he has struggled and suffered 
in following the sunna, in implementing the commands of 
God as interpreted from the Quran and the 'traditions'. 
The radical leader, therefore, derives his position largely 
from his religious knowledge and from his example of stead- 
fastness in putting that knowledge into practice. For the 
radicals, the 'supernatural gift of the spirit' is derived 
from the scriptures; the Quran is the principal carrier 
of sacred power which is then passed on to those who have 
access to it through literacy. This is also partially the 
case with the moderates, but in the urban environment literacy 
and Islamic learning are associated with a 'tradition' and, 
at the same time, the strength of national political power, 
and the greater integration of the moderate leadership within 
it, curtails the possibility of expressing defiance. 
The difference between the moderate and radical leader- 
ship is clarified by considering biographical summaries 
of some of the more important Wahhabi leaders. 
The moderate leadership. 
a) Muhammad al-Tahir is currently the 'master' of the madrasa 
Sabil Al. -Islam wa Dawatu Illaihi (The Way of 
Islam and 
the Preaching of God). He was born in Boy(-i, a Fulani village 
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between Cao and Ansongo. His family boasts of a number 
of prominent clerics, among them Hafiz Muhammad who gained 
a reputation for resistance to the French presence during 
the 1930's and 40's. His father was also part of this Fulani 
'maraboutic' tradition. Al-Tahir began his Quranic studies 
at an early age, first learning the Quran by rote, then 
learning to write it from memory, eventually being able 
to pick out the meaning of certain passages as a foundation 
for a more comprehensive knowledge of Arabic. 
As a young man he continued his Islamic studies in 
Benghazi, Libya, which was a centre of the Sanusi brother- 
5 hood. it was in U-Uýa in the 1950's that he first became 
exposed to reformist ideas, primarily through the writings 
of Ibn Taymiyya and 'Abd al-Wahhab. He later traveled to 
Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana before concentrating his mis- 
sionary effort on his native region of Cao. 
In spite of his avowed adherence to Wahhabism, Muhammad 
al-Tahir remains faithful to many features of the maraboutic 
tradition. He has not, for example, abandoned the large 
turban of the traditional literati; he still gives benedic- 
tions and blessings during prayer--thinqs that are not prac- 
ticed by most other wahhabis. 
'Umar Muhammad, more commonly known as Sirki Maiga, 
is sometimes referred to as a 'chef de file' of the moderaLe 
5. Under Italian colonial rule the Shaikh of" the lodge at 
Benghazi was regarded as the ambassador of the head of- Lhe 
brotherhood to the Governor of Cyreniaca. Cf. Evans-Pritchard, 
1949: 115. 
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Wahhabiyya in Cao. He does not, however, have an advanced 
religious education and his position is more that of a spokes- 
man than a religious leader. He has contributed to the 
strength of the movement in Gao largely through his wealth 
which was earned in trade. His education was French rather 
than Islamic and he began by working as a clerk in a store 
run by the colonial government. Not long after independence 
in 1960 he had saved a sufficient sum of money to become 
an independent trader. His main activity was in the cattle 
trade between Gao and northern Ghana. 
In the early 1970's he attended a religious meeting 
organized by Wahhabis (among them Muhammad al-Tahir) and 
subsequently 'converted' to Wahhabism. He changed his name 
from Sirki Maiga to 'Umar Muhammad as part of this officiai 
conversion with the explanation that he had not previously 
been a Muslim. Since his conversion he has used much of 
his wealth for the development of the Wahhabiyya, converting 
his home into a mosque, financing the construction of a 
madrasa and providing poorer Wahhabis with the means to 
go on pilgrimage to Mecca. 
c) yusuf i Yehia is the imam of the moderate Wahhabi mosque 
in Cao's second quarter established by 'Umar Muhammad and 
is master of the Medersa Islamique al-Mahdi Askia. His 
father was the imam of the mosque of Djoulabougou, the central 
mosque in Cao, and Yusufi Vehia received his early religious 
education from him. When his father died, Yehia replaced 
him for a short time as imam, but left soon after to continue 
I? 5 
his religious studies abroad, first to Niamey, the capital 
of Niger, where he studied under the tutelage of al-Habib 
ibn Abdullah, another, Wahhabi originating from Cao. He 
then went to Saudi Arabia where he stayed for several years. 
He accepted the religious principles of Wahhabism and upon 
his return to Cao worked to put these into practice, colla- 
borating primarily with 'Umar Muhammad. In the early 1970's 
his home became a meeting place for the newly emerging Wahhabi 
community, and Friday prayers were held there before the 
completion of the mosque funded by 'Umar Muhammad. 
Although he holds a respectable position in the Wahhabi 
community, he is sometimes criticized by other Wahhabis 
for liberalism in his style of life. He is said to smoke 
cigarettes, to chat freely with women and to be too much 
concerned with clothes and jewlery. He does, in fact, wear 
a 'boubou' and an expensive gold ring rather than anything 
that would identify him as a Wahhabi. He is d1so criticized 
for limited knowledge of Islam and for a lack of conscien- 
tiousness in the running of his madrasa. His position as 
leader of the Wahhabi community, therefore, does not appear 
to be derived from any personal qualities or gifts but is 
r, -ither associated with his deceased father's position as a 
leader in the traditional Muslim community. 
The radical leadership. 
a) Seydu Idrissa, or Abu 'Amra Sa'id 
ibl, Idris as he officially 
calls himself, is the leader of the 
rauiCdi wahhabiyya. He 
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was born in Kadii, a large village with about 800 inhabitants 
located 7 km downstream from Gao on the opposite shore. 
In this region, as in much of rural Africa, dates of birth 
are not registered or recorded, but by most estimates he 
is believed to have been born in the mid-1930's. His relati- 
ves did not hold any political or religious office but rather 
were ordinary villagers who lived mainly from their work 
on the land. Aside, perhaps, from learning the rudiments 
of prayer at an early age, he did not begin his Quranic 
studies until he was in his late teens or early 20's. Advan- 
ced Islamic education was not available in Kadji and since 
the labour of adolescents and young men has always been 
important in the Songhay agricultural economy, independent 
travel, for Seydu Idrissa and others, was not possible before 
adulthood. 
His search for Islamic learning took him first to the 
Gabero region between Gao and Ansongo where he began to 
memorize the Quran under the tutelage of a Fulani marabout, 
'Abd al-Wahid. 
Seydu ldrissa's next teacher, Alfa Larabu Cthe Arab'), 
another Fulani, was the first to exercise a significant 
inf luence on him. Alfa Larabu had studied in Mauritania 
, ind later in Kano and 
Sokoto in northern Nigeria. before 
establishing himself with a following of 
disciples in Nayni, 
a village in Niger. Alfa Larabu, following the traditions 
of Qadiri reform which were, and remain, 
important in the 
, -ireas where 
he studied, practiced a simplified version of 
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Islam. He was, nevertheless, very much a part of the marabou- 
tic tradition. He had a wide reputation for his ability 
to heal the sick and to bring rain, even though he opposed 
the manufacture and use of 'gri-gris' as well as other prac- 
tices involving 'Islamic magic'. He imparted to his students 
a more comprehensive knowledge of Arabic rather than the 
typical rote learning of the Quran of traditional Islamic 
education. Alfa Larabu also maintained a farmer's enthusiasm 
for work in the soil. During the growing season he is said 
to have spent much of his time with his followers in the 
': 'ields. Seydu Idrissa later expressed much the same enthu- L 
siasm with his own work on the land and with his frequently 
voiced opinion that a man who doesn't work in such a manner 
would soon be begging from family and friends or corrupted 
by salaried work in the city. 
Seydu ldrissa studied with Alfa Larabu for about three 
years before he moved on to another marabout in Niger, Alfa 
Hassan Lata. Hassan Lata had also studied in Kano and 
Sokoto and was also a 'puritan' adherent of the Qadiriyya 
order. After Hassan Lata Is early studies in Nigeria he 
is said to have traveled to the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
I raq, Afghanistan and India before 
finally returning to 
his natal village of Lata some twenty years after 
his depar- 
ture--a voyage which could well be exaggerated 
by his admir- 
ers. Whether or not his travels were as extensive is 
repor-ted, 
he seems to have been able to impart 
to his students, including 
Seydu ldrissa, a knowledge gained from experience of intel- 
lectual tr-(Nnds throughout the Islamic world. 
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When Seydu Idrissa left the following of Hassan Lata 
after two years he had completed his religious training 
as a talibe and was sufficiently instructed to become a 
'marabout' himself. In the early 1960's he went to Ghana 
and eventually established himself as a trader, traveling 
between Kumasi and Tamale with imported clothes as his main 
article of trade. He improved his knowledge of the Hausa 
language, which he had earlier been exposed to during his 
study in Niger, through his dealings with Hausa traders. 
At the same time he built up a following of disciples, mainly 
Songhay migrant workers, and estabiished a reputation as 
a pious and learned Muslim. 
It was during his stay in the zongos of Kumasi and 
Tamale that Seydu Idrissa became committed to Wahhabi reform. 
In 1967 or '68 the Songhay community in Kumasi constructed 
a mosque and Seydu Idrissa was elected as its imam. He 
held this position for only a short time before the Ghanaian 
government, on 19 November, 1969, announced that it would 
deport immigrants without valid residence permits from 2 
December of the same year. Seydu Idrissa, when he returned 
to his natal village of Kadji, was one of over 200,000 'ali- 
enst who left Ghana by June, 1970.6 
At this point Seydu ldrissa's career is tied to the 
development of the Wahhabiyya in the Gao region in the early 
1970 9 S. The narrative of his career from this point onwards 
6. Cf. Adomako-Sarfoh, 1974: 138. 
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is treated in the next chapter. 
b) AI-Hajj Ali ioma, an adjutant to Seydu Idrissa in the 
beginning of the Wahhabiyya in Cao, was born around 1925 
in the village of Jamkoi, south of Bourem. His uncle was 
the chief of the village and Ali Joma's family held a respec- 
ted position in the community. He began his Quranic studies, 
based on traditional rote learning, in his village with 
a local alfa. As a young man he traveled to Macina, the 
former seat of a 19th century Fulani empire, to continue 
his Islamic education. He later went on piigrimaqe and 
studied for several years in Saudi Arabia. During this 
time he became exposed to Wahhabi ideas. After leaving 
Saudi Arabia in the 1960's he went to Ghana where he met 
Seydu Idrissa and began his involvement with the Wahhabiyya. 
c) Sadu 'Abd al-Rahman, another adjutant to Seydu ldrissa, 
was born around 1943 in Wani. This village was the site 
of the mahdist, uprising led by Musa Aminu in 1949. 'Abd 
al-Rahman's family was forcibly moved from Wani to Watagouna. 
He began his Quranic studies under the tutelage of his father. 
Later, like Ali Joma, he went for several years to Macina 
to further his knowledge of Islam. In 1967 he traveled 
to Ghana where he began teaching the Quran to beginning 
students and, at the same time, studying under the tutelage 
of other Muslim clerics, among them Seydu Idrissa. 
It was 
during this period that he came under the influence of Wahhabi 
reform and became an ardent supporter of Seydu ldrissa. 
13 Oll 
*** 
At the time that the --adical Wahhabi leaders f irst 
returned to their natal villages after their studies, the 
rural Songhay 'maraboutic' tradition was relatively weak. 
A much stronger tradition was to be found amonq the nomads 
for whom the exclusive bearers of religious authority and 
sanctity (baraka) were tribal holy men whose prestige was 
often very high. The Wahhabis opposed this system of saintly 
intervention and also worked to reduce what prestige remained 
to the traditional Songhay cleric. Their campaign in the 
villages introduced a new dimension to Songhay Islam: the 
standard of learning increased and the field of interaction 
between Muslims widened from the local community to a network 
of villages. 
The moderate leaders were generally part of a stronger 
Islamic tradition than that found in the traditional village 
mi I ieu. Muhammad al-Tahir follows the tradition of Fulani 
mallams and can be said to have almost inherited his position 
as a reformer from this background. Yusufi Yehia, through 
his family background, belongs to a tradition of urban 'cler- 
icalism' which gave him a strong claim to leadership in 
the moderate Wahhabi community. 
VI. THE GROWTH OF THE GAO WAHHABIYYA 
The opposition between moderates and radicals was not 
always present in the Gao Wahhabiyya. In the first few 
years of its development there was cooperation between the 
urban and the rural reformists, while the Wahhabis of the 
villages in some instances lived peacefully with their tradi- 
tional neighbours. This initial tolerance, however, was 
short lived and the divisions between religious groups that 
we find today emerged in an atmosphere of tension and vio- 
lence. 
The ultimate source of these conflicts lies in the 
communication of religious ideas, and I begin by summarizing 
the routes by which reformist ideas found their way into 
Songhay society. 
Origins. 
Islamic reform, marked by an emphasis on the Quran 
and hadYth as primary sources of religious knowledge is 
not restricted to Wahhabism but rather has been an essential 
feature of contemporary (and medieval) Islamic history in 
many parts of the world. In tracing the sources of Wahhabism 
in Gao, therefore, we find a variety of influences, or rather 
d variety of sources of a similar influence, ý,; 
hich have 
,i place in the origins of 
the reform movement. 
One aid to the development of reformist Islam came 
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From northern Nigeria. Here, British indirect rule in the 
late 19th century probably altered the political evolution 
of the Sokoto empire by sheltering it from schism, civil 
war and predation. This encouraged the consolidation of 
Islam and gave an impetus to a puritan' version of the 
faith which has continued into the 20th century. The refor- 
med Qadiriyya movement in Kano and Sokoto 1 was a source 
of learning for Fulani clerics in French West Africa who 
were then able to establish enclaves of higher Islamic lear- 
ning in spite of the French authorities' prevailing suspicion 
and hostility towards the development of Islam. Seydu Idrissa 
is among the Wahhabis who were educated in this milieu. 
Also of Nigerian origin were the Hausa mallams who may have 
exercised an influence upon the immigrant Songhay community 
in Ghana. 
Reform movements in North Africa have also, to some 
extent, had an influence in Gao. Muhammad al-Tahir, the 
founder of a madrasa in Gao, was trained for several years 
in the Sanusi centre of Benghazi, L-ibya in the early 1960's. 
Post- revo lut i onary Libya maintains an interest in dissendna- 
ting Ghadafi's ideas on the primacy of the Quran as a source 
of moral and political authority, but support from the Libyan 
government for Wahhabi reform, while it exists, has been 
minimal. 
Cdo has a minority population of Algerians as well 
as a small Algerian consulate because of 
its position as an 
administrative and trading town close (in relative terms) to 
1. Cf. Paden, 1976. 
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the Algeria/Mali border; but the Algerian expatriates remain 
aloof from the black population and there has been little 
or no influence from the Algerian Islamic movements such as 
the Ibadis from the central oasis towns or the Muslim Breth- 
eren (Ikhwin al-Musliml) from the northern coastal cities. 
Probably the most important source of Wahhabi ideas 
came from those who traveled to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage, 
remained there to study and eventually returned to West 
Africa with a more rigourous approach to Islam. This Middle 
Eastern influence is an important source of reform throughout 
West Africa. Islamic institutions like the Dar al-hadith 
in Medina are especially important in the promotion of Wahhabi 
ideas. It is the long-term pilgrim who wishes to pursue 
Islamic studies and, perhaps, become literate in Arabic, 
that is especially receptive to the simple ideas expressed 
in Wahhabi brochures and lectures. The religious background 
of the pilgrim is an important factor affecting the recepti- 
vity of reformist ideas. Those with a strong committment 
to 'traditional' Islam are less likely to change their reli- 
gious orientation. A pilgrim, for example, with a background 
in the Tijaniyya brotherhood with its emphasis on sainthood, 
miracles and strong, often ethnically or tribally oriented 
values of community participation in ritual. would likely 
be less receptive to the reformist campaign in Saudi Arabia 
than one who was 'unattached' to any Muslim community or 
already partly committed to the principles of a 'Purified' 
Islam. 
134 
The Songhay Wahhabis have been very much part of this 
I pilgrimage connection'. Financial constraints, however, 
especially in recent years, have prevented most village 
farmers from participating in this source of knowledge and 
prestige. Trade and employment in the southern coastal 
cities have been the principal sources of money for the 
journey to Mecca but such opportunities are now scarce. 
Correspondence with other parts of the Muslim world 
has been a source of ideological reinforcement and, especi- 
ally for the radicals who remain distant from their Muslim 
neighbours, a way for the feeling of participating in a 
wider Islamic community to be developed. Seydu Idrissa 
maintains occasional contact with a wide range of correspon- 
dents, especially in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon. He 
cited to me as his most prestigious correspondent 'Abd al-Aziz 
ibn Baz, a Tauft! in Medina who is among the most important 
members of the 'ulama in Saudi Arabia. 
2 
Among the radicals 
of the Gao area, Seydu Idrissa appears to be the only one 
to engage in such correspondence. In a largely non-literate, 
isolated community, the receipt of a foreign letter has 
a strong effect and the prestige attached to this activity 
makes it a source of legitimation of Seydu Idrissa's authority. 
Saudi delegates have also occasionally vis-L,, -ed West 
Africa. Since the change of government in Mali in 1968, a 
number of visits have been made to major towns such as Gao, 
Timbuktu, Kayes and Bamako by imams from Mecca and Medina. 
2. Baz's status as a high ranking mufti in Saudi Arabia 
is confirmed by Quandt (1981: 94) who mentions him as a 
former rector of the Medina theological college where he 
was a major influence on Juhayman bin Muhammad, the leader 
of the Mecca incident of 1979. 
10 
3 
In 1983 a delegation came to Cao from Medina with the 
intent of investigating the development of Wahhabism and 
the conflicts between Muslims in the area. The delegation 
was led by 'Umar Muhammad (not to be confused with the mode- 
rate Wahhabi leader), a Fulani who is said to have been 
born in Mecca and who is the General Secretary of the Islamic 
11niversity in Medina. Also in the delegation was Hamidu 
Bukuru, a native of Karibandja, a village in the Gao region, 
who holds a position in the Dar al-Radith in Medina. As part 
of their itinerary they visited the Wahhabi villages of 
Dar al-Salam and Berra. There are conflicting reports about 
their findings. The radical Wahhabis indicated that the 
delegates were thrilled with their Quran school system and 
had found many similarities with the education system in 
Saudi Arabia. Whether or not the delegates praised the 
Wahhabi education system in the glowing terms reported to 
me, they did encourage the Wahhabis' progress in this direc- 
tion by donating a large amount of books and pamphlets, 
among them numerous copies of a condensed version of the 
teachings of 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Mubddl aL-Isl5m (the Mani- 
fest in Islam), which is standard fare for Wahhabi students. 
An official in the government sponsored Association 
Malien Pour l'Unit6 et le Progr6s de l'Islam (AMUPI), on 
the other hand, said that the delegates had come to elicit 
promises from the radical Wahhabis to re-unite with the 
other Muslims in the region but that, having given such a 
promise, Seydu Idrissa failed to put it into effect. Very 
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likely there is some element of truth in both accounts. 
Influential Muslims from other parts of the world have 
also been a stimulus to Islamic reform in Ghana. In the 
ZOD90 communities in Ghana there appears to have been some 
influence from Indian Islamic reform as led by 'Abd 
ai-Hassan Nadvi, the rector of the Islamic Academy of Lucknow. 
Nadvi is the major agent of transmission of the thought 
of Maulana Maudoodi, the first Muslim thinker to sweepingly 
condemn 'western-style' modernity as being incompatible 
with Islam. Nadvi had a direct influence on Sayyid Qutb, 
a leading activist of the Muslim Bretheren in Egypt. 
3 In 
the 1960's Nadvi was interested in promoting Islamic reform 
in Ghana, his principal objective being to create a reform 
effort to counteract the influence of the Ahmadiyya. it 
is likely that Nadvi had some influence, both financial 
and ideological, upon the Muslim communities in the zongos 
of Ghana. 
Early conflicts (1970-1978). 
In tracing the development of the Wahhabiyya in the 
Gao region I have not had access to written sources such 
as police reports or other government files but have relied 
upon oral testimony from participants in, or opponents of, 
the reform movement for whom the events were significant 
and rel(itively easily recalled. The detail that can be 
derived from written sources is, therefore, sometimes lacking, 
3. Sivan, 1985: 23. 
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and the narratives from which I have worked sometimes had 
the nature of 'stories' rather than 'histories' but in such 
cases the 'story', whatever its accuracy, is valuable in 
indicating the opinions and attitudes of participants in 
a conflict. By comparing a number of accounts, moreover, the 
general nature and sequence of events has become clear and 
the trends in the development of the Wahhabiyya in Gao over 
a period of 15 years has become more apparent. 
In 1968 the political situation in Mali became more 
avoura e or te eve opment o ie a ly 
change in government involving the ousting of a socialist 
regime which had discouraged the growth of Islam in the 
country. 
The socialist government led by Modibo Kieta was, of 
the newly-established regimes in the post-colonial period, 
one of the most Marxist-Leninist oriented. The new Malian 
state tended towards centralized control in its implementa- 
tion of 'planned socialism' and in its drive for economic 
independence and full 'decolonization'. 
4 No political system, 
in a country with a majority population of Muslims (roughly 
'70% in Mali), however. could hope for stability by opposing 
outright the religious traditions. The government's theory 
of socialism was itself related, in some of the political 
rhetoric, to the Muslim tradition in which the people have 
such pride. But it ulls not Islamic values as such that 
4. Grundy, 1964: 175-76. 
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were constantly emphasized, but rather the values of the 
party which was conceived as having its roots in the Sudanic 
Muslim tradition. 5 Modibo Kieta made this clear in an add- 
ress to a conference of the Union Soudanaise in 1954: "Le 
R. D. A., I'Union Soudanaise, est une seconde religion qui 
trouve sa source dans la religion Musulmane qui veut qu'on 
aide les pauvres et qu'on d6fende les faibles.,, 6 While 
not waging open war against Muslim leaders and clerics, the 
socialist regime jealously monopolized state power and dis- 
couraged the development of Islamic organizations which 
would potentially gain political influence. The disbanding 
of the Union Culturelle Musulmane, the main organizational 
body of the Wahhabiyya in Bamako, was a key manouvre in 
the socialist regime's suppression of Islamic reform. 
The regime which took power in 1968, while remaining 
fsecular', has been more tolerant of the development of 
Islam, the president, Mussa Traore, making it clear that 
he is a practicing Muslim. The Union Culturelle Musulmane 
was re-established in 1968 but disbanded once again in 1971 
when the government felt its Political monopoly threatened. 
The creation in 1981 of the government controlled Association 
Malien pour I'Unit6 et le Progr6s de l'Islam (AMUPI) was 
a compromise which attempted to strike a balance between 
centralized authority and the development of Islam. 
Amselle, conducting research on Wahhabi traders in 
5. Hodgkin and Morgenthau, 
1964: 225. 
6. ibid. 
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Bamako in 1968 witnessed a change in attitude among the 
Wahhabis which followed the fall of the socialist regime. 7 
Suddenly they were more open and cooperative, feeling free 
to promote their version of the faith. This change in the 
relationship between Wahhabis and the central government 
has also been evidenced in the rapid increase in Wahhabi 
mosques and schools since the coup. 
year after the change of government in Mali, the 
Busia government in Ghana deported over 200,000 migrant 
workers. Among those who returned to Mali were Songhay 
Wahhabis who had been living more or less permanently in 
Ghana. It is with this influx of committed reformists in 
1969 and 1970 that the Wahhabiyya became solidly implanted 
in the Gao region and conditions for the conflict between 
the exponents of reform and the traditionalists were esta- 
blished. 
As with the beginnings of Wahhabism in Bamako in the 
1950's, a focal point in the early disputes between Wahhabis 
and traditionalists in Cao was the issue of whether the 
pious Muslim should pray with his arms at his side, as the 
traditionalists do, or with his arms folded across his chest, 
as do the reformists. The furor over this detail of prayer 
reached a high pitch in the beginning phase of the Wahhabiyya 
in the early 1970's. The complaint was mainly vocalized 
by the traditionalists who saw the 'bras crois6es' as an 
Amselle, 1977: 12. 
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innovation which was an affront to traditional African islam. 
The root cause of this complaint seemed to be that they 
perceived the change as an attack upon the validity of their 
own practices and, perhaps, their own identity. 
The traditionalists were by far the majority, but they 
did not form a unified group. Protest against the new trend 
was vocal, sometimes violent, but also random and disorgan- 
ized. It was the local identification with Islam that was 
treatened by the 'crossed arms'--the outward manifestation 
of change--rather than any specific organized group. 
The Wahhabi leaders, representing the opposite side 
of the conflict, were often those who had been exposed to 
'new' religious ideas through travel and study. Many percei- 
ved their reformist ideas as a re-affirmation of Islam-- 
in a sense a return to the 'true' tradition--in opposition 
to pagan beliefs and to the adoption of 'un-Islamic' values 
and customs. One of the most important 'abuses' to them 
was the manufacture and use of amulets or 'gri-gris'. To 
the Wahhabis this represented an appeal to lower spiritual 
elements for protection in this world rather than the unique 
God. 
These issues began to crystalize when Seydu ldrissa 
returned to his home village of Kadji from Ghana in 1970. 
lie was initially welcomed as a hero, was recognized as being 
the most learned man in the village and was elected imam 
of the village mosque. His election as 
imam t-, as almost, 
certainly not without its opponents, but at this early stage 
14i 
Seydu Idrissa seems to have been more conciliatory than 
he was later to become, allowing his followers, who prayed 
with crossed arms, to worship together with those who were 
more reluctant to change. 
With relatively easy access to Gao from Kadii, Seydu 
Idrissa participated in the early efforts of Wahhabis in 
the town, collaborating with those whom he was later to 
denounce as 'infidels'. In the village, however, he had 
an independent following and he seems to have concentrated 
most of his preaching activity there. His main objective 
upon returning to Mali seems to have been to preach a 'puri- 
fied' Islam to those in the villages who were not in touch 
with the Muslim community in Ghana. 
Upon his arrival in Kadji, Seydu Idrissa initiated 
public meetings and discussions in which he criticized the 
practices of local clerics and asserted the 'correct' way 
of practicing Islam. These public attacks on traditional 
Islam provoked response from local religious leaders, but 
none were able to match Seydu or his close disciples in 
learning and literacy, in knowledge of the Scriptural autho- 
rity. As a consequence Seydu gained a devoted following, 
recruited mainly from amongst those who attended these deba- 
tes and who were convinced by his arguments, admiring of 
his knowledge and captivated by his rhetoric. 
Seydu Idrissa's success in his home village encouraged 
him to spread the reformist doctrine to other villages in 
the Gao region. Those of his devotees who 
had some Islamic 
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learning also traveled to other villages to spread Wahhabi 
reform. One of these 'missionaries' was 'Umar Sadu, also 
a native of Kadii. He frequently visited Bagoundje, a large 
village of over 1000 inhabitants about 5 km, from Kadii on 
the opposite shore. Many villagers there initially responded 
favourably to the drive for reform, and it has since become 
one of the strongest sources of support for the radical 
Wahhabiyya. Such spokesmen as 'Umar Sadu appear to have 
been initially tolerant in their approach, though they still 
strongly attacked traditional practices which they considered 
questionable. The following are examples of the messages 
that such 'missionaries' as 'Umar Sadu delivered as remembered 
by traditional villagers of Bagoundje who were attracted 
by the message of reform without, however, formally joining 
the Wahhabiyya: 
They said to the believers that there is no God 
but Allah; they said to the people that anybody 
who does not believe in God, if he dies, he dies - 
an 'infidel (k5fir). Whoever believes in spirits 
of the stone or of the tree, who believes in alfa 
or magicians, who believes in anything but God, 
if he dies, he dies an ilifidel. 
When they [the Wahhabis] came all that they told 
us was taken from the Quran. They told us what 
God has said, what the Prophet said. Anything 
that was not this we were not to follow. The 
people were very excited, especially when they 
heard [the Wahhabis] speak of the Quran and hadith 
and what God said and what the Prophet said. Every- 
14 -) 
body came to hear... They told us that the Quran 
is the word of God and that the hadith is the 
word of the Prophet. When they told us this we 
were no longer masters of ourselves. 
It was largely through the message that the Quran is the 
word of God and that His will can be understood and obeyed 
for greater prosperity that the reform movement gained an 
enthusiastic rural following. 
Stimulated by the success of their missionary effort 
in the villages, Seydu Idrissa and his closest disciple, 
Sadu 'Abd al-Rahman, formed the idea of creating a sep:. Irate 
Islamic organization which would recruit villagers in the 
region of Gao and migrant workers in other cities in West 
Africa--a Muslim organization, therefore, which was to be 
anchored to Songhay society, although ethnic exclusiveness 
was probably not intended. This organization was later 
to be called the Jama'a Ans5r al-Sunna (Community of the 
Helpers of the Sunna), the title by which the radical Wahha- 
bis identify their movement. They traveled first to Bamako 
to seek official government approval for their proposed 
organization. This approval, however, was not forthcoming 
and they returned to Gao where they tried, also without 
success, to gain support from local authorities. 
Having failed to obtain official support at home they 
worked, nevertheless, to establish popular support abroad. 
With the necessary visa documents in their possession, they 
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traveled to the major cities in Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast where there were populations of 
migrant workers who would be potentially receptive to their 
proposal of an Islamic organization centred 
I 
in the region 
of Gao. Very likely their objective was to use the migration 
inherent in Songhay society to establish an Islamic mission- 
ary effort throughout the southern West African cities. 
Their only success, however, was in Ghana where Seydu Tdrissa 
had already established a following from his earlier work 
as a trader and an imam. 
Sadu 'Abd al-Rahman was highly vocal in promoting the 
merits of his teacher. He advanced the claim that Seydu 
Idrissa was an 'amir al-mu'minln', 'commander of the faithful". 
and was the chosen man to lead a rennaissance of Islam thr- 
oughout West Africa. The title 'amTr al-mu'minln was first 
used as a title of respect given to the prophet's successor 
'Umar and to the later three Khalifs. It eventually became 
more diluted in its application. It was commonly used by 
leaders of dynasties everywhere in the Muslim world; in 
the west, for example, by the Rostenids, Aghlabids, Zirids, 
HammAdids, Umaiyads (after 928 A. D. ) as wei I as by some 
of the petty Spanish kings. 
8 In West Africa it was used 
in reference to Askia Muhammad9 and in the 19th century in 
addressing the successors of Usman dan Fodio in the 
Sokoto 
empire. 10 
Many who heard 'Abd al-Rahman's claim believed it to 
8. Encycopaedia of Islam. 
9. Cf. Kati, 1913. 
10. Hiskett, 1984: 172. 
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be synonymous with the title of Khalif and thought that 
in accepting this title Seydu Idrissa. was claiming leader- 
ship of the entire Muslim world. It is true that the title 
of Khalif also became diluted and was used in addressing 
Muslim leaders, such as Usman dan Fodio, who did not claim 
leadership over the entire Muslim world, but the term theore- 
tically implies just this, successorship of the prophet, 
whereas the title of amir implies subordination to a higher 
Muslim authority such as the Serif of Mecca. 11 In accepting 
the title of 'amYr aI- Mu'm in In, therefore, Seydu Idrissa 
probably saw himself as the true leader of the reform move- 
ment in West Africa with ties to more central authorities 
in the Muslim world. Since he had not yet achieved such 
a position, however, his assumption of the title of 'amir 
was Ilkely. motivated by wishful thinking. 
Despite the opposition aroused by 'Abd al-Rahman's 
claims, the call for a new Islamic organization had immediate 
appeal to a number of traders and workers in Ghana, and 
Seydu Idrissa soon gained a strong following. The majority 
of Wahhabi leaders in Gao, however, did not give Seydu Idrissa 
support for his organization. A number of Wahhabis in Gao, 
among them Yusufi Yehia and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Wahid, when 
informed of Seydu Idrissa's activities, complained that 
they had not been consulted about his plans. Some received 
letters from Muslims in Ghana asking whether Seydu Idrissa's 
leadership of the predominantly Sonqhay Islamic community 
was authorized by them. They replied that they had never 
11 172. Wsk,. tt 
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been consulted about an Islamic organization and that Seydu 
Idrissa's claim that he spoke for the entire Wahhabi commu- 
nity in Cao wos false. 
The most vocal opposition to Seydu Idrissa's and 'Abd 
al-Rahman's plans in Ghana came from al-Habib ibn Abdullah, 
a Songhay Wahhabi who lived during much of his career in 
Niamey and who presently runs a madrasa in Segu. In essence, 
al-Habib told his listeners in the zongos of Ghana that 
Seydu Idrissa was leading his followers to disaster. His 
claims to leadership were said by al-Habib to be outrageous 
and he could not at the same time realize his goal of Islam- 
ization and remain a guest in a non-Islamic state. This 
denouncement, in addition to the realization that Seydu 
Idrissa's claim to leadership was not unanimously accepted 
by the Wahhabi community in Gao, created a division in Ghana 
between those who accepted his leadership arid those who 
did not. 
Almost as soon as this conflict arose in Ghana, Seydu 
Idrissa returned to Kadji, leaving 'Abd al-Rahman behind 
for a short time to handle the affairs of the movement. 
Upon his arrival in Kadji he found that news of the conflict 
in Ghana had preceeded him and that he had been relieved 
of his position as village imam. 
There were many, however, who were still loyal to him, 
including his parents and other relatives. Accompanied by 
them he moved to a plot of his father's land several kilo- 
meters frein Kadji to establish a seperate community. This 
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move was perceived as a hijra, an emmigration from the land 
of the unbelievers (dar al-Xufra) to the land of the faithful 
(ddr al-Drn). In the Wahhabi religious primer Mub5d! al-Islam 
we find the following: "the hijra means departing from 
the land of the polytheists (bilid al-Shirk) to settle with 
the community of Islam (bil5d al-Islam); and the hijra is 
ordained on the Muslim community until the Final Judgement. " 
When the Wahhabi leaders of Cao received word of this 
move they were greatly concerned about the potential for 
further dissention in the Muslim community. They decided 
that a show of solidarity on their part would best encourage 
Seydu Idrissa and his followers to re-unify with Kadji. To 
maximize their show of solidarity and the moral pressure 
it was to create they invited Muslim leaders from Niger 
and Burkina Faso, perhaps numbering two dozen, to join them 
in their appeal. This effort backfired because as the for- 
eign clerics arrived the military authorities started sur- 
veilance of them and, fearing arrest, the visitors quickly 
left the region. It is possible that some were deported. 
Meanwhile the governor, Koke Diembele, had been informed 
of Seydu Idrissa's cession from his village and, after inves- 
tigating the situation, issued an ultimatum: the Wahhabis 
were given one week to reintegrate with the Kadji community 
before the military was to forcibly remove them from their 
independent village. 
During this week of 'grace', 'Umar Muhammad led a dele- 
gation of reformist leaders from C,, -: Io to plead with 
Seydu 
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Idrissa to obey the governor's demands. The moderate Wahhabi 
community, besides opposing division between Musl.: Lms, was 
concerned with the possibility of government repression 
in the event that Seydu Idrissa lead his followers into 
conflict with the authorities. This fear was strongly rein- 
forced by the fact that conflict with the traditionaiists 
in Gao had recently led to a closure of the new 'Wahhabi 
mosques. Before the concerns of the Wahhabi community could 
be expressed, however, Seydu Idrissa proposed that they 
join forces in fighting the gover%pnt militarily. If he 
perceived the move of his followers away from Kadji as a 
hijra, it is also possible that he saw the proposed struggle 
against the government as a jihdd in defense of Islam. The 
delegation discouraged him from pursuing what they felt 
to be a suicidal venture and, lacking their support while 
faced with the governor's deadline, he eventually agreed 
to move his followers back to Kadii. 
His followers returned to Kadji but they built a new 
village beside the original one with a space of about 50 
meters between the two. The new village was called, perhaps 
euphemistically, Dar al-Salam, ' Dwelling of Peace' . This 
location for Seydu Idrissa's village was a compromise that 
created a simmering resentment among the remaining villagers 
of Kadji-. The division was seen by them as an attack upon 
the traditional beliefs and practices which were the founda- 
tion of their lives. A more palpable effect was the division 
of families between members who 
had joined the ranks of the 
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reform movement and those who stayed in the old village. 
In families that did not become Wahhabi er,, masse conflict 
was an inherent part of religious change with older family 
members usually disagreeing with younger, newly committed 
Wahhabis whom they perceived as slandering tradition. The 
division of Kadji took this conflict a step further. Here, 
the division of community and family was complete and appar- 
ently irrevocable. The religious primer, Mub5d! al-IsIdm, 
was a source of the conviction of radical Wahhabis that 
in abandoning their unbelieving family members they were fol- 
lowing the true way of Islam: "Whoever bears obedience 
to the prophet and testifies to the unity of God should 
not cherish those who deny God and his Messenger, even if 
they are his nearest kin. " Children who joined the reform 
movement thus no longer felt any obligation towards their 
parents (now k5fir) if the latter did not join them in their 
'conversion'. This heightened the feeling among the tradi- 
tionalists that the Wahhabis were taking their reforms too 
far and were a threat to corporate village life. This per- 
ceived threat sometimes led to a violent response. Thus 
the establishment of Dar al-Salam marked the beginning of 
period of conflict which was to continue over several 
years, culminating in the arrest of Seydu Idrissa and about 
40 of his followers in 1974 or '75. 
This conflict cannot be fully understood without consi- 
dering the changes that have taken place in Songhay family 
structure over the past century. Olivier de Sardan has 
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reconstructed, largely from oral testimony, the pre-colonial 
family structure of the Songhay. 
12 
The head of the family 
was the eldest male, the patriarch to whom all other family 
members owed allegiance and respect. Sons would bring to 
him all their earnings and in return would expect aid, as 
in arranging for marriage payments, and economic security. 
Attached to the patriarchal household were often 'slaves', 
or horso who worked in the f ields and pa-i(i tribute to the 
noble family. Position and rank in the household hierarchy 
were based upon age, the young deferring to their elders 
and inheritance of family land following the principle of 
primogeniture. 
The French did not wish to destroy the patriarchal 
family structure but rather intended it to flourish as the 
basis of social stability. This was not to be so. The 
emancipation of 'slaves' removed a pillar of patriarchal 
domination in noble families. A permanent solidarity between 
brothers or even their economic cooperation was no longer 
a given in the productive system. Economic interdependence 
was replaced by an individualization of the economy. A 
diversifiCdtion of opportunities was one of the main reasons 
behind this: migration played a decisive role in the weaken- 
ing of family ties. With departure to the Gold Coast, young 
men acquired a new economic and social position. 
They could 
live by their own work, independent of the extended domestic 
structure. They could by themselves earn 
the income necessary 
12. Olivier de Sardan, 1984: Chs. V and XII. 
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for bridewealth and they could even, in times of famine, 
become an important means of support for their relatives 
senior in age. 
13 
Another factor in the individualization of the economy 
was the division of land which resulted from colonial concep- 
tions of ownership. The pre-colonial system of inheritdnce 
followed the necessity of giving control over, the use of 
family land to the 'patriarch'. Upon t1he death of the head 
of the extended family, it was the successor- -e i ther a brother 
or the eldest son--who 'inherited' this r-esponsibility of 
land management while junior male siblings usually remained 
to work, jointly on the land and to share t. -he berief its of 
production. 
The new relationship of village Far-mers to the land, 
introduced by European conceptions of ownei-ship, accelerated 
the process of individualization and privatization. The 
family head became less a 'manager' of the land arid more 
an townert; the patriarch "West plus un, gestionnaire du 
processus collectif de la production, il est 6galement un 
19propri&taire.,, 14 A more absolute conception of ownership 
was closely related to the problem of inheritdnce. Thus, 
under colonial rule, upon the death of the father, his sons 
had equal 'right' to access to famLly land; inheritance 
was no longer based upon the principle of age. The brothers 
of the dece-3s(, d those who might previously have taken over 
13. Olivier de Sardan, 1984: 246-47. 
14. Ibid: 247. 
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the family headship, were bypassed in favour of the 'equal' 
inheritance of his sons. The rule became the division of 
land between male siblings which led to the par-ceiling of 
land and the reduction in size of units of production. 
This parcelling of land was possible only because a diversi- 
fication of the economy had given those with smaller plots 
a basis for subsistence. A change from 'patriarchal' exploi- 
tation of land, a system which united several nuclear families 
-ended production unit, to 'paternal' exploitation into one ext., 
which obeyed only the social rules of immediate pa-Urilinial 
Filiation and favoured the 'nuclear family' as the principal 
unit of production, weakened ties of cooperatLon and gave 
junior male family members a new measure of independence. 
In many cases the siblinq group remained solidary but this 
interdependence was no longer a necessity. 
It was possible for religious reform to provoke family I 
division only in a situation where patriarchal amthority L 
was weakened and where the nuclear family, a married couple 
with their offspring, largely replaced the extended family 
as the basic social unit of production. Relationships between 
children and parents, especially mothers, are often strong 
and affectionate; sibling groups often remain close and 
are sometimes a unit of economic cooperation - But 
in many 
-irents or between cases ties between chi Ldren and their p(l 
siblings are more. 'dffective'. based upon emotiorial sofida- 
rity, than 'effective', a necessary and 
dependable social 
link which provides economic security. In this situati(-)j, 
it was possible for religious commit, 11cio- to override tht, 
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values of kinship and community, though not without grief 
and turmoil. A more individualized economy and social struc- 
ture was a necessary condition for individualized religious 
'conversion'. Whether or not the weakening of kinship ties 
was a cause of religious reform is a question that I shall 
reserve for later discussion. 
One of the major events that followed the division 
of Kadji was an extension of family and community division 
to include other villages where Seydu Idrissa's partisans 
were living. He seems to have called for the divisions 
himself, believing that the correct practice of Islam was 
being hampered by continued daily life in villages where 
'mixed' Islam was present. The village divisions took one 
of three forms: 1) the most common form of division occurred 
where the Wahhabi community, as in Kadji, moved to a plot 
of land separate from the main village, owned by one of 
their members, and established a separate village. The 
distance between the new Wahhabi community arid the traditional 
village varied from between roughly 50 meters to several 
kilometers. These new villages were sometimes given Arabic 
names but remained administratively part of the main village; 
2) there were a number of villages 
where division was resisted 
by the traditionalists who held local power. In these cases 
the advocates of reform either left the village 
for one 
which had already been divided or, as 
in Bagoundje, they 
gradually moved to houses and compounds 
in one quarter of 
the village without forming a completely spatially 
sepdrate 
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community. In the Wahhabi 'quarters' of such villages the 
autonomy of the reformist community is jealously guarded 
and intrusions of non-Walihabi villagers are not tolerated 
unless they are on 'official business'; and 3) In Berra 
official village leaders 'converted' to Wahhabism, or struck 
a balance between the rival groups, which enabled the Wahha- 
bis to become politically dominant. In this case it was 
the traditionalist community which moved to establish a 
seParate village from the original settlement. 
These divisions affected almost every aspect of village 
life. The chief's authority was not recognized by the Wahha- 
bis, unless, as was the case only in two or three villages, 
he belonged to their group. Though it was necessary for 
them to deal with local authorities, the lives of the Wahhabis 
were, and remain, governed as far as possible by the laws 
of Islam as expressed in the Quran and hadith. 
Cooperation in terms of communal labour and help for 
the poor became limited to partisans of the same religious 
tendency. Prayer was held separately, usually, before the 
construction of mosques, in the compound of their 
imam. 
As in Kadii, the general aspect of the division of 
villages which created the most bitterness was the 
breaking 
of family ties along religious lines. It was especially 
the fact that the Wahhabis refused to visit their parents 
if they did not convert that caused grief. This is made 
clear by a statement from a traditionalist -in 
Bagound(je: 
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They told the people... that any brother who did not 
come [i. e. become a Wahhabi], any mother who did not 
come... that if anybody fallen sick did not come, even 
if it was a mother, that they would not visit them, 
that they would separate from them completely. 
Marriages were no longer contracted between the two groups, 
nor were baptisms, marriages or funerals attended by rival 
family members. The Wahhabis also established separate 
burial grounds. 
At the same time that villages were dividing, a rupture 
took place between the radicals, under the leadership of 
Seydu Idrissa, and the moderate Wahhabis in Gao. When the 
Gao Wahhabis realized the dangerous course being taken by 
Seydu ldrissa they made every effort to disassociate them- 
selves from him and his activities. 
Despite this attempt at disassociation, the difference 
between members of the Wahhabi groups was not immediately 
visible to non-reformists. Most Wahhabis could be distingui- 
shed by their manner of dress which made them a target for 
insults and violence. 
Invective was, and remains, one of the ways in which 
boundaries between religious groups were sharpened. The 
radical Wahhabis referred to those who did not belong to 
their group as kafir, '* irifidels', or mushrik, 'Polytheists'; 
the moderate Wahhabis they referred to as murtadd, 'apostates'. 
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Iriitially the traditionalists called the Wahhabis 'wahha- 
bantye', the Songhay equivalent of 'Wahhabi' or 'followers 
of Wahhab'. This term lost its sting when many Wahhabis 
began to consider it a more or less accurate assessment 
of the main source of their religious allegiance. The most 
biting term of abuse used by the traditionalists was 'alhawa- 
rintye', literally 'those who follow their desires'. This 
word can be understood in several senses. It is used by 
the Songhay in reference to the Kharijites ('the leavers'), 
the strongest example to them of Muslims who 'turned their 
backs to the reiigion, who denied the suzerainty of both 
the prophet's successor 'Ali and his rival Mu'awiya, and 
who therefore 'left the community of Islam'. Traditional 
villagers, not understanding the motivations or the beliefs 
of radical Wahhabis, sometimes explain that they are Khari- 
jites, that they are a splinter group inspired by the origi- 
nal sectarians. In a telescoping of time which is typical 
of rural peoples who do not live by a linear calendar, some 
traditionalists believe that the original Kharijites who 
battled 'Ali, or their immediate descendants, were responsible 
for spreading reformist ideas to the Wahhabis and causing 
them to leave their families. 
Another sense in which the word alhawarintye is under- 
stood implies an accusation of sexual promiscuity. 'Those 
who follow their desires' are those who are unable to control 
their sexual impulses and therefore need to cloak their 
abnormal passion in the guise of religious secrecy and closed 
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communal activities. The often lighthearted scandalmongering 
of the traditionalists includes stories of wife swapping, 
adultery, and the licentiousness of 'the Marabout' (Seydu 
Idrissa) which is appeased only by his choice of the village 
women who parade naked before him after the Friday prayer, 
etc. The significance of these stories lies in the fact 
that they portray the Wahhabis as hypocrites and therefore 
exonerate the traditionalist community of accusations of 
improperly practicing Islam. 
This kind of invective and abuse is still current, 
but at a time when hostilities between religious groups 
was at its height verbal abuse was probably far more common. 
The frustration and violence between traditionalists and 
Wahhabis which had resulted from religious disputes and 
social divisions usually erupted at random. Name calling 
in the streets of Cao sometimes led to fights with fists 
and batons. The office of the commandant de cercle was 
often crowded with litigants and bandaged heads and arms 
became a more common sight in the town. The same sort of 
violence often erupted in the countryside. 
The conflict between religious factions was accentuated 
by two events which reinforced the traditionalists' belief 
that the Wahhabis were undermining the foundations of family 
and religious life. one event led to an accusation by the 
traditionalists that the Wahhabis of Dar al-Salam had 'kidnap- 
ped' married women from another village and married them 
before divorces had been carried out by their husbands. 
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Another event involved the disappearance of a sacred stone 
that was important in the traditional religion in Gao. 
Outlines of these disputes are as follows: 
a) Al-Haii 'Ali Joma, a prominent member of the radical 
Wahhabiyya returned from the pilgrimage to find that his 
uncle had been replaced as chief of Jamkoi during his absence. 
His uncle's removal may have been related to his adherence 
to reformist doctrine. His religious stance would have 
been resented by many villagers who did not hold his views 
and who perhaps were alienated by this change. 
Jamkoi had a large proportion of men who undertook 
the migration to Ghana, many of whom were there at the time 
of the dispute over the chieftainship, working to make up 
for a bad harvest, while their wives and children remained 
behind in the village. A number of villagers, including 
the wives of migrants, supported 'Ali Joma and his uncle 
and were sympathetic to, if not members of, the Wahhabiyya. 
'Ali Joma and his uncle, in defiance of the new chief, 
led as many of Jamkoi's inhabitants as would follow them 
to the newly established village of Dar al-Salam. Most 
of those who moved were women, many of whom had husbands 
in Ghana. 
Some traditionalists accused the Wahhabis of abducting 
the married women by telling them that their husbands would 
eventually meet them in their new village. It is not 
likely, 
however, that they were kept in Dar al-Salam under duress, 
for some who were later under pressure to 
leave fought very 
hard to stay there. 
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The new arrivals were quickly integrated into the commu- 
nity of Dar al-Salam. They were told words to the effect 
that they had left the land of the unholy (d5r al-KUfra) 
and had moved to the dwelling of peace (d5r al-Salam). 
If they left this new home they would no longer be Muslims. 
If they died on the way to their previous home they would 
descend straight to hell; but if they stayed in Dar al- 
Salam they would be blessed as were the wives of the Compani- 
ons who left Mecca to accompany the prophet Muhammad on 
his exodus to Medina. 
Many of the women, with or without husbands in Ghana, 
are said to have married Wahhabi men in Dar al-Salam. The 
Wahhabis are reported to have justified their marriage to 
these women, in spite of their failure to wait the three 
menstrual cycles required in Muslim divorce proceedings, 
by stating that the husbands of the women were klfir and 
the marriages were therefore not legal. 
Inevitably the men working in Ghana came to hear of 
the separation of their wives and they accused the Wahhabis 
of criminal abduction. The receveur des postes in Gao was 
a brother-in-law to several of these women and he lodged 
a complaint with the police authorities. His sisters-in- 
law, after much argument with the police, were convinced 
to return to their husbands. Most men, however, seem to 
have been unwilling to insist that their wives return to 
them. 
Another incident that increased the tensions between 
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Wahhabis and traditionalists was the disappearance of a 
sacred stone from the ancient burial ground beside the tombeau 
des Askias. The stone (tondi kara) was said to have been 
carried from Mecca at the time of Askia Muhammad's triumphant 
pilgrimage. According to one story, the stone was first 
carried by Abu Mariama, a gorongobu, or Songhay master magi- 
cian. When Mariama could no longer carry the stone it was 
taken by an elephant which took it the rest of the way to 
Cao. 
The predominantly white stone was flat and smooth, 
approximately one meter long, 60 centimeters wide and 20 
centimeters high. Its tapered end was positioned to face 
east and it was said that if one followed its trajection 
one would arrive at the ka'ba in Mecca. The stone was consi- 
dered to have healing powers, to bring fertility and to 
Figure View of stone from above (sketched by Abdu Ture, 
grandson of t-. he imam of the Tombeau des Askias). 
bring rain. During the Muslim holidays of Ramadan and the 
Great Festival passers by would circle the stone three or 
four times, then take sand from beside the stone and pour 
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it on their heads in much the same fashion as people once 
showed submission to the Askias of the Songhay empire as 
well as to other powerful rulers. This suggests that the 
stone was used as the equivalent of an ancestral shrine 
of the Askias, or of Askia Muhammad in particular. 
The most popular festival involving the stone took 
place on the Muslim New Year. This was called the dadaw 
M, ri, the 'grandmother' or the festival of the grandmother. 
A torchlit ceremony was led by the gorongobu, a family of 
magicians and descendants of Abu Mariama, the man said to 
have carried the stone part of the way from Mecca. Grand- 
mothers made a sacrificial offering at the close of the 
ceremony for the well being of their grandchildren. In 
the morning there were visits between family members, and 
grandparents gave small gifts to their grandchildren. With 
the disappearance of the stone the New Year's festival lost 
its traditional ritual focus and became more a part of the 
'orthodox' Islamic observance. 
The Wahhabis objected to the rituals associated with 
the stone, as they objected to all practices that involved 
veneration of spiritual power that did not, as they saw 
it, come directly from God. It is for this reason that 
many held them responsible for its disappearance. The stone 
probably disappeared in 1973, shortly before the Muslim 
New Year was to be celebrated, though a slightly earlier 
date is also possible. For many Songhay traditionalists 
in Gao this disappearance was catastrophic. Even with a 
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cursory description of the rites associated with the stone 
based on the memories of participants rather than observation, 
one can see that it had an important place in the lives 
of the townspeople. It was a source of reassurance of pros- 
perity in a difficult environment and, perhaps more impor- 
tantly, it was a focus of the solidification of family ties, 
particularly the traditional affection shown the grandmother, 
in the face of urban conditions which were promoting the 
adoption of western values, individualism and a weakening 
of ties between generations. 
An unfortunate coincience relating to the stone's disap- 
pearance is the fact that the rains in that year were disas- 
terously slight, even less that the inadequate rainfall 
of the previous four or five years, and the Sahel experienced 
one of its worst droughts in recorded history. The drought 
conditions, which affected the lives of every resident in 
the region of Gao, were blamed by many upon the disappearance 
of the sacred stone--and the disappearance of the stone 
was blamed by many on the Wahhabis. 
The governor, Koke Diembele, appears to have been reluc- 
tant at first to deal harshly with the Wahhabis in spite 
of the extreme antagonism that had arisen between rival 
religious groups as a result of their reforms. Elsewhere 
in the country, with the possible exception of Timbuktu, 
the Wahhabiyya was becoming an increasingly influential 
movement. Islam in general was gaining rapidly 
in popularity, 
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and the government may have felt any punitive measures against 
Muslims for religiously oriented activities would have to 
be considered carefully. In Gao, however, when the radical 
Wahhabis, came to be perceived as a threat to the stability 
of the region, the military authorities decided to take 
action. 
There are a number of possible reasons behind the deci- 
sion to crack down on the radical Wahhabiyya, the most obvi- 
ous of which is that the local authorities began to tire 
of the almost continual disputes between members of rival 
religious factions which often involved physical assault. 
The situation in the entire area in which the reformists 
were active was becoming more and more difficult to control. 
The factor which seems to have been most instrumental 
in bringing about punitive action was the undermining of 
state authority at the village level. The chief, being 
the state representative, was responsible for the settlement 
of land disputes, maintenance of village census information, 
and tax collection. The Wahhabis, though not refusing out- 
right to pay taxes, often made it extremely difficult for 
the chief to perform his official duties. On one occasion 
the chief of Kadii entered into a violent quarrel with the 
Wahhabis in Dar al-Salam and was injured in an assault. 
The incident was immediately reported by the traditionalist 
villagers in Kadii to the authorities in Gao. 
At roughly the same time, in 1974, the Wahhabi community 
in Bagoundje was attempting to split off from the main village 
in defiance of the chief's decision which forbade thern to 
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do so. The chief resisted any division of the village and 
the dispute eventually became a test of his authority. 
When the authorities recieved simultaneous complaints 
about Wahhabi behaviour in Kadji and Bagoundje they decided 
to act. In Dar al-Salam Seydu Idrissa and about five of 
his close followers were arrested. In Bagoundje about 35 
Wahhabi men involved in the unauthorized 'd6campemený were 
taken into custody. All the Wahhabi prisoners were publicly 
paraded and disciplined in the Place de I'Independance, 
a large field in the administrative quarter of Gao. This 
was an unprecedented action on the part of local authorities, 
probably intended as a warning to other reformists to avoid 
confrontation in their efforts to promote change. Seydu 
Idrissa is said to have urged his followers, in the course 
of their punishment, to have courage, saying that they must 
not despair, that they would surely enter paradise as a 
r-eward for their sufferings for the cause of Islam. 
Many of those arrested were eventually sentenced to 
six months in Kidal prison, located at a military outpost 
in the Sahara desert about 300 km north of Gao. Those who 
committed acts of violence or played leadership roles were 
given longer sentences, up to two and a half years. Seydu 
Idrissa himself was given three years, the longest sentence. 
Sadu 'Abd al-Rahman escaped arrest by fleeinq into 
Ghana and, according to one account, later avoided arrest 
there by moving to Niqeria, then Saudi Arabia. His flight 
was eventually followed by an open defection from Seydu 
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Idrissa's organization. Years later, around 1980, he was 
permitted to return to Mali after promising to make a public 
apology for his actions. 
When Sadu 'Abd al-Rahman lost his position of leadership 
within the reform movement the gap was filled by al-Haji 
'Ali Joma who acted as leader while Seydu Idrissa served 
his prison sentence. In this task 'Ali Joma was assisted 
by an associate from his home village, al-Tahir Munir who 
is currently a leader of the Wahhabi community in Ghana. 'Ali 
Joma's years of leadership, in partnership with al-Tahir 
Munir, seem to have been comparatively stable. This stabil- 
ity was likely due to the effects of government suppression 
and the fear of further action against the reform movement. 
Political involvement and the beginning of reconciliation. 
When the prison sentences of the Wahhabis were over 
their conflict with the traditionalists was much abated 
but it had not disappeared altogether. One Wahhabi leader 
in particular, Ali Sadu Mahman, has continued an aggressive 
opposition to traditional practices. He exercises 
his 
influence in his native village of Tondibi in the cercle of 
Bourem which is slightly isolated from the cluster of 
Wahhabi 
villages surrounding Gao. 
On the whole, however, the trend has been towards a 
lessening of overt confrontation. Sadu Mahman 
has probably 
been acting independently and without encouragement 
from 
the radical movement's central 
leadership. This more concil- 
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iatory approach to change represents a redirecting of the 
radical Wahhabiyya from active hostility toward the existing 
political system to at least partial acceptance of it 
as a means of achieving their goals. 
Political activity on the part of the Wahhabis takes 
place through the Union D6mocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM). 
This branch of the government, commonly referred to as the 
parti, was established in 1979 as a means by which the gov- 
ernment could formulate and implement cooperative programmes 
at the village level and as the product of a long-standing 
promise to 'democratize' the one-party state system. To 
ensure the acceptance of government programmes, participation 
in UDPM elections became mandatory. At the local level 
members of the UDPM do very little and their office brings 
them almost no political power. Competition over these 
positions is largely for the status they bring; and for 
the radical Wahhabis it is actually a matter of importance 
that their leaders are not full participants in a non-Islamic 
government, that they do not have to follow orders from 
an 'infidel'. 
The deput6 for the cercle of Cao, a higher level posi- 
tion in the UDPM, is reputed to be a Wahhabi sympathiser, 
an association that would not have been cultivated by a 
politician during the early conflicts. He 
has, it is said, 
'one foot on the land and one foot in the water'. His native 
village of Forgho has supporters of 
both the moderate Wahha- 
biyya centred in Gao-city and the radical village-based 
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organization of Wahhabis as well as traditionalists. The 
depute, to gain and maintain support, has had to strike a 
balance between rival religious factions. His main support, 
however, seems to come from the moderate Wahhabis in Gao 
and from traditionalists who have become more accepting 
of religious reform. 
The most successful participant in local politics who 
belongs to the radical Wahhabiyya is Zacharia Ture. Much 
of the support he is given comes from a wide circle of family 
members and friendships which he has maintained since his 
adoption of Wahhabism. His father was the chief of Berra, 
a village about 3 km north of Cao, and since his father's 
decease his uncle, Albonkana Ture has held the office. Albon- 
kana is what might be called a half-Wahhabi, having a wife 
in the Wahhabi section of Berra who remains secluded and 
a wife in Cao whose household is more liberal. This is 
probably his way of attempting to bridge the divisions that 
exist in his village. Zacharia is almost certain to succeed 
to the office of chief upon his uncle's death. Already 
he is the de facto chief of Berra, making, or being consulted 
on, all important village decisions. 
Besides his village influence, Zacharia was elected 
Adjoint Secretaire of the UDPM in the arrondissement central 
of Gao in 1979. In 1981 he was elected Secretaire G6ne'ral 
de la Jounesse of the arrondissement central, and in 1984 
he returned to his position as Adjoint Secretajjýe of the 
UDPM. These positions, though relatively minor in terms 
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of the political influence they bring, are noteworthy consi- 
dering Zacharia's lack of knowledge of French and his adhe- 
rence to the Wahhabiyya. He overcame these iimitations 
largely through a forceful personality, a keen wit and a 
relatively moderate attitude in religious issues despite 
his adherence to reform and his position as the political 
leader of the radical Wahhabiyya. Perhaps more importantly 
he makes it clear that he is a member of the Armah, the 
Songhay nobility which has traditionally been more involved 
in politics than the rest of the population. Zacharia iden- 
tifies with this background and does not, for example, dress 
as a Wahhabi but wears the traditional 'boubo-a' and turban 
which are typical of the nobility. It is likely that many 
of his political supporters are not aware of his involvement 
with religious reform. 
Zacharia Ture's importance lies especially in his role 
as mediator between the radical Wahhabiyya and the government 
and in his efforts to lobby for concessions on the movement's 
behalf. His position in this regard is solidified by ties 
of kinship. His only full brother, Algazani Ture, who is 
not a Wahhabi, works as adjoint administrative secretaire 
to the commandant de cercle. It is in the office of the 
commandant that many grievances involving religious and 
political conflict are aired. 
He also has ties of kinship with the radical Wahhabis 
(see fi gi-i re. P-I b9 )- Zacharia's young uncle, Seydu Ali Ture, 
lives in Dar al-Salam and is married to a daughter of Seydu 
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Figure 
Some key relationships in the family of Zacharia Ture. 
Idrissa. Zacharia has himself married a sister of Ibrahim 
Ture, a young leader in the Wahhabi settlement of Koyma, 
located on the opposite shore from Berra. These ties, combi- 
ned with more distant kinship links with Wahhabis in a number 
of other villages, helps to place Zacharia in a strong posi- 
tion in the radical Wahhabiyya. 
An important example of Zacharia Ture's lobbying efforts 
concerns the continued attempt on the part of the radical 
Wahhabis to establish an officially recognized, independent 
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Islamic organization able to work freely for the promotion 
of the reformed faith. In November and December of 1984 
there were frequent visits on the part of radical Wahhabis, 
and in particular Zacharia Ture, to the office of the comman- 
dant de cercle. These visits often involved the promotion 
of the idea of a recognized Islamic organization for Seydu 
Idrissa and his followers. 
The authorities, however, were strongly opposed to 
this idea. Islamic organizations, specifically the Union 
Culturelle Musulmane, which unified Wahhabi groups, had 
been banned by both post-independence Malian governments. 
In 1981 the Association Malienne Pour I'Unit6 et le Progr6s 
de l'Islam (AMUPI) was established, largely because the 
government feared the consequences of an uncontrolled popula- 
tion of reform-oriented Muslims. This organization is tied 
closely to the government and, like other political organs 
in the country, operates in a pyramidal structure that is 
controlled, ultimately, by the cental government in Bamako. 
Through the AMUPI the government controls the flow 
of foreign aid for such projects as mosques and madrasas. 
The association also mediates in religious conflicts without 
involving the justice system and, in the towns, orcjariizes 
the celebration of Muslim festivals. 
The AMUPI in Gao has been dominated by the Guindo family 
whose origins are among the Dogon cliff dwellers of the. 
Mopti region. They control much of the import trade market 
in Gao and are probably the weal%ý-hiest arid most influential 
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family in the city. They represent the conservative element 
in Gao, both in terms of religion and politics. The regional 
presidency of the AMUPI is held by the head of the family, 
Muhammad ('baba') Guindo and, until recently, monthly meet- 
ings were held in his home. Traditionalist Muslim leaders 
as well as moderate Wahhabis are represented on the AMUPI's 
executive committee. The radical Wahhabis have boycotted 
the association, ostensibly because it is controlled by 
a ? secular' government. 
In 1984 the regional branch of the AMUPI in Gao attemp- 
ted to resolve the situation of conflict between the radical 
village Wahhabis and the traditionalists by inviting Seydu 
Idrissa and Zacharia Ture to join the executive committee 
of the association. This was a compromise offered to meet 
half-way their demands for an independent Islamic organiza- 
tion. The invitation was opposed by some members of the 
AMUPI who, in essence, continued to consider the radical 
Wahhabiyya as heretical. Nevertheless, in December, 1984, 
Seydu Idrissa was offered the position of secretaire g6n6ral 
de la culture, which involves primarily the organization 
of public religious meetings, and Zacharia Ture was offered 
the (perhaps more important) position of membre des conflits, 
which involves the settling of disputes between Muslims, 
particularly disputes arising from religious 
differences. 
The radical Wahhabis considered these invitations an 
insult. The consensus seemed to be that their teaders, 
I 
especially Seydu Idrissa, were more 
deservin(i of a post 
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such as the national leadership of the AMUPI and that, with 
time and God's will, this is indeed what will be achieved. 
Seydu Idrissa expressed similar disappointment in a letter 
to the regional branch of the AMUPI which strongly condemned 
the association, stating, in effect, that the AMUPI was 
too closely involved with the non-Islamic government and 
that its affairs were managed in an authoritarian manner 
approaching demagoguery. This refusal to participate in 
the AMUPI indicates not only the single-mindedness with 
which religious principles are held, but also the continued 
reluctance within the radical reform movement to participate 
in what are judged to be compromising political activities. 
Seydu Idrissa does not feel the inclination to involve 
the Wahhabiyya in non-Islamic politics. His ideal remains 
the establishment of a Muslim community where religion is 
the law, where there is freedom to follow the rules of Islam 
to the letter without the interference of secular rulers, 
and in attaining this goal he wishes to deviate from the 
ideal, as he perceives it, as little as possible. 
The task of political involvement is given to Zacharia, 
Ture who typifies the Songhay man of practical action. 
He is politicallY ambitious and his position in the reform 
movement seems to be an avenue for power that is greater 
than that derived from his public activities. 
These different orientations in the leadership of the 
radical Wahhabiyya represent not so much a contradiction 
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as a division of labour that is typical of many Islamic 
and non-Islamic religious movements. The man of religion 
guides the movement with his greater insight into the will 
of the divine, while organization, discipline and action 
come from his more practically oriented right-hand man. 
The activity of the Wahhabis after the release of Seydu 
Idrissa from prison resembles a process of entrenchment- 
a solidification of the territory gained in their earlier 
assaults on traditional practices. Active aggression in 
the pursuit of their cause seems to have been less frequent. 
The isolation of the Wahhabis from their rival villagers 
and the mediation activities of Zacharia. Ture and the AMUPI 
seem to have generally decreased open conflict. Although the 
more recent activities of the Wahhabis in their promotion 
of reform seem to have been more pacific, their basic goal 
appears to remain the same: the establishment of a large 
community of believers who base their actions on the word 
of God as recorded in the Quran and the traditions of the 
prophet. 
It should be noted that reconciliation or an attitude 
of greater tolerance has also been 
demonstrated by the state. 
Events in Bamako arising from the increasing strength of 
reformist Islam show a great reluctance on 
the part of the 
government to be placed in the position of an open adversary 
of the reformist trend. The 
Malian state has responded 
to pressure from reform groups 
by identifying itself more 
closely with in Islam that cuts 
across reciional and nation, 11 
disputes, one that presents a simple image of unitý, 
through 
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religious observance. 
Pressure from reformists consists essentially of the 
demand that the state take into its hands the responsibility 
for control of the moral behaviour of its citizens in accord- 
ance with Islamic law and custom. 
Nous attendons de tous ies intellectuels du pays 
ensemble de mener un combat ouvert contre les 
facteurs degradants qui sont en train de compro- 
mettre le devenir de nos enfants: film carate. 
th6atre porno, film cowboy, drogues, alcools, 
adult6re, homosexualite, W sont d6jA cause de 
moralit6 de notre jeunesse. 
In taking this call for moral 'purity' further, we find 
a carefully worded appeal for the formation of an Islamic 
state: 
On sait que I'Etat est une institution qui ropose 
historiquement sur le principe de la s6paration. 
La s6paration de I'Etat d'avec I'Eglise, ta s&para- 
tion du pouvoir civil du pouvoir militaire, du 
pouvoir politique du pouvoir economique. Ces 
s6parations sont Les etapes qui ont marqu6 la 
formation de 1'Etat europ&en. Et la doctrine 
liberale de I'Etat est une synth&se de cette 6volu- 
tion. On peut bien se demander si ces &16ments 
doivent necessairement s'integrer a la construction 
de 1'Etat Malien. L'histoire nous mettra en garde 
contre les reproductions passives d'instit-utions 
et doctrines qui ont fait leurs preuves dans 6es 
contextes socio-historiques fort diff6rent des 
n6tres. 16 
Opposition to this idea of a ndtional moral and legal 
unity based upon Islam cent-Aes upon the social diversity 
15. Kady Dram&., in Jamana, no. 8,19ýJ5. 
16. Ibid. 
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of the country's inhabitants which have for a long time 
been part of the socio-cultural background. "C'est mecon- 
nAitre les r6alites historiques de notre pays et de I'Islam 
que de croire A une uniformisation de toutes les situations 
I 'r socio-culturelles. L Islam admet le droit A la difference, 
y compris la non-croyance.,, 
17 
Faced with pressure to lead a struggle against 'anti- 
Islamic' vices on the one hand and to remain tolerant of 
non-Muslim traditions as well as different traditions within 
Islam on the other, the Malian government has responded 
by bringing the organization of Islam as far as possible 
into state control. One of the first examples of such state 
control was the formation of the A. M. U. P. I. The disbanding 
of private Islamic orqanizations(notably the Union Culturelle 
Musulmane) was accomplished with the nearly simultaneous 
establishment of a government organization charged with 
the 'administration' of Islam: the organization of festivals 
and public lectures, collection and distribution of alms, 
etc. More recently state control of Islamic education has 
been initiated with restrictions on the independent operation 
of madrasas. 
18 
By taking traditionally religious institutions 
into government colltrol, and at the same time providing 
them with conditional government support, the Malian govern- 
ment presents itself as a guardian of Islam at the same 
time as it reduces the independent power of reformist com- 
munities. 
The Malian government has also responded passively 
17. Morfindang Traor6. in Jainana, no. 4,1985. 
18. See below, Ch. X. 
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(as we have seen in its reluctance to use force against 
the radical Wahhabiyya at the height of 'extremism') through 
reluctance to prosecute reformists who infringe on state 
authority in their over-zealous attempts to Impose a 'puri- 
fied' Islamic morality. An example of state passivity in 
the face of reformist excess is evident in the lack of resp- 
onse from police authorities to a Wahhabi 'raid' on the 
prostitutes of the Bakaribougou quarter in Bamako on May 
28,1985 (during the month of Ramadan) in which women of 
t mauvaises moeurs' were beaten and their homes damaged or 
destroyed. 
19 
The most significant feature of this event 
is not the violence or overzealousness of the reformers 
but rather the state's lack of response to what was a clear 
infringement of its monopoly of justice. 
Reconciliation between reformists and the state, there- 
fore, has moved in both directions. The radical Wahhabis 
of Cao have come to see the advantage in at least minimal 
participation in local politics as well as (after imprison- 
ment) the disadvantages of bringing defiance too far. The 
state, on the other hand, has little to gain by bringing 
itself into open conflict with reformists. More than this, 
the state benefits from reformist excess by deriving from 
it the justification for bringing r-eligious organization 
into the domain of state administration. This is at the 
same time a source of political 
legitim, 3[cy and a means of 
bringing diverse and often conflicting expressions of Islam 
into closer state control. 
19. Jamana, no. 4, 1985. 
VII. r LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION 
Frequent reference has already been made to elements 
of leadership among the Wahhabis. My intention here is 
to briefly bring some of this material together, and intro- 
duce some new information, in a discussion of the place 
of the radical Wahhabiyya in filling a political niche in 
the villages where they are influential. 
The central theme of this discussion is the erosion 
of autonomous local political authority and its replacement 
by a political system in which village leader-ship is control- 
led, first by the colonial power and later, more definitively, 
by the independent nation. The response of the radical 
Wahhabiyya to poliLical domination is to maximize the author- 
ity of the religious leadership as well as the eFectiveness 
of more informal systems of cooperation within the limits 
of state control. The town offers less room for such inde- 
pendence and we f ind a correspondingly weaker, more govern- 
ment controlled, leadership among the moderate reformists. 
The importance of the imposition of national' politics 
and the decline of local political authority in the develop- 
ment of Islamic reform is brought closer to our attention 
by Kessler's study of rural Islamic, reform in the T11alay 
state of Kelantan. The pre-colonial history of this region 
is marked by an urban 
fOCUS tO ISIdM dnd its associated 
systems of 1(: iw and worship. In the 1890's Uhis focus was 
1. Kessler, 1978. 
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strengthened with an expansion of the administrative powers 
of the Mufti and a closer relationship between autocratic 
power and religious officialdom. Under colonial domination, 
however, the Islamic leadership underwent a decline in pres- 
tige by 'deflecting' opposition to British rule. A major 
issue associated with this cooperation with the colonial 
power was the construction of English schools, an acceptance, 
therefore, of western systems of administration and other 
aspects, perhaps less desir. -ij)Ij-, from a Muslim point of 
view, of the western intellectual and cultural traditions. 
Other equally significant developments during the colonial 
and early post-colonial period in Kelantan were: 1) rapid 
urban growth which placed old sei-tlers and peasant villagers 
in a position of conflict with the leadership of the town; 
the removal of centra'L administrative power to Kudla 
Lampur, thereby concentrating the benefits of independence 
on the more developed and largely non-Malay west coast; and 
the creation in the 1950's of political parties which 
provided an electoral outlet for local grievances. The 
period of less than a century from the pre-colonial monarchy 
to post-colonial party politics in Kelantan was accompanied 
by a shift in rural 1slamic observance from mild acceptance 
to fervent, though unscholarly. piety. 
A similar process is represented bY the development 
of Islamic retorm in the village setting of Gao. Hav i ng 
considered the limited participation of the Wahhabiyya in 
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national politics in an earlier chapter, I will now turn 
to a discussion of the erosion of local political authority 
through colonialism and nationalism and the place of the 
Wahhabi organization in creating and alternative political 
integrity. 
The chieftainship. 
With the atomization of the Songhay empire--its politi- 
cal division inLo autonomous villages or clusters of vil- 
lages--the Songhay chief, in facing the threat from the 
Tuareg and Kunta, became a warrior or mediator, sometimes 
combining these roles, sometimes changing in one direction 
or the other. In the northern portion of the Niger bend 
the Songhay villages were more easily overcome and exploited 
by the nomads, while resistance was concentrated in the 
region occupied by the Zerma who tended to be more politi- 
cally unified and capable of defending themselves. 
2 
The authority of the chief in pre-colonial times was 
based upon several forms of legitimation. Occasionally 
the chief was a descendant of the f ir'st occupants of the 
soil. The power of the chief in this case was limited since 
he depended upon the consensus of his subjects for his posi- 
tion of leadership and for acceptance of his decisions. 
2. Cf. Olivier de Sardan, 1984: ch. IV. 
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He was, in essence, an arbitrator, having little recourse 
to violence. 
More commonly in the region north of Ansongo, the chief 
was a member of the Armah nobility, a leader descended from 
the Moroccan invaders, with greater means to exploit his 
subjects. Often this kind of chief depended upon "Iuslim 
clerics for advice in a division of labour in which the 
alfa advised and the chief decided. The power of the ch'Lef 
was in any case not extensive, not extending beyond a cluster 
of four or fi,,, -e villages. Where he was a member of the 
nobility and received tribute, the act of giving tribute 
on the part of a subject vras more to demonstrate allegiance, 
to recognize the chief as a source of justice and protection, 
than to show submission to a despot. 
' 3 Even in villages exploited 
by the nomads the chief retained a qre--ýat dedl of prestige. 
He usually acted in the best interests of the community, 
Lrying to make the most of the situation by negotiating and 
compromising with the surrounding nomadic grr--)ul)s to minimize 
the possibility of raids. 
A general feature of French colonialism, at least until 
World War 11, was a decline in the status of chiefs within 
their communities because of their position in the colonial 
administration. Coloni. al rule was centralized and tended 
to lead to a leveling in the leadership structure of socl-- 
eties under French authority. The principal reasons for 
this are noted by Crowder: 
3. Olivier de Sardan, 1984: 106. 
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The agents for the collection of taxes imposed 
by the French were the chiefs. They were also 
responsible for raising forced labour for work 
on roads, railways and even European plantations 
and for providing carriers for the administration 
and for ensuring the forced cultivation of certain 
cash crops. These new functions were largely 
responsible for the changeover of the position 
of the chief from the symbol of the collective 
unity of his people to the most hated member of 
that community. The chiefs abused their traditional 
authority in raising taxes and labour not only 
for the French but also for themselves. The admini- 
stration turned a blind eye to this, provided 
chiefs served their interests loyally. For thus 
they could continue to pay these agents of the 
administration a pittance for their services, 
and be rid of them whenever they Vere dissatisfied 
with them on charges of extortion. 4 
While the political position of the chief, between the colo- 
nial administration and the village, potentially increased 
his power by his ability to exploit his subjects while 
being maintained in his position by the administration, 
the prestige of the chief often suffered when he abused 
his power. 
When the oppressiveness of the colonial presence abated 
during the post-war period of independence movements and 
the drive toward nationalism, the prestige of the chief 
was somewhat improved, while at the same time his power 
decreased. Since the chief was the local representative 
of the central political power his status in the community 
depended largely upon the degree of perceived oppressiveness 
of the state. 
If we apply this formula to the contemporary Songhay 
chief we find that he must perform two kinds of function 
Crowder, 1968: 187. 
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which are sometimes contradictory. On the one hand his 
duties as representative of the national government (more 
specifically the Minist6re de l'Int6rieur) demand that he 
perform often unpopular duties, such as tax collection, 
and, in general, act as mediator between the commandant 
de cercle and the village residents. On the other hand, 
he usually aspires toward a position of respect in the com- 
munity, towards a role as the symbol of collective unity, 
which may be difficult to achieve if he is identified too 
closely with the representatives of national government. 
This is a classic dillema of local leaders in peasant com- 
munities. 
This dillema is especially acute among the Songhay 
because their integration into Lhe state is marked by a 
low degree of political participation at a high level. 
Integration is achieved more or less by domination, not 
by the occupation of local leaders in important political 
positions. Hence the Songhay chief often occupies his posi- 
tion of leadership in a population that has minimal loyalty 
to the national government. 
This situation is largely a consequence of the manner 
in which the Sahelian nations were created. Little consider- 
ation, if any, was given to tribal affiliation or cultural 
variations from one region to another and the problems that 
would be posed by cutting across ethnically or culturally 
homogeneous areas with a national border. In Mali the most 
important consequence of the allocation of national territory 
has been the cultural differences between the north and 
183 
the south. To a large extent the people of the savannah 
region of the south are more politically integrated than 
the nomads of the Sahel who have more cultural affinity 
with North Africa than with sub-Saharan Africa. The Songhay 
to some extent share in this political marginality but, 
being sedentary and settled closer to administrative towns, 
they are more easily controlled than the desert tribes. 
Despite Seydu Idrissa's disclaimer to the effect that 
he is not interested in involving the Wahhabiyya with poli- 
tics, this religious reform movement has become a major 
channel for the expression of rural political dissent. 
Since the 1970's this dissent has not been expressed in 
a direct way against the government but rather has taken 
the form of a maximization of aloofness. 
By hiving off from traditional villages the Wahhabis 
have largely avoided the dillema of local leadership. The 
chief, who mediates between the villages and the central 
government is usually, from the point of view of the Wahhabis, 
a member of a rival faction. Their own leaders are immune 
from the risk of contaminating themselves with cooperation 
with a perceived oppressor. For a radical Wahhabi chief 
to retain power or for a Wahhabi candidate to be elected, 
the majority of village members must belong to his religious 
faction, a situation that prevails in Berra and Lobu. In 
the few instances where the chief is a Wahhabi he can probably 
depend upon the cooperation of his village as long as he 
does not enact centrally directed orders too enthusiastically. 
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The most he can expect from non-cooperation with the govern- 
ment, such as in denying requests to compromise with the 
rival religious faction, is the loss of his official poli- 
tical position and his acceptance in the Wahhabi community 
as a hero. 
Radical organization. 
Dar al-Salam is the central village in a network of 
Wahhabi communities that have been built along similar lines. 
The central building in Dar al-Salam is the mosque. it 
is also the largest structure, measuring approximately 35 
square meters. The centre of the mosque is open to the 
air, with roofs in the front and back covering the men's 
and women's prayer areas, each supported by eight thick 
pillars. The entire structure is made of mud-brick. There 
is a stairway on one side which leads to the front roof 
from which the Muezzin calls, but there is no minaret, pro- 
bably in keeping with the example of the Saudi Arabian Wah- 
habis who construct their mosques with the greatest simpli- 
5' 
city, allowing no minarets or ornaments. A well is located 
close to the mosque where water can be drawn for ablutions. 
The boys' and girls' madrasas are on opposite sides of the 
mosque, but the latter remains unfinished and the girls 
and women study in the compound of one of Seydu Idrissa's 
wives in the eastern part of the village. A key building 
5- Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1929: 1087. 
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in almost all Wahhabi villages is the guest house where 
visitors can meet village leaders without having to be wel- 
comed in any particular compound and inconveniencing the 
household where women must not be seen. The compound of 
Seydu Idrissa is also centrally located, largely for conven- 
ience because of his duties in the mosque and school (he 
does not have regular dealings with the women's madrasa), 
but also because living close to the area of worship and 
study affirms his position as leader of sacred activities, as 
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a living focus of the religious life of the village. 
There is a strong belief among the followers of the 
radical Wahhabiyya that their villages are sacred, bastions 
of purity in a world dominated by the impure, places of 
piety and belief in a realm of impiety and unbelief. This 
is especially true of the central village of the radical 
Wahhabis, Dar al-Salam. Here, where Islam is followed with 
an eye to perfection, the sacred and the pure are seen to 
be cultivated. The Wahhabi village, it was stressed, is 
clean in contrast to the town where clothes become dirty 
in a day. Implicit in this is the watchword of the Christian 
puritails 'cleanliness in next to (godliness--the realm of 
the sacred is also the realm of the tidy. 
The explicit model for Dar al-Salam was the structure 
of religious teaching centres in the Middle East, particularly 
Medina, with their mosques, school buildings, and housing 
for students and guests. A closer resemblance, however, 
can be found with the z5wiyas, the lodges of the Sufi orders. 
This is so riot only in terms of structure (important Sufj 
lodges are arranged along similar lines with mosques, schools 
and guest houses) but also, and more importantly, in terms 
of the function of the organization of the religious com- 
mun 1 ty. The Sufi lodge provides religious instruction, 
places of prayer as well as lodgings for visiting members. 
This structure is made possible by a network of contacts 
between religious leaders, or muqaddams, whose znwiyas are 
united under the central leadership of the brotherhood. 
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This comparison would probably be strenuously denied 
by the Wahhabis themselves, to whom Suf ism represents a 
divergence from the true path of Islam. The main differences 
between Wahhabism and Sufism, however, lie in the theology 
and ideology of the two and do not fully penetrate to the 
social functions of the religious organization. Here the 
Wahhabi leadership, in their role as legal advisors, arbiters, 
judges, educators, and literate men who direct a social 
network, are similar to the Sufi muqaddams and marabouts. 
ideally the Wahhabis may wish to lessen their role as inter- I 
cessors between man and God; practically they have adopted 
the Sufi-like role of intercessors between man and man. 
Thi-s point shall be elaborated in the discussion of the 
radical Wahhabi leadership which follows. 
Amonq nomadic tribesmen throughout most of the Muslim 
world the cleric often has an important position as mediator 
between tribal units. Islam in this context acts as a general 
element of social identity and as a buffer between local 
tribal groups with specific interests. Agriculturalists, 
on the other hand, with greater economic self-sufficiency, 
do not have the same social conditions which might give 
the cleric an important position. Here exploitation on 
the part of a state or raids arid prodation from nomads were 
primary sources of insecurity. To be accepted at the village 
level Muslim leaders could not remain unbiased; they became 
part of the local community. By being rooted 
in this way 
1 
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the sphere of influence of Muslim clerics in village communi- 
ties was socially and geographically bounded. 
TsIamic reform in the village context is associated 
with an expansion of the sphere of influence of the Muslim 
cleric. Once a relatively unimportant f igure having only 
tenuous links with the wider Islamic civilization, he becomes, 
as a spokesman or missionary of reform, the focus of an 
organized political network oriented towards religious and 
social change. This network, though bounded by limits on 
political autonomy imposed by the state, acts as a focal 
point for the regulation of village life and for the import- 
ant- cooperative ties between villages which share the reform- 
ist orientation. 
The radical Wahhabiyya is unusual in that all of its 
members, tat le-ast nominally, recognize the religious leader- 
ship of one man, Seydu Idrissa. This situation is found 
among the nomadic. tribes loyal to the Suf i tradition but 
among the Songhay, who have traditionally lacked inter- 
village cohesiveness and influential leaders, this degree 
of centralization is new. Central leadership gives the 
movement a focus and has enabled it to develop an authority 
structure which gives it greater control over its membership 
than other Wahhabi groups in West Africa. The ideology of the 
radical Wahhabiyya resembles puritan Islamic reform movements 
elsewhere but the organization, ironically, resembles Lhat 
of their rivals. the brotherhoods. 
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Seydu Idrissa struck me upon initial acquaintance as 
a genial man. His round face with full cheeks and his stocky 
build contributed to an impression of affability and health. 
But after the initial impression it became easier to perceive 
the hard edge of a man convinced of the truth and unwilling 
to let pass any perceived challenge to his vision of reality. 
When he became serious this conviction showed through in 
a measured and confident voice and gestures which seemed 
well adapted to the messages of reform that he often preached 
concerning the true path of Islam and the iniquity of others. 
Much of his authority of manner seems to come from 
the respect. arid admiration given him by his followers. 
His words are listened to with great attention and, in situ- 
ations that permit, qtiestioris are asked with humility and 
submission to his knowledqe. Amongst themselves the children 
of his Quran school call him 'baba', -father. He seems indeed 
to be a patriarch to his foilowers, a man reputed to possess 
greater knowledge and experience then themselves who guides 
them through life, teaching them the higher values to which 
he has greater access. To other followers he is called ,L 
lalfa' or, when speaking French, 'marabout', both terms 
refering to Muslim clerics of all kinds, including Sufj 
holy men. The belief that he has superior knowledge of 
Islam seems to be a major source of his authority. Some 
believe that he knows the closest secrets of God. includinq 
the time of thee Day of Judgement. One especially enthusiastic 
I') U 
devotee, unaware of his heresy, said 'he was sent by God 
to live and work among us. He is even a prophet'. This 
is an extreme statement but it does point to a trend, or 
potential trend, in the radical Wahhabiyya which resembles 
the near apotheosis of the founders of some of the Sufi 
6 brotherhoods. 
This extreme example of devotion points to a contradic- 
tion between the Wahhabi ideal of equality between believers 
and what Evans-Pritchard calls "the need for personal contact 
and tenderness" 
7 
in the religion of rural peoples which 
is often, in the case of Islam, expressed in the cult of 
the saints. Evans-Pritchard's statement implies that the 
need for holy men and devotional enthusiasm is spiritual, 
that it derives from rural man's closeness with the environ- 
ment, with seasonal cycles and the rhythm of life as lived 
by the 'simple folk' or, in the case of the urban poor, 
as an emotional escape from drudgery and misery. But it 
is perhaps more profitable to consider the role of spiritual 
intermediaries, the way in which they provide the community 
with a locally-based social framework which effectively 
ý 1, 
fills a political niche. Respect for holy men is of funda- 
mental importance to the organizational structure of socieLy; 
and although Songhay society is not based upon segmentary 
lineages as is usually the case with tribes dependent upon 
saints, the radical Wahhabi leadership is important as a 
channel for local political ambitions and dCtiVities as 
For example. O'Brien, 1971 on the Mourides. 
14'vans-Pritchard, 1949: 1. 
8. Cf. Gellner, 1969 and 1984: ch. 4. 
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well as a system of inter-village cooperation. 
The independent organizational structure of the radical 
Wahhabis is situated within closed communities established 
by the mechanism of the hijra. The boundary between 'believers' 
and ^'infidels' is clearly defined. A 'believer' is one 
who acknowledges the leadership of Seydu Idrissa, who lives 
in a 'hijra' village or community and who submits to village 
rules and the strict practice of Islam which is part of 
community life. Loyalty to the group is based upon recogni- 
tion of its leaders and a committment to reformed Islam 
which involveýs a strenuous effort to learn and implement 
the guidelines of the sunna. 
Exclusive attachment to the Wahhabi community thus 
often overrides loyalty to kin. Ties of reciprocity between 
Wahhabis and their traditionalist family members are dissolved 
and, while close attachment remain between kin who adhere 
to the movement, the 'convert' to the radical Wahhabiyya 
belongs to a group in which all co-religionists can be called 
'brother' and 'sister'. Like many other Islamic communities, 
the radical Wahhabiyya can in this sense be called a -' frater- 
riity I. With this point in mind it is instructive to consider 
the example of the Saudi Arabian Ikhwan: 
As former Bedouin the Ikhwan were most noteworthy 
for their renunciation of tribal loyalty and even 
family ties in favour of the bonds of brotherhood. 
In a desert, tribal society where the family was 
an individual's security, identity and legitimacy, 
the renunciation of all this was no light matter. 
It underscored the degree to which Ibn Sa'ud was 
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able to substitute the brotherhood of Islam domi- 
ciled in the hijrah for the protection, security 
and identity which they surrendered when they 
left the tribe. ý 
It is important to add that the Ikhwan were generously subsi- 
dized by the Saudi state, a position which gave their supra- 
kin loyalties a great deal of stability and effectiveness. 
The Gao Wahhabiyya differs from this in being economically 
marginal. At the same time, however, Songhay family loyalties 
do not have the same importance as the family and tribal 
affiliations of the Bedouin. For the Songhay, family, division 
certainly entailed much grief, but the supra-kin loyalties 
of the radical Wahhabiyya, in spite of the movement's limited 
resources, are associated with a clear social identity and 
a maximum degree of security in an unstable environment. 
In radical Wahhabi villages the kind of respect given to 
Seydu Idrissa, which resembles the saint veneration of the 
brotherhoods, is sometimes also given to the village imam. 
Literacy in Arabic and the access this gives to the revealed 
Truth is the most important asset of a Wahhabi religious 
leader. The imam functions in a community dominated by 
oral modes of communication where literacy, either in Arabic 
or French, is a gift possessed by few. This is a community 
in which, but for a few dilligent students, rote learning 
of the scriptures prevails; yet an understanding of the 
scriptural message is the ideal. The imam, then, becomes 
the intermediary between man and God through his understanding 
Habib, 1979: 321 
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of the message of the Quran, the final Revelation. 
Since the practical application of the scriptural message 
extends to nearly every aspect of the believer's life, the 
position of the imam is a very important one. He leads 
prayer five times daily, reads and explains the Quran and 
ýadTth, conducts ceremonies such as weddings and funerals, 
mediates in disputes between villagers and is consulted 
on any matter pertaining to the correct practice of Islam. 
His wishes are respected and his advice usually implemented. 
He is elected above all because of his literacy and religious 
knowledge. 
On the surface there does not appear to be a great 
deal of manoeUvring to attain the position of imam. But 
holders of religious authority do seem to take precautions 
to secure their position. In Bagoundje, for example, the 
regular imam was away for an extended period in Saudi Arabia 
and his responsibilities were shared in his absence by two 
leaders. These may be called the 'hot season imam' and 
the 'cool season imam' because they alternated their direction 
of religious affairs in the village in accordance with the 
climate. The ostensible reason for this was that the 'mosque', 
being unfinished, was simply an enclosed field and one imam 
was better able to withstand the summer heat than the other. 
It appears, however, that such an arrangement would create 
a balanced but weak leadership during the imam's absence 
which would diminish the possibility of the emergence of 
a rival to his position. 
There was, in addition to the two subsitute imams in 
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Bagoundie, a third leader who was said to be in charge of 
more practical matters. He was visible when meetings took 
place in Gao with Seydu Idrissa. One of his functions was 
to supervise the implementation of directives from the move- 
ment's central leadership and to relay the findings of such 
meetings to other senior men in the village. Thus, while 
the imam is usually the most important village leader, there 
is also room for more 'secular' leaders, those who do not 
excel in religious knowledge or languages but who nonethe- 
less have a talent for organization and a knowledge of prac- 
tical affairs. In many cases these are men whose abilities 
were recognized before their change to Wahhabism or who 
belonged to families whose members often became village 
leaders. 
In addition to the leadership of older, respected men 
there are positions or duties of lesser importance given 
to younger men who may be called 'assistants'. These are 
sometimes younger men who not only pursue their studies 
in Arabic and religion, but who also have some experience 
in the national school system and have some facility, though 
often very limited, with French. Such men often accompany 
village leaders on journeys to the town where they act as 
translators and, when necessary, as bodyguards. 
In some villages there is also a demand for young men 
capable of a great deal of travel to act as messengers. 
These men seem to be more often literate in Arabic than 
1- r) 
French since, among the radicals, inter-village communication 
is almost invariably in Arabic. A certain pride seems to 
be taken in the process of sending and receiving written 
messages. Seydu Idrissa and a small handful of other leaders 
in the movement are fully literate in Arabic and their written 
messages are usually clear and correct. The f ew men who 
act as messengers from Dar al-Salam are also literate because 
those receiving the communication may not be fully conversant 
with Arabic and would require a translation. 
Those in charge of running the lodges in Gao and Ansongo, 
though few in number, also have positions of responsibility. 
The two lodge keepers in Cao are relatives of Zacharia Ture. 
An elementary knowledge of French and other local languages 
such as Tamdshaqq is useful to them in their daily purchases 
of animals for slaughter and other food items, and in their 
dealings with visitors to the 'restaurant' who are often 
neither Wahhabi nor Songhay. The lodge keepers have their 
families in Dar al-Salam and occasionally take turns visiting 
them. Tn this way their wives and children avoid the 'per- 
nicious' influence of the city. 
With migration and temporary labour in the coastal 
towns a significant part of the Songhay strategy for survival, 
there is a place for Muslim leadership to act within migrant 
communities. Cohen's study of Hausa migrants in Ibadan 
io 
shows how adherence to Islam, in this case the Tijaniyya. 
IG. Cohen, 1969. 
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brotherhood, can maintain ethnic exclusiveness in a predomin- 
antly non-Muslim environment and can operate as the basis 
for a social network that helps adherents to find housing 
and employment as well as a rallying point for political 
self-preservation. 
Up to date information on Songhay migrants in Ghana 
came to me only through those who had returned recently 
to Cao. This was a limited vantage point and the study 
of Islam among Songhay migrants remains a promising topic 
of research (political factors permitting). 
It can be surmised, however, that the Wahhabiyya operates 
along similar lines to the Tijaniyya among Hausa migrants 
in Nigeria. But unlike the Hausa, Songhay migrants have 
usually been mobile, often staying in the southern towns 
for one or two years before returning home. 
In spite of this predominant transience the radical 
Wahhabiyya has established Quran schools in Kumasi and Accra. 
The presence of these schools, which are said to be linked 
to the radical Wahhabiyya in Gao, points to the continued 
existence of a thriving Muslim community in the zongos of 
Ghana and to the presence of a religious literati which 
may act as a focus for community solidarity and cooperation. 
Seydu Idrissa. claims that these schools and the Wahhabi 
movement in the migrant communities themselves, fall under 
his leadership, but contact between Dar al-Salam and Ghana 
appears to be irregular and the schools and communities 
of Kumasi arid Accra likely have a great deal of autonomy. 
The problems faced by migrants from the Sahel in the 
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cities of Ghana are numerous. Busia, in his expulsion of 
over 200,000 migrants in 1969, introduced a trend, which 
has lasted to the present, of economic nationalization and 
xenophobia which places considerable restrictions on the 
opportunities available to migrant workers. Rapid urban 
growth has been coupled with economic decline and unemployment 
to effectively put an end to the opportunities for migrants 
to become wealthy through economic exploits and adventure 
in Ghana. 
In spite of this decline, Ghana remains a frequent 
destination for Sonqhay migrants from the Gao region. Drought 
and economic marginality in the Sahel as well as the estab- 
lishment of particular realms of employment, such as work 
as porters, which are maintained by a network of cooperation 
based on ethnicity and religion, encourage the continued 
movement to the south. 
A possible response to the limitation of economic oppor- 
tunities in the south is an increase in the duration of 
residence in the migrant communities. If a migrant worker 
has found an activity in the coastal towns by which he can 
feed himself, he might consider it foolish to sacrifice 
this opportunity for the uncertain situation prevailing 
in his home village. It is possible, therefore, that besides 
the seasonal migrants who leave their villages to pursue 
any opportunity that is available, then return within 
the year, there is a core of more permanent migrants who 
have been successful in finding employment. 
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Transience continues to be encouraged, however, by 
the possibility, however remote it may seem, of an abundant 
harvest in the north and by the difficulties workers face 
in sending money to their families. Previously it was pos- 
sible to send postal money orders, but this practice has 
recently been curtailed by a lack of cash in the post office 
in Gao which makes such money orders useless in a situation 
where the cash is needed immediately, not in one or two 
years. Many migrants return, therefore, out of a sense 
of responsibility to their families who are left in the 
vi I lages. 
The radical Wahhabiyya is probably important in the 
coastal towns for its creation of cohesive migrant communi- 
ties which operate effectively in a situation of limited 
opportunity and bureaucratic complexity. Such a community 
would help members with the problems of housing, employment 
and with going through the bureaucratic procedures required 
of foreign workers by the Ghanaian government. It may also, 
on occasion, function as a link between the migrant worker 
and his family in the north. 
Muslim leaders in this context are a source of religious 
knowledge and a focus of community ritual observance. As 
the purveyors of religious learning, of the 'correct' way 
of life, the religious leadership helps to define the boundary 
of a community whose members are required to function in 
a social and political environment which they perceive 
to be, and which may be in reality, essentially hostile. 
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Religion thus marks a boundary of trust. A co-religionist 
is also a 'brother', one who is not prone to back-stabbing, 
often one who can be trusted to help in a difficult situation, 
especially if asked to do so by a community leader 
In traditional Songhay society there is generally no 
community wide organization of agricultural labour, no wider 
network than the extended family for the creation of work 
groups during periods of intense agricultural activity. 
An exception to this can be found among the Wogo of Niger 
who have developed a system of work teams 1, q called the bogu. -I 
With this system, groups of children, from the age of 12 
or 13, meet on af ixed day once or twice a week to work 
on the fields of one or the other of their fathers. The 
owner of the field, in return, must bring food to the workers 
in the fields and is responsible for the preparation of 
a large communal meal in the evening. A work group formed 
by children is continued into adulthood as its members become 
older. This system is exceptional and the Wogo, partly 
as a consequence of their labour organization, are also 
unusual in terms of agricultural productivity, with a rela- 
tively high income from short cycle rice and cash crops 
such as tobacco. Among the Songhay of Gao labour cooperation 
more commonly is organized on a kinship or friendship basis 
and the goals of production are lower. 
Olivier de Sardan, 1969: 41. 
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The radical Wahhabis have implemented a system of labour 
cooperation which more closely resembles the organization 
of the Wogo, than that of their more immediate traditional 
neighbours. Tuesdays are set aside for community projects 
and all able-bodied men and older boys are expected to par- 
ticipate. If a man needs help during the crucial periods 
of sowing and harvesting he informs a village leader and 
a work group is organized. In one instance a man in Berra 
needed help at a time when labour in the village was not 
available. In this case a work group was sent from Dar 
al-Salam for a day to perform the necessary task. This 
example is important because it demonstrates the potential 
of the rural Wahhabiyya to increase agricultural production 
and improve the physical living conditions in their villages. 
Even the Wogo, who are among the most agriculturally produc- 
tive village dwellers of the Niger river, do not possess 
a supra-village system of labour cooperation. 
The Wahhabis of Dar al-Salam have also shown themselves 
to be more experimental in their approach to agriculture 
than most traditional villagers. During the 1984-85 drought 
year they attempted larger rice crops than most other vil- 
lagers. Vegetables, for consumption in the village, were 
planted on a more extensive scale than had ever been done 
by them before. Small gardens were planted inside many 
compounds which were tended by women. These were usually 
irrigated by boys when the women were indoors or absent. 
Large gardens were also planted outside the village and, 
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in at least one instance, were irrigated by a gas-powered 
pump. Men who had never bothered with gardens before became 
involved and shared information with one another about such 
things as the correct preparation of the soil and the best 
amount of irrigation. Gardens were also started for the 
first time on a larger scale than in other Wahhabi villages 
but not as extensively as in Dar al-Salam. Gardening activity 
was limited mainly. by the scarcity of seed. 
The Wahhabi organization of labour invites comparison 
with the Mouride brotherhood of Senegal 
12 
which bases its 
wealth and overwhelming success in rural areas upon the 
production of groundnuts. The basic unit of rural organiza- 
tion among the Mourides is the dara, originally a Quran 
school which demanded more agricultural labour from its 
students than studiousness. The structure of the Quran 
school early in the history of the brotherhood evolved into 
the exclusively agricultural dara where young devotees, the 
tak-der sacrificed their vigourous years in extremely dif- 
ficult conditions in the service of their shaikh. When, 
usually in their thirties, the tak-der were released from 
service by their shaikh, they were treated with great defer- 
ence in their natal villages, particularly by friends and 
relatives, and were considered to have secured a place in 
paradise through their sacrifice. 
The Wahhabi school in Dar al-Salam is similar to the 
Mouride dara, the large Quran school that is maintained 
by students' labour, but among the radical Wahhabis there 
12. O'Brien, 1971. 
. 
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is no equivalent of the sacrifice made by the tak-der who 
work in exclusively agricultural daras. The Wahhabi system 
of labour cooperation is oriented towards village prosperity 
and village leaders do not accrue wealth as do the Mouride 
shaikhs. It should be stressed, however, that the organi- 
zational structure of the radical Wahhabis has the potential 
to be a key element in the development of the subsistence 
economy of the Songhay, not only because of the development 
of a supra-village cooperative system, but also because 
of an attitude which accompanies it of openness to innovation, 
to change in the agricultural system for the benefit of 
the community of believers. 
This potential, however, has not been fully realized. 
Drought has been a major obstacle to any form of economic 
improvement and with the seasonal impracticability of grain 
c, r, ops, the Wahhabis are essentially on the same footing 
as everyone else in the region: the struggle for survival. 
The question of the possibility for the more structured 
Wahhabi system of leadership to improve agricultural producti- 
vity will have to be considered in future when, hopefully, 
environmental conditions will have improved. 
Discipline and conformity. 
The overt aim of the Wahhabiyya, the aim most frequently 
expressed by leaders and followers of the movement, is to 
practice Islam in full accord with the guidelines of the 
sunna. But livinq within the jurisdiction of a non-Islamic 
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state, the radical reformists are not permitted to fully 
implement and enforce Muslim law. The sanctions that they 
do apply are for minor infractions, usually relating to 
such things as negligence of religious duties or failure 
to obey the specific rules of the movement, such as the 
restrictions on travel. 
In Dar al-Salam there is a small building made of the 
same mud-brick as the other buildings that serves as a 
'prison'. Wahhabis acknowledge that corporal punishment 
may be administered if a blatant infraction of the rules 
of Islam were to occur. I was not, however, present during 
any case in which physical punishment was applied. The 
prison is probably not used for periods longer than several 
days. Moral pressure is the most important method of cor- 
recting undesireable behaviour. Isolation and confinement, 
coupled with persuasion from vil1age leaders and peers 
is an effective, if severe, method of behaviour modification 
in a society that is founded on the values of kinship and 
community. 
Conformity is demanded not only within individual vil- 
laqes but also on a wider scale within the movement as a 
whole. The inspiration and direction of the movement comes 
from the centre, Dar al-Salam, and other villages are ideally 
expected to submit to the dictates of its leadership, espe- 
cially in religious matters. 
The extent to which the radical Wahhabi leadership 
controls the movement's membership is strictly limited by 
the Malian state which is ever-ready to secure its monopoly 
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on politics and power if these are perceived to be threatened. 
At the same time the state is tolerant. With a majority 
population of Muslims and with puritan Islam gaining popular- 
ity the government is reluctant to use its coersive power 
against Muslims who, if anything, are too sincere in their 
practice of the faith. The arrest of radical Wahhabis in 
1974 or '75 shows the limit to which the government will 
tolerate independent leadership. Such a leadership is permit- 
ted to function only if it is given a religious gloss, sub- 
merging its political ambitions beneath the surface of Islam, 
and if it does not too strenuously defy state authority. 
The chief, at the very least, must not feel unsafe in his 
dealings with the Wahhabis. 
Historically the unification of Songhay villages under 
a central Songhay leader has not been truly achieved since 
the fall of the Askia dynasty. Political cohesion exists 
through the state, but this is an imposed unification; it 
does not meet the ethnic prerequisite for Songhay village 
cooperation. It is unlikely, however, that a religious 
movement, even one occupying a minority of villages, could 
achieve complete unity of purpose and centralized control. 
Far-flung Wahhabi villages, such as those west of Bourem, 
receive little contact from the Wahhabi capital and it is 
unlikely that, despite their adherence to the movement and 
to the leadership of Seydu Idrissa, they are as strict in 
their application of Muslim principles as villages closer 
to the 'nucleus'. Conformity expands outward from the centre 
205 
and, as contact with the leadership and intellectual inspira- 
tion of the movement grows less solid, the strength of con- 
formity correspondingly declines. 
Nevertheless, the movement is founded on a scriptural 
literature and in so far as a basic literacy in Arabic and 
a knowledge of Muslim principles can be ensured, the Wahhab- 
iyya would be likely to achieve at least a minimal unity. 
It is through a careful adherence to the moral guidelines 
of the Book, therefore, that a certain uniformity of behaviour 
has been achieved. This consensus depends upon the contents 
of scriptures being adequately communicated to the non- 
literate majority within the movement. 
One way in which this is accomplished is by sending 
# preachers' from Dar al-Salam to other villages at the time 
of the Friday noon prayer to give readings from the Quran 
and ýadlth. This ensures that followers are taught the 
meaning of the scriptures not only from their own imam but 
also from a perhaps more competent representative of the 
prestigious capital. This may or may not serve to increase 
the general awareness of the principles of Islam, but it 
more certainly increases an acceptance of the leadership 
from Dar al-Salam. These Friday visits, however, appear 
to be infrequent and take place almost exclusively within 
a radius of a morning's journey from the capital. 
Dar al-Salam, as the centre of religious leadership 
arid authority, is also the 'supreme court' of the radical 
reform movement. This is so in the sense that 
difficult 
religious questions and disputes 
between Wahhabis that cannot 
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be resolved locally, are referred to Seydu Idrissa for 
resolution. Such cases are dealt with privately. A minor 
problem of this kind arose in Bagoundje when I wished to 
tape record a summary from the imam of what he had said 
in a sermon. The request created some consternation and 
I was finally told in French that "this is something we 
have never done before. It cannot be done until we ask 
the marabout, [Seydu Idrissa]. " 
An important feature of the movement which contributes 
to its centralization and uniformity of belief is the system 
of Quranic education. Ouran schools exist in a number of 
villages, most of them close to the capital, but all of 
these except the central school in Dar al-Salam are for 
only the first few years of the child's studies. From the 
third year onwards students go to the capital to continue 
their religious education. Children living in villages 
without a Quran school go to Dar al-Salam from the first 
year. The capital is therefore a centre of education and 
socialization. In learning the principles of Islam, students 
are also taught the behaviour expected of them as functioning 
members of the community and the values of puritan Islam 
are deeply instilled in them. 
Moderate organization. 
The structure of the radical Wahhabiyya in Gao contrasts 
sharply with that of other reform groups in i"Iali. The Subbanu 
Association in Bamako, for example, even in Lhe early staqes 
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of its development in the 1950's when the fervour for reform 
had become high, avoided the implementation of a hierarchical 
leadership organization. The executive board of the associa- 
tion, commonly referred to as the bureau, consisted of a 
president and his deputy, a secretary general and his deputy, 
a treasurer, a group of delegates responsible for organiza- 
tion and another group responsible for the propagation of the 
1.3 * faith. The bureau operated, in principle, by consensus. 
The president was an honourary member who presided over 
meetings and who did not need to have a formal education. 
in general the presidency was reserved for influential members 
of the association and was often held by traders of great 
repute. The president's most important function, as Kaba 
says, "was to use his influence during critical times and 
get things done for the association. In other words he 
I 
served less as a leader than as a public relations man. it 
Ir 
Other executive members, though their positions sometimes 
demanded an education, did not possess significant authority 
over the association's membership. Disciplinary measures 
were minimal, usually consisting of small fines for minor 
offences such as unjustified absence from meetings. The 
most drastic punisment was expulsion from the association, 
usually applied in the case of behaviour blatantly contrary 
to Islamic doctrine. 
15 
*** 
I'll 
. Kaba, 
1974: 141. 
ibid: 142. 
ibid: 145. 
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Like the Subbanu association, the moderate Wahhabis 
of Cao do not possess an organizational system comparable 
to that of the radical village movement. The ties uniting 
reformists in the town are loose. The only leadership posi- 
tions specific to the moderate Wahhabis are the imamates 
of several of the town's mosques. The imam has as his central 
duties the leading of prayers and delivering of sermons. 
Many of the organizational functions of the moderate 
Wahhabiyya in Gao have been taken over by the government 
controlled Association Malien pour I'Unit6 et le Progres 
de l'Islam (AMUPI). The radical Wahhabis have boycotted 
the AMUPI, wishing instead to create their own Islamic organ- 
ization. 1f) Funds cannot be collected for the progress of 
the reform movement that have not passed through this associ- 
ation. The AMUPT settles disputes between Muslims and organi- 
zes religious lectures, the celebration of Islamic festivals 
and the reception of foreign religious delegations. The 
AMUPI possesses a monopoly on these activities which, in 
the town at least, it rigourously enforces. 
Several executive members of the AMUPI, such as 'Umar 
Muhammad, Yusufi Yehia and Muhammad al-Tahir, are moderate 
Wahhabis, but the organization is dominated by its non- 
Wahhabi membership. The regional president, Muhammad Guindo, 
together with several family members also on the executive 
committee, seem to control much of the AMUPI's activities 
and poilcies at the level of the region and the cercle. 
16. See above, pp. j6t, -jrj,,,. 
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While moderate Wahhabis are well represented on the associa- 
tion, they do not possess an officially recognized autonomous 
organization for the promotion of their own interests. Their 
more conciliatory approach to reform and their existence 
in the town, which leaves them open to close scrutiny by 
the authorities, greatly limit the degree to which they 
are capable of autonomous organizational activity. An appro- 
priate model for the organization of the moderate Wahhabis, 
therefore, is that of the bureaucracy, even though executive 
members of the AMUPI may be trained for, and accepted into, 
their positions of leadership on the basis of 'tradition'. 
For many villagers, however, the close ties between 
the AMUPI and the central government are distas-t, (, tul, and 
the1eaders of the radical Wahhabiyya have avoided participa- 
tion in this association. They have instead done several 
things to develop an organization without makl-ng it too 
bureaucratic (and thereby incurring legal reprisal from 
the government for creating a rival to the AMUPI): 1) they 
divided villages, usually leaving the ties with the state, 
through the chieftainship, in the hands of rival villagers; 
2) they have increased the influence of Muslim clerics, 
giving, the imams greater authority over the members of 
the reformist community than that held by the traditional 
alfa in non-reformist villages; and 3) unofficial 'secular' 
leaders are also given a place in their communities. Such 
leaders concern themselves with local affairs and compete 
for local political office when there is a chance for success. 
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This set of developments is the key to the formation within 
the radical Wahhabiyya of an informal leadership structure 
and a system of village organization, both of which are 
largely independent from the state. 
VIII. WOMEN AND WAHHABISM 
Traditionalist villagers occasionally suggest that there 
is a shortage of marriageable women in Wahhabi communities. 
This suggestion is linked to their accusation that the Wahhabis 
'kidnap' women out of desperation to find marriaqe partners. 
Why, after all, would women join reformist communities in 
large numbers where they are kept in strict seclusion and 
dominated by their husbands? Even if it were stripped of 
its intent to slander, however, such an assumption would 
be impossible to verify without an exhaustive survey of Wahhabi 
settlements. A shortage of marriageable women in the Wahhabi 
movement, moreover, is not evident on the surface. It must 
be acknowledoed that Islamic reform appeals in some way to 
both sexes and in order to understand this appeal and the 
changes that it is bringing about to traditional Songhay 
society it is important to consider the place of women in 
the movement, the changes in family relationships involved 
in their adherence to reform and the degree of religious 
enthusiasm which lies behind their acceptance of the rules 
of reformed Islam. 
Women are essential to the reform movement's survival 
and their compliance with rules which are applied specifically 
to females provides one of the most striking examples of 
the rigourous way in which the rules of Islam are followed 
in the radical Wahhabiyya. What motivates these village 
women to overcome practical disadvantages 
in implementing 
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the rules of seclusion? This problem becomes especiallY 
compelling when we consider the traditional position of Songhay 
women, a position which, on the surface at least, gives them 
far greater independence than those committed to Wahhabism. 
Freedom and seclusion. 
In traditional Songhay society women enjoy a degree 
of respect and status that is unusual for an African society. 
To the western observer this may not be immediately apparent. 
Songhay women at first seem little more than efficient sources 
of domestic labour; they are rarely fully integrated into 
their husbands' families and they have no rights of inheri- 
tance. 
In the traditional village, however, ifa man and a 
woman meet on a path it is the man who first greets the 
woman; if two men meet it is the younger who first greets 
the elder. 
1 The spiritual place of women is important in 
bringing about the respect that is shown them, particularly 
at a later age once they have had children. Women are said 
to be more open to being possessed in the holle dances and 
are repuLed to be the most formidable magicians. 
2 They 
usually receive greater affection from their children than 
do men, even when the children are grown to adulthood. 
1. Prost, 1954: 196. 
2. Rouch, 1954: 48. 
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woman who is said to possess lakkal (Ar. 'aýjj)--a concept q 
which refers to an ability to learn, patience, curiosity 
and honesty--must be respected by her husband. In the words 
of an old Songhay woman, "[elle] peut demander Wimporte 
quoi ft son mari, il lui accordera; m6me si elle lui dit 
'couche-toi je vais t'egorger', car elle-m6me fait tout ce 
qu'il veut. ,3 
This is an extreme expression of an ideal of mutual 
respect between husband and wife. It is, needless to say, 
an exaggerated statement--a Songhay man would not willingly 
submit, Isaac like, to a sacrificial altar to satisfy a whim 
of his wife--but as an exaggeration it expresses clearly 
a social ideal that women be treated courteously, especially 
by their husbands. 
This is an ideal that, alas, does not always conform 
to reality. Strong quarrels between spouses are common and 
divorce is frequent--'monnai courante' as one observer 
has put it. 
4 In spite of the fact that divorce is considered 
extremely undesireable it is common for men and women to 
marry several times in their lifetimes. Indeed, the lasting 
relationship is a rarity. Women are not integrated into 
their husbands' families upon marriage and, at the same 
time, they maintain ties with their own kin. Thus, when 
disputes between husband and wife arise, the woman is usually 
3. Bisilliat, 1967: 217. 
, l. Prost, 1954: 196. 
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able to return to her family. This is quite possibly a 
social factor behind the ideal of respect towards women; 
they must be treated considerately to maintain harmony in 
the marriage union. 
In the villages, traditional Songhay women are not 
confined to the home. This is, above all, because the sexual 
division of labour gives them numerous outdoor chores, the 
most important of which are carrying water, collecting 
firewood, tending gardens and selling locally produced items 
in the markets. 
In the towns, women whose husbands are wealthy remain 
more closely tied to the home than village women who parti- 
cipate in a subsistence economy. 'Proper' conduct is associ- 
ated with the luxury of having servants to do difficult 
chores. In Gao, when women leave their compounds it is 
usually in groups of two or three; a woman walking in the 
streets alone smacks of potential adultery and is disapproved 
of. The strict rules of Muslim dress and seclusion, however, 
do not apply. Covering the head with a scarf is required 
of married women, and 'provocative' western clothes are 
usually forbidden, but the veil has no place among the require- 
ments of proper conduct. Full seclusion is rarely practiced. 
Most women feel no hesitation in chatting with neighbours 
in the streets or walking with friends or relatives to the 
market. 
The strict seclusion of radical women changes some 
of these traditional values. Outside the home the woman 
ideally wears full-lenoth dark robes which cover the wrists 
1 _5 
and ankles, with a hood that covers the back of the head 
and shoulders and a thin veil that folds down completely 
concealing the face. Old women and girls before puberty 
do not necessarily wear the veil unless they are in the 
mosque. In Dar al-Salam these rules are especially emphasized, 
but lin other radical villages the veil is more frequently 
replaced by a large scarf which is draped over the head 
and brought forward like a monks cowl to hide the face in 
shadow. In the home when the outer robes are not worn women 
try to dress attractively, wearing colourful garments, jcýkqejry 
and makeup if their husbands can afford them. 
Even with the 'correct' attire it is considered unseemly 
for a woman to be outside the home without a specific purpose, 
especially if alone. When the par-hs of men and women appear 
likely to cross, the women will stop or move aside to let, 
the men pass and to avoid a possible encounter. Men who 
wish to enter a compound which is not their own shout a 
greeting and wait for a reply so as to qive women, if there 
are any, a chance to conceal themselves. If, in spite of 
all precautions, a man surprises a woman without her veil, 
she dives to the ground with her face turned away. 
Because of these restrictions Wahhabi women perform 
a minimum of tasks outside the home. With the exceptional 
hardship of the drought and the absence of men in some vil- 
lages, women can be seen wearing their full conceaiing dress 
carrying water or wood and tending herds. But in better 
times these tasks would be taken over by younq men or boys. 
Women in traditional villages tend gardens and sell produce 
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and spices in the village and town markets; Wahhabi women 
no longer perform these tasks because of a fear of their 
exposure to influences outside the home. Produce and spices 
are consumed locally rather than sold. Men and boys plant 
and tend gardens on the outskirts of the village, thereby 
eliminating another female task outside the home. 
The tasks left to women are mainly restricted to those 
performed inside the family compound: sweeping, cleaning, 
preparing meals, washing pots and dishes, weaving mats and 
tending to young children. These tasks in themselves are 
time consuming, but married women are said by their menfolk 
to have more 'free' time than their husbands who work in 
the fields, and as a result their studi-es of the Quran are 
said to be pursued more dilligently. 
These restrictions on radical Wahhabi women are far 
more wide ranging and strict than those imposed on traditional 
village women or on moderate Wahhabi women in the town. 
The wife of a moderate reformist in Cao seems to live in 
much the same way as her traditional neighbour. Full-length 
robes and veils are rarely seen in the town. Moderate Wahhabi 
women, and many traditional women, however, donot have absolute 
freedom to wander through the streets as they please, but 
remain close to the home through much of their lives. Wahhabi 
women in the town are not encouraged to attend Friday noon 
prayers. This is mainly the Prerogative of older women 
who might be more concerned with the world beyond, free 
from the encumbrance of children or, perhaps more importantly, 
free to some extent of the ruLes that keep them tied to 
217 
the home during their childbearing years, however casually 
these rules are applied in comparison with the radical Wahliabbis. 
Despite a temptation to do so, it w,,, -)uld be incorrect 
to assume that Wahhabi women oppose seclusion and are forced 
into it by their husbands in a conspiracy of masculine domina- 
tion. Veiling and seclusion are often implemented as symbols 
of prestige and upioard mobility. Smith outlitne-, the. Hausa 
classification of marriages into 'Chree catlegories: f 1-111. 
purdah, partial wife seclusion and no seclusion at all. 
Full purdah has high prestige while the abserice of seclusion, 
known as the marriage of the igriorant, is ccinsidered lowly-5 
Although there is no precedent tror Full seclusion among 
the Songhay, the practice ot partJLal scýclusion is associated 
with high status. The Arma-h of Timbuktu, for example, in 
spite of Gheir nomiInal adherence to Islam, keep gi. ris before 
marriage strictly confined Lo the home t-Aiere they learn 
to embroider, weave stxaw mats and do bead work, ýýihile or-her 
Songhay girls are not secluded and acquire household tech- 
niques as they help their mothers in M-inding Ordin arid 
cooking. 
6 The Songhay, therefore, have also associated 
seclusion and leisure vAth high social S-Uit-I's. 
The social pattern associated with seclusion in the 
Muslim societies of West and North Africa (and probabiv, 
elsewhere) is as follows: SeCILISion is pra, --ticed most strictly 
by townsfolk whose primary source of income comes from trade 
5. Smith, 1959: 246. 
6. Miner, 1953: 140. 
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or salaried employment; non-seclusion is mainly found in 
the villages where women Participate in a subsistence economy 
(and in poorer urban households where the women's contribution 
to the domestic economy requires work outside the home). 
Maher's study of the Berber of the Middle Atlas in 
Morocco shows that seclusion in villages is Iii-mited primarily 
by the domestic routine. Women, besides caring for children, 
fetch water in the morning and evening, cook meals, chop 
wood, tend animals and in some seasons work in fields, weeding 
and stripping maise cobs. Married women in the town, except 
descendants of black slaves who occupy an inferior status, 
do not work outside the home. The domestic routine among 
the strictly secluded Wi%7es of urban households is marked 
by a slow punctiliousness: of the tendency to spin out each 
domestic task, performing it with exquisite care, persists 
throughout the townswoman's lifetime. " 
7 
Cohen, who describes 
a similar rural/urban pattern of seclusion among the Kanuri 
of Northern Nigeria, also attributes the difference to the 
economic activities of women: "Rural peasants need help on 
their farms; water must be obtained from wells, often at some 
distance from the household. Even among the poor of the 
city, women must go out of the compound for water. Therefore, 
the poor cannot so easily keep women totally out of parti- 
cipating in overlapping activites and interactive areas 
in which they contact the man's world. " 
8 
In societies where 
seclusion is the social ideal, the most important prerequisite 
7. Maher, 1974: 117. 
8. Cohen, 1971: 009. 
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for its implementation is a division of labour which frees 
women of the necessity to perform chores outside the home. 
The seclusion of radical Wahhabi women, therefore, 
is possible largely because of a re-structuring of the division 
of labour so that it prevents, in so far as possible, female 
contact with 'the man's world'. To what extent have men 
made sacrifices in order to keep their wives in seclusion? 
For the most part men have taken over tasks outside the 
home which both men and women previously shared. Only men 
do business in the markets, whereas before women participated, 
perhaps more frequently, in this activity. Selling produce 
and spices in the market, however, a task which is seen 
to be exclusively female, has been abandoned in favour of 
local consumptiotj. Men have largely taken over the herding 
of animals, another task which was previously shared, but 
women in some villages, probably because of labour shortage, 
can occasionally be seen performing this task. Only rarely 
do men perform the traditionally female tasks of carrying 
water, gathering and carrying firewood or collecting grasses 
for weaving. Children, usually boys, carry water and wood. 
Women often collect grass, walking to the outskirts of the 
village in groups of three or more at dusk when they (, and 
the gra8s) are less visible. 
Children, therefore, are important in maintaining seclu- 
sion through their performance of traditionally female tasks 
outside of village compounds. This may explain, at least 
in part, why seclusion is maintained more rigourously in 
Dar al-Salam than in other Wahhabi villages. The imPorting 
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of over one hundred boys form other villages to attend the 
madrasa significantly increases the availability of labour. 
few hours are set aside each day for their studies, but 
besides this boys are largely available to be put to work. 
In other villages where less labour from children is available 
(and from whence some of this labour is drained into Dar 
a]-Salam) women more commonly perform chores which take 
them away from their compounds. Dar al-Salam, the centre 
of religious inspiration, is better equipped to implement 
the ideal of seclusion. 
In some West African societies in which the full seclu- 
sion of women is an ideal, the role of a women who is married 
and one who is divorced or widowed can be dramatically dif- 
ferent, enabling women to change Fror-, i seclusion to relative 
freedom Lhrough a change in marital status. Amongst the 
urban Hausa, whose wives are usually strictly secluded, 
a divorced woman often becomes a prostitute and can then 
remarry to become 'respectable' once again. 
q The Kanuri 
of northern Nigeria give v.,, omen a clearly defined positon 
between marriages, called the zower. Younger Kanuri women 
return to their agnatic kin upon divorce to soon be remarried 
but older women who have had several marriages ý-ire given 
more freedom and are oft-en supported by more than one lover. 
io 
The radical Wahhabis of the Gao area have no equivalent 
status for divorced women. Seclusion applies AlmOSL equally 
to married and unmarried women. alLhough girls and older 
9. Cf. A. 'Cohen, 1969 and Smith, 1959. 
10. R. Cohen, 197J.: 128. 
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women beyond their childbearing years appear, to have mcre 
freedom. If a woman were to find living under the strict 
rules of the Wahhabi community oppressive, however, there 
is an alternative: she can leave the community to live 
with non-reformist kin--in Wahhabi terms she can become 
an apostate (murtadd). This is a drastic measure but one 
which has occasionally been resorted to, especially ea-rly 
in the history of the Cao Wahhabiyya when sepdrate communities 
were first being established. The older Wahhabi women, 
those who have 'converted' to the movement, either by acqui- 
escing to a decision taken by their husbands or by marrying 
into the reformist community, are livinq under the rules 
of seclusion by choice. Whether or not the second generation 
of Wahhabi women, those who were born into the movement, 
k, ill tolerate the rules of seclusion is a question Lhat 
t; ari only be answered with the passaoe of time. 
The strict implementation of seclusion amongst the 
radical Wahhabis has certainly introduced changes to the 
-Formist villages, but it has not entirely lifestyle cf rel 
overturned the traditional value systein. As has been mentioned, 
it may be associated with the preservation of parental author- 
ity. Seclusion incr. -lases dependence upon elders in arranging 
marriages and in requldting any form of contact between 
the sexes. Men who are away from their homes I-eel theinscl'ves 
to have a greater assurance of their wi\ies' fidelity. Finally, 
difficult chores outside, the. home haN., -e become more exclusively 
relegated to men and children, dnd some women appear to 
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have more ieisure time than their counterparts in traditional 
villages. 
It may be incorrect to believe that ttiose who subject 
themselves to the rules of seclusion are completely sacrificing 
the traditional respect given women in Songhay society. 
Some degree of sacrifice is certainly entailed, but Wahhabi 
women appear to have their own leaders and their own ways 
in which status and influence can be achieved. One of these 
is through the acquisition of reliqiotis knokfled. ge. More 
important, however. is the status of their husbands. The 
religious knowledge of women is largely related It--o the know- 
ledge and status of their husbands who may have taught them 
or given them t. he freedom to st, udv. The most influen't-lial 
women in 'L. --he -Whhabi villages are the female 'alfas' In 
Ddr il-Salam this vioma n is Lhe wi. fe of Seydu 1drissa, while 
hiýi Lwo other wives are at an advanced level in their studies. 
In West Africa it is in general the nobilir-y in Muslim 
societies that enforces seclusion. Amongst the radicai 
Wahhabis of Gao, however, especiilly, those in Dar al-Saiarn, 
seclusion is universalized and men have adjusted the division 
of labour to accomriiudav, e a more strict application of the 
rules. Women from poorer households, therefore. often share 
in both the boredom and the status th, --it, seclusion involves. 
Divorce. 
Marital instability appears to be an inherent Feature 
of patrilineal societies in which a wife is not absorbed 
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into her husband's family or lineage, but remains Loyal to 
her own kin. There are numerous determinants of divorce 
frequency, which vary in importance in different social 
contexts, but a wife's attachment to her natal kin appears 
to be the most important. In such circumstances, as Fallers 
puts it, "patril-iny tends to divide marriage by dividing 
the loyalties of spouses. " 
11 Lewis shows that among the 
Soma 1i husbands retain absolute rights over children. a 
feature that one would expect to stabilize marriaoe, yet 
32 % of marriages end in divorce. He finds that "although 
the Somali are strongly patrilineal and pay generous bride- 
wealths, marriage amongst them is unstable. This ... 
is con- 
sistent with the strength oF patrilineal affiliation which 
binds a woman more strongly to her own kin than marriage 
binds her to her husband's kin. " 
12 
Another example can 
be found in R. Cohen's study of marital instability among 
the Kanuri of northern Nigeria. I" Here, too, it is shown 
that kinship involvements for both husband and wife tend 
to weaken the bond between them. In Kanuri society a woman's 
natal household may be a source of support in the event 
of incompatibility or an over-demanding husband who goes 
too far in asserting male dominance. The zower is a clear 
role for divorced women which gives them, especially later 
in life, a great deal of freedom between marriages. Male 
dominance in Kanuri society is to some extent balanced by 
a woman Is right to obtain zower status which, Cohen suggests, 
serves to increase a woman's role in decision-making Processes. 
11. Fallers, 1957: 21. 
12. Lewis, 1962: 
. 
13. R. Cohen, 1971: Bi. 
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similar pattern may be found among the Songhay of 
Gao. Women are not integrated into their husbands' households 
but rather remain attached to their own families, with espe- 
cially close ties to the mother and sisters. Rights over 
children are retained by the husband, but a high incidence 
of fostering often prevents any exclusiveness of paternal 
custody and Chi ldrt-MS' dt-t-. a(, hmN=-, nt to their mothers usually 
remain strong even when parents are divorced. 
Divorce follews the simple Muslim pattern with the 
responsibility for renouncing the marriage ultimately residing 
wi th men. Ofteri d. -vorces occur when an oider man 
is inter- 
ested In obtaininq -. second wife--an action which is socially 
toierated but which is rarely tolerated by wives. In practical 
terms, then, the dominant marriage pautern ýimonq the Songhay 
car-i be described as serial monogamy. 
, rhere is an apparent contradiction it-i the values relAing 
to traditional Songhay women. They are not fully integrated 
inLo their husbands' families and have few rights over the 
children they may bear, yet they are idealiy treated consi- 
derately by their husbands, are the focus of familiai affection 
later in life. and are considered to possess speciai spiritual 
powers. This contradition, however, is only an apparent 
one, for the special qualities of married women may be a 
compensation for their social marginality or a- counter- 
weight to the power they retain, in fact, to propeL events, 
towards the dissoliition of marriaqe because of the tie,,, 
they maintain with their families. 
*** 
22'-, 
The radical Wahhabis are reticent to talk about their 
families. This is unusual in a society in which kin reld- 
tionships are valued; it probably stems from the fact that 
many radical Wahhabis have separated from relatives who 
dild not join the movement and the embarassment in having 
kin who are not 'true Muslims' can make this an uncharacter- 
; stically -taboo subject. I was fortunate enough, however, 
to obtain some information on marital staLus in Dar al- 
Sa 1. am. A list was kept by Seydu Idrissa Of d1l. those who 
at. tend the womens' madrasa which includes all females in 
the village over t. he age of 5. It remained for- me to go 
through the list with Seydu Idrissa and a senior Quran school 
teacher, both of whom knew village affairs well, to find 
the womens' marital status. This information was considered 
by Seydu Tdrissa to be worth disclosing since he believed 
it showed the dilligence of women, no matLer what their 
family responsibilities, in pursuing religious knowledge. 
The figures for divorced women include only t:, hose wtio 
are between marriages; they, do not indicate the Erequency 
with which divorces and remarriages occur. It is probable 
that some wornen divorce and remarry several times in their 
I ives. Nevertheless, it is clear that a high divorce rate 
occurs in radical Wahhabi communities. With approximatelv 
36 % of women aged 40 through 44 in the divorced status, 
it appears as though most marriages end in divorce. The 
percentage is higher for older women because those who are 
still in their childbearing years are considered more desire- 
able partners and would have greater opportunity of remarriage. 
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Age Single Married Divorced % Divorced Widowed 
10-14; 23 1 
15-19! 15 16 
t 
20-24! 3 46 3 5.77 
25-29! 
t 
2 28 
30-34! 19 3 13.04 
35-39! 4 2 8.57 
40-44! 6 4 36.36 
45 + 
7 3 16.67 8 
Total! 43 127 1.5 I 
7.61 12 
Divorced of total sample. 
Table 4. Marital status of women in Dar al-Salam. 
it- is impossible, on the basis of this limited data, 
to arrive at any definite conclusions concerning the pat- 
terns of Wahhabi marriage and divorce. The f igures can 
help us, however, to glimpse some of the reality behind 
the barrier of seclusion. It must be stressed that Dar 
al-Salam is not a typical Villdge. It is the c--nLre (--)f 
the radical Wahliabiyya and, as such, it has a greater propor- 
tion of men with high status than other villages. Amongst 
men with high status polygyny is common. The radical Wahhabis 
have two or three i, rarely four) wives more commonly than 
the trad. itionalist Songhay pol)ulation. They stress that 
it 1--ted for is permi. men to have up to four wives, that 
women must accept their position and have no right to create 
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disorder in the household out of jealousy. However, it 
seems unlikely that even fUIIY committed Wahhabi women observe 
this advice. The themes of Seydu Idrissa's address to the 
village women during the sermon of the id al-XabTr was 'obey 
your husbands' and 'love your co-wives'. His almost exclusive 
stress on these topics is in itself an indication of familial 
disorder. Women may accept li. ving in polygynous households, 
perhaps attracted by the prestige of living in Dar al-Salam, 
but such unions are often unstable and divorce at least 
in part, may drain the village of oldei- women who have rela- 
tives elsewhere. The concentration of the female population 
into lower age groups is also partly. explained by a low 
life expectancy. 
The radical Wahhabis, then, share a high divor-ce rate 
with the rest of the Songhay population. Traditionalist 
women remain tied to their natal kin and acceptance of poly- 
gynous marriages is rare. Wahhabi women, committed as they 
are to the tenets of Islam, are more dccepting of polygynous 
unions, initially at least, and it is rivalry with co-wives 
that often precipitc---ites divorce. Situations in which men 
who do not have high status attempt to exercise te right 
to more than one wife may also encourage marital instability. 
Wahhabi women, because of the rules of seclusion, may be 
more isolated froin their natal kin. but the hjqh rate of 
divorce suggests that, for many women, family ties can still 
provide a source of 'refuqe' between marriages. 1n the 
case of women whose families are in the traditiorialist com- 
munity, divorce may lead to leavinq the Wahhabi movement 
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on a permanent basis. 
A note on foster, -rig. 
Children in Songhay society are highly valued and even 
couptes that do not have adequate means of support. try to 
produce as many children as possible; in a society situated 
in an unstable environment and. with most families living 
on the brink of destitution, children can be an effective 
source of old-aqe security. Fosteý-inq creates ties of reci- 
procity between members of the oxtended family. Foster 
children are equally tied to their foster parents and to 
their real parents; and where divorce, occurs, the mother 
remains a focus of tier childrens' affection and respect. 
During (-. )ne ot my visits to Dar al-Salam I was awakened 
'I in the middle. of thl- night by the sound of somebody rummaging 
through my belongings. Was the-re a thief in the 'dwell-ing 
I 
of peace? I switched on an electric torch in time to see 
a small boy, no older Lhan three, running out of the room. 
He had probably, burried himself on the ember of a mosquito 
coil because it was Lying smouldering in the sand. rhe 
next morning when I asked my Wahhabi hosts about this I 
was told that the boy was an orphan. There are three orphans 
in Dar al-Salam, roughLy the same age and from different 
faini I ies. They steer) in a hut, near the viltage centre and 
are fed by the married teachers in the w-adr-asa, but do not, 
belong to any one family and, as my experience with the 
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'thief' indicates, they are not closely looked after, even 
though their physical needs are met. Older children who 
-i r (,, (,,, - r-phaned would presumably become involved in the madrasa 
and in this way would be more carefully socialized. 
The existence of orphans in a wider social milieu in 
which fostering is common suggests a weakening of kin ties 
among some members of the radical Wahhabi community. 'Con- 
version ' leads to a severance of relations with any family 
member who remains in a traditionalist village. A child 
born in a radical Wahhabi community would not be fostered 
to traditionalist kin, even if he were orphaned. 
The exclusiveness of the radical VJahhabiyya has in 
many cases shattered traditional lines of reciprocity, leaving 
some members without kin support; but the close-knit nature 
of reformist villaues makes extended kin ties largely super- 
f luous. A member of the radical movement knows that in 
spite of' his severance of relations with ' infidel' family 
members, lie can depend upon support from his co-religionists. 
IA. THE OBSERVANCE OF ISLAM. 
In the Islamic state every aspect of the believer's 
life is potentially guided by religious principles. In 
the context of a secular state, as in Mali, the scope for 
the application of Islamic principles is more limited since 
law, especially criminal law, is monopolized by the national, 
non-Islamic judicial system. There is still room, however, 
for a wide range of ritual and social practices to be guided 
by Islam; and the Wahhabiyya of Cao has sei: zed every possible 
opportunity of implementing elements of the religion in 
their daily lives. 
In this chapter I discuss the written sources of their 
systematic observance of Islam as well as how the witten 
moral code is implemented, with particular reference to 
Islamic ritual. In doing so I concentrate on the practices 
of the radical Wahhabiyya with comparisons to practices 
of the moderates and traditionalists. 
Principal written sources of religious knowledge. 
The Wahhabis rely almost exclusively 
and the traditions of the prophet (ýadlth 
knowledge. They have tried to go beyond 
rote learning of the Quran and a veneration 
of its meaning to an understanding of the 
sacred text. 
upon the Quran 
for religious 
the traditional 
of it exclusive 
message of the 
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In the traditional cultural context of Gao, which has 
muc in common with the rest of West African Islam, the 
language of the Quran was taken to have greater sacred power 
than its actual contents. The predominance of what Goody 
and Watt have called 'restricted literacy" has meant that 
while the most essential requirements of Muslim worship 
may or may not have been -implemented, the influence of the 
Quran in daily life was basically as a powerful magical 
instrument. The meaning of sacred texts was rarely under- 
stoodbut the words were endowed with a spiritual transcendence 
which had the power to bring good fortune and ward off evil. 
This remains the predominant attitude towards the Quran 
in rural Africa. 
One of the main peculiarities of the Wahhabiyya lies 
in the fact that it is the only contemporary Muslim tendency 
in the region of Gao to break away from the traditional 
pattern of Islamic magic and replace it with a veneration 
as much for the meaning of Arabic texts as for the Book 
itself. While much of the veneration for the Quran remains, 
the full implications of its meaning have only recently 
made an impact on Songhay society; and in the radical Wahha- 
biyya especially, much of the respect given the Quran in 
its former use in Islamic magic has continued in the imple- 
mentation of its messages. Thus the unique 
feature of the 
radical Wahhabiyya is the enthusiasm with which 
literate 
adherents probe the messages of the Islamic text 
for the 
possibility of including 'new' behaviourai guidelines in 
Coody arid Watt, 1968. 
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their daily lives in order to receive spiritual blessing. 
it is through the acquisition of literacy in a clerical 
elite that they have been able to attain this new understand- 
ing of Islam. 
Traditional Islam--the Islam marked by, among other 
things, holy men and amulets--demonstrates a veneration 
for the written word per se. The meaning of the text is 
usually unknown and the sacred value of the written word 
comes from the Quran itself, perceived as a powerful instru- 
ment, dangerous in the wrong hands. Like other magical 
practices, the manipulation of Quranic passages is used 
for prosperity in this life, for good health, protection 
from spirits, success in examinations, ad infinitum. IL 
is most commonly therapeutic, related in some way to physical 
and emotional well-being. 
Reformist Islam to a large extent dispenses with the 
veneration of the sacred script and turns instead to obedi- 
ence of the sacred command. Not the word but the meaning 
of the word has the greatest power. Knowledge is imperative. 
To obey one must understand the command; it cannot simply 
be sewn in a pouch and forgotten. The reward for obedience 
does not always come in the here-and-now but can be deferred 
and given in paradise. 
How do these approaches to the Quran deal with Lhe 
failure of the religious system to assure prosperity? In 
'Islamic magic' the power of the amulet can be annulled 
by pollution, by contact with urine, menstrual blood, all 
the perceived corrupting substances of life. If Pollution 
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does not appear a likely cause of failure the holy man can 
theoretically be blamed, but this occurs very rarely, especi- 
ally if the holy man is venerated, for he is not the source 
of sacr-ed. power but only the intermediary, the medium by 
which it is transferred from the Book to the client. More 
commonly the failure of Islamic magic is simply ignored 
or denied. In a story told to me of the resistance to French 
rule there was an incident in which the rebel tribesmen, 
armed only with swords and spears and pursued doqgedly by 
superior French forces, sent forward directly into the face 
of the enemy a mounted warrior, wearing amulets said to 
make him invisible and protect him from bullets. As the 
warrior approached the French troops opened fire, with predict, - 
able, results. But my storyteller denied the failure of 
the amulets. He explained that the warrior had indeed been 
invisible but Lhe bullets had done nothing to really harm 
him; rather, he had fatally broken his neck in the fall 
from his horse. We see from this example that the inefficacy 
of Islamic magic, in commc-ii with all such practices, is 
easily denied, while only the reinforcing instances, the 
cases where the sacred script does its job, are admitted 
as evidence of the sacred power of the Quran. 
Rei-ormist Islam has less trouble in explaining mis- 
fortune. All thaL-, happens, qood or bad, comes from God-- 
and His reasons are not to be enquired into. Since prosper- 
ity can be deferred until the afterlife the difficulty posed 
by the pitiable siint and the prosperous sinner is not a 
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serious one. The radical Wahhabis of Cao sometimes take 
this a step further, into what can best be described as 
I reverse predestination I. A young Wahhabi in Bagoundje 
who was susPiciOUS Of my mission asked not so much about 
my plans and intentions as about the state of my health, 
my finances, and the general quality of my life. Upon hear- 
ing about some of my difficulties he seemed pleased and 
explained that mishaps and suffering were good; if God wished 
to punish me in the afterlife He would provide me in this 
life with wealth and glory. Suffering was a sign that God 
was testing my determination and the reward for facing adver- 
sity would be in paradise. 
For the Wahhabis, therefore, the Quran is important 
not so much as a sacred object but as a sacred Revelation. 
This is not to say that it is never venerated as a sacred 
object by the reformists. On the contrary, they are respect- 
ful of a certain power that emanates from the Book itself, 
and observe carefully the prohibitions concerning its contact 
with the ground as well as other sources of pollution. 
They are also respectful of dangers that can result if one 
studies the Quran alone, without a religious guide. Miner 
provides the similar example of a Songhay tailor in Timbuktu 
who went insane because, it was said, he studied passages 
which were "forbidden for any but Alfa to read. .. ,2 The 
Wahhabis, with their similar injunction, share in the mysti- 
fication of the scriptures typical of traditional literacy. 
2. Miner, 1953: 255. 
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The emphasis, however, has shifted dramatically from the 
vener-ation of the word to the veneration of the command. 
This emphasis on command is not restricted to the Quran 
but completely pervades the approach to life which, espe- 
cially among the radical Wahhabis, involves a patterning 
of behaviour in accord with the 'golden age' of Islam. The 
hadTth, or traditions of the prophet, also play a part in 
the lives of the radical Wahhabis that goes beyond the atten- 
tion paid by most other Muslims. rheir approach to these 
traditions is eclectic, with various collections of ýadlth, 
such as the al-Arba'Tn ('The Forty' ), a small volume of 
forty-one hadith collected by Yehia ibn Saraf al-Nawi, being 
the basis of their knowledge. In principle they accept 
the six standard books of traditions followed by most Muslims. 
Hadith accepted as reliable (i. e. traced more reliably 
to the prophet) are of ten scrupulously and literally 
observed by the radical Wahhabis in a way that goes beyond 
the practice of most other reformists. On one occasion while 
IF" about a doz having tea witl-i a group o. f-. en Wahhabis in Bagoun- 
die, I noticed that on several pillows, made of inexpensive 
print fabric depicting peacocks standing in a bed of flowers, 
an alteration had been made to the design. The heads of 
the peacocks had been -)ced; eff. the eyes were carefully 
stitched over with thread and the rest of the outlines of 
the heads scribbled over with ink from a ball-point pen. 
When I asked about thi. s I was told thaL images of living 
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beings are evil: they prevent angels from entering one's 
home and the maker of these images will be asked by God 
on the Day of Judgement to resurrect them, an obviously 
impossible feat since God is the only creator. The implica- 
tion of this seems to be that the imitator of living beings 
in a certain respect imitates God's role as creator but 
is not able to endow his creations with a soul. This avoid- 
ance of representational art comes from a hadith: 
'Aisha relates that she bought a cushion on which 
there were pictures, and when the apostle of God 
saw them he stood at the door and would not enter. 
Seeing signs of displeasure in his face she said: 
'0 apostle of God, I repent unto God and his apos- 
tle. What have I done amiss? ' He asked, 'What 
is the meaning of this cushion? ' 'I bought it 
for you to sit and recLine on' said she. 'Verily' 
he answered, 'The makers of these pictures will 
be severely punished on the day of resurrection, 
and it will be said to them, "Bring to life the 
pictures you have made., -3 
This prohibition is extended by the radical Wahhabis to 
include the taking of photographs, and the same ýadlth was 
cited when I was prevented by the radical Wahhabis from 
using my camera. The ban on representational art is wide- 
spread in the Islamic world. but nowhere does it seem more 
rigidly applied than among Gao's radIcal ý4ahhabis in their 
careful observance of 1slam. 
The principal source of non-scripLur-al inspiration 
for the Wahhabis comes from the work of Muhammad ibn 'Abd 
al-Wahhab (d. 1787) which usually tikes the form of small 
3. GuiLlaume, 1966: 129. 
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'catechisms' collected by his sons and other followers. The 
most common source of al-Wahhab's ideas amongst both radical 
and moderate Wahhabis comes in the form of a condensed pam- 
phlet entitled Mubadi al-Islam (The Manifest in Islam). 
Here we find four fundamentals which are relevant in defining 
the Wahhabis' approach to Islam: 
1. - Knowledge: the recognition of Cod and His prophet, 
the recognition of Islam as evidenced by the Quran 
and hadith. 
2. - Acting according to this knowledge. 
3. - Propogating this knowledge. 
4. - Persistence in the face of adversity or persecution 
which inevitably comes as a result of spreading the 
knowledge of Islam. 
The most influential predecessors of al-Wahhab were 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the liarlbali judiciai school 
(mathhab) and Ahmad ibn Taimiyya, a lianbali theologian of 
the 14th century A. D. Ibn Hanbal, for the Wahhabis, is 
the jurist who most scrupulously follows the traditions 
of the early Islam of the prophet and his companions. He 
stresses the superiority of the text over independent reason. 
The Quran and the traditions are, in Hanbali jurisprudence, 
the sole sources of religious obligation; nothing beyond 
this need be obeyed and nothing besides Cod must be worship- 
ped. Ibn Taimiyya is important, abov-e, all, 
for his popular- 
ization of a theology based upon 'Hanbali law. His emphasis 
on obedience to Cod alone, on complete and methodical 
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submission to His will, are ibn Taimiyya's central themes 
which are taken up by the Wahhabiyya. 4 
The most essential of God's commands for the Wahhabis 
is a rejection of the worship of all spiritual beings other 
than the unique Deity. Islam for the Wahhabis "is above 
all a rejection of all gods except God, a refusal to allow 
others to share in that worship which is due to God alone 
(shirk).,, 5 
The most important religious principle for the Wahhabis, 
then, is the supremacy and oneness (a]-Tawhid) of God. 
To them, whoever invokes a being, living or dead, other 
than God is an infidel. The believer's conception of God, 
according to the Wahhabis, must come from God's description 
of Himself, as contained in the Quran, and believed in impli- 
citly rather than interpreted or considered metaphor. Thus, 
God is com-eived literally as seated on a throne. God exer- 
cises His will in determining all events. Nothing happens 
other than through His will and power. He is the sole source 
of success and misfortune. 
The eschatology of the Wahhabiyya similarly follows 
a literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures. After death 
the soul remains in the grave until the Day of Judgement 
when it is resurrected and all men stand nake(i and uncircum- 
cized before God and are judged according to their deeds; 
those deemed worthy of paradise stand on the right hand 
4. Ct'. Laoust, 19,, 39: 532. 
5. Hourani, 1983: 37. 
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of God while those destined for the fire stand on the left. 
Submission to the will of God is considered the basis 
of committment to Islam and the means of gaining entrance 
to paradise. Obedience to God involves carrying out His 
commands as contained in the Quran and in following the 
example set by the most pious of believers, the prophet 
Muhammad. The prophet, however, is considered only a guide, 
to be admired but not to be worshipped. 
All of this finds its reflection in the theology of 
ibn Hanbal and ibn Taimiyya; but al-Wahhab tends toward 
an exclusiveness that does not have a place in the Hanbali 
system. The true believer must avoid those who are not 
in the Muslim community, even if they be his closest kin. 
Al-Wahhab also added a number of injunctions that are not 
found in Hanbali law. Attendance at public prayer is obliga- 
tory; smoking is forbidden and may be punished with up to 
40 stripes; the mere utterance of the formula 'there is 
no god but God and Muhammad is His prophet' is not sufficient 
to make a Muslim--further enquiry must be made into his 
character. 
6 
Furthermore, the Wahhabiyya does not rely upon any 
one system of Islamic jurisprudence in spite of its close 
association with Hanbalism. The Saudi state follows Icianbali 
law but for al-Wahhab, as for many he has inspired. the 
only written authorities requiring obedience are the Qtiran 
and the traditions. of the four major jurisprudential schools 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 19-9: 1086, 
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(mathhab) of Islam, the Hanbali is favoured by most Wah- 
habis, but the other three, the Maliki, Salafi and Hanafi, 
are also considered important in the interpretation of Muslim 
law. The cannonical rites are considered valid only in 
so far as they do not contradict the Quran and hadith. 
Two other sources of Islamic doctrine, ijm5', or consensus 
of the community, and qiyds, personal interpretation of neces- 
sary action through analogy with the teachings and life 
of the prophet, are rejected, being not derived directly 
from the Quran and traditions. 
The five pillars. 
Tn the traditional observance of Islam among the Songhay 
of Gao, emphasis is placed upon the social aspects of worship 
such as the Muslim festivals and such ceremonies as naming 
, ind marriage. The Wahhabis, particularly the radicals, 
on the contrary have simplified the observance of communal 
rituals and placed greater emphasis on the 'correct' practice 
of the five pillars: 
The profess-ion of faith (shahada): The attitude toward the 
profession of faith, the witnessed assertion that there 
is no god but God and Muhammad is the prophet of God, orl , 
the part of both radical and moderate Wahhabis, seems to 
be similar to that of Saudi Arabian Wahhabis who do not 
content themselves with the shahada as a sign of adherence 
to Islam. They require, in addition, an examination of 
the roligious condi; ct and character of the believer as a 
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confirmation of his loyalty to the faith. Among Cao's 
radical Wahhabis the willingness of the believer to live 
in one of their villages is in itself a sign of sincerity 
because of the completeness with which the adherent's life 
becomes absorbed into the community and the routines of 
Muslim worship. 
Prayer: In examining the Wahhabi practice of Islam prayer 
most clearly exemplifies the precision that is demanded 
in the observance of every aspect of the faith. Perhaps 
the most significant and striking aspect of the radical 
Wahhabis performance of prayer is the fact that the men 
are required to attend the village mosque for all five daily 
prayers unless they are working in distant f ields or travel- 
ing. Only rarely do men pray alone. 
Each village has a regular muezzin who shouts the call 
to prayer from the top of the mosque or, in villages where 
there is no mosque, from a roof or high wall. If men are 
traveling or working away from the mosque one of them shouts 
the call to prayer as others perform their ablutions. 
The general feeling among radical Wahhabis seems to 
be that prayer at a mosque or common meeting place has more 
value than if it were performed elsewhere. This is appa- 
rently because prayer in a large group is seen by them to 
more clearly imitate the example of the original Miuslim 
community of the proPliet and his companions. In a number 
of reformist villages mosques remain half constructed because 
7. Khoury, 1983: 160. 
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Of . har-ds. hip inflicted by the drought, yet prayers are perform- 
ed within the unfinished walls, even during dust storms 
and the scorching mid-day temperatures which can reach 50' 
celcius. Under such conditions prayer becomes a form of 
collective asceticism. 
Wrist watches are set with the greatest precision possi- 
ble and care is taken to be sure that the muezzin calls 
at the correct time. Clean water is always drawn from a 
well, ready for ablutions. Men ideally assemble at the 
mosque as soon as possible after the call so that women, 
even though they are veiled and have a sepacate entrance 
to the mosque, will not be encountered en route. Men who 
come early perform two rak'as, then sit reciting from the 
Quran, pronouncing short litanies or simply waiting for 
the imam's entrance. When the imam arrives all stand and 
assemble in straight rows, arms folded across the chest, 
shoulders and toes touching those of one's neighbour. Younger 
men with some status, messengers, higher-level students, 
teachers, etc., make sure the rows are straight. They sight, 
pull some worshippers forward, push others back, until they 
are satisfied that the row is as near perfect as possible. 
Then they give a signal that all is ready and the prayer 
begins. 
Recitation from the Quran in prayer is slow, clear 
and deliberate. During the prayers of morning and evening, 
which are shorter for most Muslims, lengthy sGras from the 
Quran are recited, so that these prayers are frequently 
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the longest. 
When the prayer is completed the men wait five or ten 
minutes for the women to leave. Usually there will be fewer 
than ten women in a large village attending prayer since 
they are not required to pray in the mosque. While waiting 
the men often silently pronounce litanies. Unlike the tradi- 
tionalists and many moderate Wahhabis in Cao who pronounce 
the same litany after prayer, the radical Wahhabis do not 
use the rosary but count instead with their fingers. Their 
explanation is that on the Day of Judgement a rosary can 
be lost or destroyed, but the hands of those entering para- 
dise will always be resurrected and the faithful will thus 
be equipped for prayers in the next world. 
Pre-adolescent boys who are usually at the primary 
level in Quran school are not required to attend all prayers 
in the mosque, though it is not uncommon to see three- or 
four-year-olds at prayer with their fathers. As they become 
older, advance in their Quranic studies and take on more 
responsibilities, boys are required to pray in the mosque 
with the same diligence as their elders. 
Women are neither required nor encouraged to pray in 
the mosque except for attendance at the midday Friday sermon. 
Usually, when the men are gone for their lengthy prayer, 
women from neighbouring compounds gather together, perform 
prayers rapidly (in turns so that someone will be able to 
watch young children) and then spend a brief period social- 
izing. Their visits are mentally timed so that they can 
24,11 
return Lo their compounds shortly before the men return, 
but sometimes they are late and have to scatter as the men 
signal their approach. Some women, however, seem to pray 
at the mosque regularly. In Dar al-Salam these are the 
wives of Seydu Idrissa and of other village leaders who 
have an interest in maintaining a position of religious 
leadership among the women of the village. 
It is not at all uncommon to see those men who are 
crippled or ill make a special effort to attend prayer in 
the mosque. That which motivates them to endure this hard- 
ship seems to be the belief that communal prayer, conducted 
in accordance with the requirements of Islam, brings the 
benefit of both spiritual and physical healing. 
The radical Wahhabis are critical of the way those 
who do not belong to their movement perform their prayers. 
They point out that many of their moderate and traditionalist 
rivals, even when water, is available, perform their ablutions 
with sand as was permitted by the prophet only in the event 
of extreme water scarcity. Even this many do perfunctorily 
as a simple ritual gesture. They are also critical of the 
haste with which others perform prayer, their lack of punctu- 
alit. y and the fact that they are often conducted alone or 
in small groups in the streets or inside household compounds 
rather than in a mosque. Moderate Wahhabis and traditional- 
ists pray in large gatherings in their mosques only on th(ý 
occasion of the Friday praver or durinq the celebraLion 
of Muslim festivals. 
2/15 
The radical Wahhabis have rarely prayed in mosques 
other than their own since they divided their villages along 
religious lines. They consider other imams k5fir, iril-idels, 
and praying with them is seen to involve a taci+- acceptance 
of their 'incorrect' practices. One exception to this prohi- 
bition of non-Wahhabi mosques was made during a visit from 
an imam from Mecca to the Tombeau des Askias in 1984. For 
several Wahhabi leaders this was memorable not so much because 
of the relaxation of their usual ritual seclusion or 
the prestige attached to the visiting imam but because they 
had their shoes stolen from the mosque entrance while praying 
inside--an incident which only served to reinforce their 
negative attitude toward traditionalist Muslims in Gao. 
The prohibition against praying in non-Wahhabi mosques 
and the requirement that worshippers pray and travel in 
groups has made it necessary to accomodate those who travel 
to the markets of Cao and Ansongo in lodges. In some respect 
the lodges of the radical Wahhabis are similar in function 
to the zawiya's of the Sufi brotherhoods, except that urban 
lodges of the Wahhabis are not residences of scholars and 
do not house Quranic schools. The Wahhabi lodge in Gao 
is a large two-storey house containing a small central court 
where animals are kept prior to slaughter, and several second- 
floor rooms for 11odging visitors from outside town. In 
the front of the lodge facing the street are several shelters 
made of locally-woven straw mats and hides which serve as 
a 'restaurant'. Here, inexpensive meat and rice dishes 
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are prepared, often for non-Wahhabi clients. Prices are 
kept low as an example to other Muslims of their piety and 
unselfishness. At the side of the lodge there is another 
straw shelter which serves as a meeting place and a 'mosque'. 
Prayers are conducted here, each time led by the most learned 
man present. There seems to be a greater tolerance of tradi- 
tionalists in the town itself, for these prayers are some- 
times attended by non-Wahhabis who are perhaps sympathetic 
to reformist beliefs or attracted to their style of prayer. 
The lodge and its mosque, however, were not principally 
established as centres of recruitment but were meant to 
house radical Wahhabis who come in to town on some necessary 
business, usually to sell or buy in the market. It is also 
a meeting place for Wahhabi leaders from Gao's surrounding 
villages who would arouse suspicion by descending upon one 
particular village but who are less noticable in the town. 
The strict enforcement of group prayer among men is 
a major factor contributing to the unity and continuity 
of the radical Wahhabiyya. It is the principal means by 
which the individual is submerged in the group. The prohibi- 
tion against praying alone quite simply prevents the believer 
from being alone, from thinking about and questioning the 
courses of action which the group is following, and from 
being exposed to other interpretations of belief which might 
lead him to soften his attitude and change his allegiance 
back to the traditional community. Leaving the Wahhabi 
group would have to be an act of open defiance in the face 
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of one's peers. 
Alms (zakat): Among the traditionalists in Gao and the 
surrounding villages the giving of the religious tax is 
informal, taking the form more of voluntary alms (sad5q) 
rather than a calculated percentage of the believer's income. 
Some who can afford to give a religious donation do so to 
a trusted religious leader. The Guindo family which heads 
the AMUPI in Cao is often given alms for distribution to 
the poor. The AMUPI is also the organization which receives 
and distributes the zakat of the moderate Wahhabis in Cao. 
In the traditional Muslim villages the zak5t is sometimes 
given to the chief or imam for distribution and, as in 
Gao, at other times is given directly to the poor. Again, 
the amount of the contribution depends largely upon the 
individual conscience of the donor and is not a fixed per- 
centage. 
The month of Ramadan is usually the time when alms 
are given, but during Fridays throughout the year beggars 
crowd around the shops of some wealthy merchants who make 
a regular practice of giving on the holy day. 
Radical Wahhabis who have an income which supercedes 
their daily living requirements give the zakat during Ramadan. 
They give to their own village imam rather than to non- 
Wahhabis. The amount of income from the zakat which goes 
to the central leadership in Dar al-Salam appears to be 
minor. rFhe radical Wahhabiyya remains poor and with condi- 
tions recently worsening the religious tax has made only 
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a minimal contribution to alleviating a desperate situation. 
The Wahhabis' primary concern during the recent drought 
has been their own physical survival. The unfinished girls' 
madrasa in Dar al-Salam and half-completed mosques in other 
villages are evidence of this poverty. Such a situation, 
however, is (hopefully) exceptional. It is important to 
note that the ideology and the leadership organization exist 
in the radical Wahhabiyya for an efficient distribution 
of alms. The only ingredient missing is an economic surplus. 
Fasting: Everywhere in the Muslim world the fast during 
the lunar month of Ramadan is an integral part of the faith. 
In Cao where heat as well as shortages of food often make 
fasting during daylight hours an extreme hardship, the fast 
is nonetheless undertaken willingly by most believers, even 
by many who are only nominally Muslim and not otherwise 
conscientious in their observance of Islam. The Wahhabis, 
therefore, cannot be distinguished clearly from the rest 
of the Muslim community by a strict observance of the fast. 
The hardship of the fast is regarded by almost all Muslims 
as a test of character and endurance. Through the required 
abstinence an individual is seen to be better able to resist 
other temptations. Fasting is also considered physically 
beneficial. For young men who are healthy it is above all 
a challenge, a means to demonstrate one's strength and piety. 
For the Songhay especially, this kind of challenge has a 
great attraction, for as Rouch observes, 
"sur le plan indivi- 
duel, la fiert6 se retrouve dans un vanit6 A toutes (ýpreuves: 
29 
de möme que les Songhay se sentent supärieurs aux autres 
Noirs, le Songhay doit 6tre lui-meme superieur a ses compag- 
nons. , 
Pilgrimage: Considering the overwhelming poverty throughout 
the Sahel--which has worsened during the droughts of the 
past decades--and the fact that most radical Wahhabis are 
subsistence farmers, it would be surprising that any manage 
to afford the journey to Mecca. Few, in fact, do. Those 
who have made the trip usually have saved money from work 
in the coastal towns of West Africa. 
For all Muslims the pilgrimage to Mecca is an important 
part of the requirements of the faith. The moderate Wahhabis 
in Gao-city tend, however, to be wealthier, usually through 
local trade activity, and seem to have made the pilgrimage 
more often. Traditionalists appear to go on the pilgrimage 
less of ten, once again largely because of poverty; and many 
of those who do travel to Mecca return with an allegiance 
to Wahhabism. 
With few exceptions, such as the imam from Bagoundie 
who was in Mecca at the time that fieldwork was being done 
for this study, the leaders of the radical Wahhabiyya, inclu- 
ding Seydu Idrissa, his close disciples in Dar al-Salam, 
and Zacharia Ture, have not made the pilgrimage. This is 
explained by the difficulties involved in earning and saving 
under the harsh rural conditions of the Sahel and by the 
fact, that those who are more apt to acquire the means for- 
the journey are prevented. by the nature of their roles 
Rouch, 1954: 51. 
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as community leaders or teachers, from finding the oppor- 
t. unity for travel. In 19th century West Africa similar 
constraints were placed upon Usman dan Fodio of northern 
Nigeria and Sidiyya al-Kabir of Mauritania who did not, 
despite their important positions as leaders of reform, 
make the pilgrimage. 
The Muslim festivals. 
The moderate and radical Wahhabis have a similar approach 
to the celebration of Islamic festivals; they have reduced 
celebration to the bare essentials of Muslim practice. The 
joie de vivre typical of African Islam, which consists espe- 
cially of dancing and singing, is dispensed with. Only 
the holidays of 'id al-Fitr (breaking of the fast of Ramadan) 
and 'id al-Kabir (the Great Festival) are ritually observed 
by the Wahhabis. The minor festivals, the birth and naming 
of the prophet and the Muslim New Year, which are given 
varying degrees of attention in different parts of the Muslim 
world, are not celebrated collectively. 
The radical Wahhabis often differentiate themselves 
from neighbouring Muslims in their observance of Muslim 
festivals by sighting the moon, which marks the dates of 
the festivals, on different days. For most Muslims in Mali 
the sighting of the new moon, which marks the beginning 
of the month of Ramadan as well as the ten days that precede 
the Great Festival, is announced on national radio. The 
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radical Wahhabis der, -de this system, saying that the moon- 
sighter is unreliable. Speaking of this radio announcement 
a prominent man in Dar al-Salam said darkly: "the Muslims 
in Bamako are either blind or they are liars; we have seen 
the moon for ourselves. " 
To their Muslim neighbours this rejection is akin to 
heresy. Sighting the new moon on a different dav from the 
radio announcement which all others follow means that the 
radical Wahhabis follow a slightly advanced or betated lunar 
calendar and celebrate the major festivals on different days 
from their neighbours. rhe reciprocity that can occur, 
which would potentially heal the rift between dLvided villages 
is bypassed. Hostility is even exacerbated. 
Among the traditionalists of Gao-city in recent years 
increasing importance has been attached to celebrating the 
birth, and a week later, the naming of the prophet. On 
both days prominent men of the town's religious community 
gather in groups of 15 or 20 to chant the praises of the 
prophet throughout the early evening. At the same time, 
in different parts of the town, there are drums and dancing. 
Women wear their finest clothes and jewelry, their hair 
especially coiffed and braided for the occasion. Many women 
wear western accoutrements for beauty such as lipstick, 
high-heeled shoes with which they struggle in the sand, 
and even, for the intellectual look, eyeglasses without 
lenses. In spite of r-his, the celebration of the birth 
of the prophet is an affirmation of the Muslim tradition. 
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Some residents of Cao speculate, probably with some accuracy, 
that the importance given this occasion has been imported 
from Timbuktu where it has been a more integral part of 
the religious practice. 
The Wahhabis uniformly ignore this festival saying 
that it was not practiced by Muhammad himself and is there- 
fore not worthy of imitation. Their austerity in this respect 
is similar to that of Rabi'a al-'Alawiyya of Basra, a Muslim 
mystic of the 8th century A. D. who, when asked what she 
thought of the celebration of a feast day, is said to have 
rep Ii ed: "you displayed a love of luxury and soft living 
and thereby you brought humiliation upon the Muslims. "9 
Some Wahhabis contend that the veneration of the prophet, 
as expressed in the celebration of his birth and naming, 
elevates him to a divine level which is tantamount to poly- 
theism (shirk). Those who celebrate the milad al-Nabl, accor- 
ding to one radical Wahhabi, are kaf ir who read the Quran 
without understanding it or following what it says. The 
radical Wahhabis are especially critical of the appearance 
of women in public without being dressed according to strict 
Islamic practice. The public display which takes place 
during the festival has reinforced their opinion of Cao 
as an African Babylon. 
The celebration of the Muslim New year is similarly 
a source of controversy. The Wahhabis 
do not give this 
event any great significance. It marks 
the anniversary 
of the hijra, the emmigration of the prophet and 
his followers 
Smith, 1928: 22. 
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from Mecca to Medina, but this does not make it an occasion 
for- any special ritual. For many traditionalists, however, 
it is more than just the beginning of another lunar year; 
it is also a time when protection can be sought from ancestors 
or jinn , and even at one time, as we have seen, from the 
spirits of ancient kings at the site of the sacred stone at 
the Tombeau des Askias. The Wahhabis, needless to say, 
oppose such practices and are especially in disagreement 
with collective animist rituals such as the cult of the 
hol,. l o. 
Rites of passage. 
It could be argued that Wahhabism in Songhay society 
is a strong disintegrative factor in the traditional milieu. 
It is true that many traditionalists lament the decline 
of religious practices such as the holle cult and ancestor 
worship which is largely due to the advent of 'puritan' 
Islam, and that most ritual practices in Islamic festivals 
have been pared down to their bare essentials, with emotional 
outpourings of grief or joy eliminated, in Wahhabi rituai. 
It can be demonstrated, however, that the simplification 
of the rites of passage is 'adaptive' to the present economic 
situation of the Songhay. Drought and famine in the Sahel, 
coupled with a decrease in opportunities in southern cities, 
has made traditional ritual celebrations, with all the 
associated efforts and expenses, extremely burdensome. The 
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simplification of these rituals, which began to take place 
of necessity in the traditional milieu, was given official 
religious sanction by the Wahhabis who reduced the required 
expense and made the essential social processes of initiation, 
marriage and burial more 'efficient'. This 'streamlining' 
of ritual is probably not an explicit factor in attracting 
new adherents to reform, but it is a feature of the Wahhabiyya 
which demonstrates an adjustment to an altered environment 
and in some respects an affirmation or reinforcement of 
tradition rather than a denial of it. 
Naming: Naming takes place seven days after birth. In 
the traditional naming ceremony griots play music or are 
simply in attendance for 'gifts'. Family and neighbours 
are invited and there is often dancing. Generally an alfa 
chooses the name, either from the Quran or. in less Islamized 
areas, from a day, month or particular event associated 
in some way with the birth. Often the name given by the 
alfa is kept secret and is called the ma b6ri, 'big name', 
while a ma kayna, 'small name', is used commonly. After 
the naming, a goat or sheep is slaughtered and distributed 
to neighbours. At this point dancing and festivities begin. 
Among the Wahhabis the name given by the alfa, usually 
the village imam, is selected from the Quran and is not 
kept secret. A goat is usually slaughtered and special 
dishes prepared but there is no music or dancing and there- 
fore no 'gifts' are necessary for musicians or griots. 
Circumcision: Tn the circumcision ceremony of the Songhay 
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the general trend during the past century has been the decline 
of collective ceremonies associated with age-grade membership 
and their replacement with more individualized, 'de-ritualized' 
circumcision. The collective circumcision, the bangii b6ri, 
('big circumcision') was, according to Boulnois and Hama 
writing in 1954, "de plus en plus abandon6e, parce que cette 
f6te du village coQte maintenant trop ch6r A la communaut6"'o 
While this may have been so in the eastern part of 
the Niger bend, the Songhay of Timbuktu practiced the circum- 
cision ceremony on a grand scale with approximately 150 
boys participating in a single ceremony, the costs of which 
were borne by a wealthy Arma, Kunta or a prominent cleric. 
In traditional villages circumcision ceremonies take 
place during the hot season when there is no agricultural 
labour and when wounds are less likely to become infected. 
Boys are circumcised between the ages of five and twelve, 
the most common age being around seven. Children who remain 
uncircumcised at the age of twelve are ridiculed. The per- 
formance of the operation is not confined to members of 
any one specialized group; the duty is given to anyone with 
the necessary skills, often a minor magician or a butcher. 
Children eat lightly for several days preceding the operation, 
usually consuming only light porridge of millet or rice. 
The operation is performed with the boys sitting on a rock 
or an upside-down mortar. The foreskin is immediately dis- 
posed of in a ditch which is dug for the purpose. The opera- 
10. Boulnois and Hama, 1954: 164. 
11. Miner, 1953: 158. 
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tion is followed by a period of isolation lasting fourteen 
or forty days in which the initiates are given knowledge which 
is required of those who wish to have the status of 'adult'. 
At the end of this period the neophyte is told his secret 
name (ma boý3ri). The children are lavishly fed during this 
time of isolation, especially during the three days imme- 
diately after the operation, and if they are dissatisfied 
with the food they have the right to ridicule their elders 
for negligence or stinginess. 
The Wahhabis do not practice many elements of circumci- 
sion which make it a 'rite of passage' in the traditional 
society. The most significant indication of this de-ritual- 
ization of circumcision is the reduction in the age at which 
circumcision takes place to between one and seven years; the 
upper age limit is thus seven rather thdn twelve years. 
In radical Wahhabi villages, children are called to be circum- 
cised every three or four years, but the 'ceremony' is bereft 
of its status as a marker of a transition in social position 
toward greater participation in the community. Special 
knowledge, such as a secret name, is inapplicable to an 
infant that has just been weaned. This is a change which 
points to an elimination of the use of magic and the communi- 
cation of magical knowledge in circumcision. A point of 
continuity with the more ritualized circumcision, however, 
is the fact that after the operation children are given 
rich food, high in protein, ostensibly to compensate for 
the loss of blood and, emotionally, to compensate for the 
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trauma of the operation. Although a number of children 
may be operated on in a single occasion this is more for 
the sake of convenience than for the sake of ritual. After 
the operation children remain in their own homes and do 
not undergo a period of collective isolation and instruction 
comparable to the traditional circumcision ceremony. 
In its pure form the traditional circumcision ceremony 
marks the introduction of the child into an age-grade organi- 
zation. Such organizations seem to have been most developed 
in Timbuktu where the koterey-- which included all men or 
boys of one town quarter who were circumcised together or 
in successive ceremonies so that they were roughly the same 
age--had chiefs, judges, messengers and courts to which dis- 
putes concerning koterey matters could be referred. 
12 
Elsewhere among the Songhay children of the same age 
do not appear to be organized in structured institutions 
but rather associate in small groups of boys or girls aged 
eight to fourteen years who share a common house while 
remaining under the supervision of an older child or a young 
adult. Among the radical Wahhabis comparable semi-independent 
groups of children can be found in Dar al-Salam where children 
attending the Quran school from a common village share a 
'house'. Wahhabi children, however, do not develop ties 
of loyalty established with initiation ceremonies. 
Marriage. The system of marriage of the Songhay largely 
follows an Islamic pattern. Polygyny is permitted (though 
rarely tolerated by women) and men are limited to a maximum 
12. Miner, 1953: 165-67. 
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of four wives. From the male point of view almost any unmar- 
ried woman is an acceptable partner, and marriage prohibitions 
extend only to those within the immediate family: sisters, 
daughters, mothers. grandmothers and aunts. Traditionally 
arrangements for marriage, especially a first marriage, 
have been made by the parents of the prospective spouses, 
and parental preference is of great weiqht in the selection 
of marriage partners. Arrangements for marriage were some- 
times made when the future partners were still children, 
but these engagements were kept secret. 13 Men usually marry 
for the first time around the age of 18 and women at 15, 
though in the Wahhabi village of Dar al-Salam 6ne girl 
aged eleven was married, apparently not an uncommon practice. 
In many traditional weddings the gift to the bride 
from the groom or his family is a central feature of the 
marriage allidnce. Among the Songhay villagers the bride- 
wealth may consist of one or two head of cattle, some clothing 
and jewelry. The gift is not very large by comparison, 
with, say, many nomadic groups, but it is sti'Ll a consider- 
able expense and for most young men wishing to marry for 
the first time the bridewealth is difficult to obtain, 
even with family support, since social requirements in terms 
of the value of gifts has diminished little since drought, 
conditions and economic deprivation became critical in the 
early 1970's. 
Often the bridewealth was earned by the young man during 
work and travel in the coastal cities. This has generally 
13. RoUch, 1954: 37. 
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weakened the dependence of young men upon their elders since 
they no longer relied on 'loans' or gifts from their parents 
or other relatives in order to contract a marriage. The 
relative economic independence of young Songhay men has 
lessened the reciprocity between generations and has been 
responsible for a weakening of family solidarity. Migration 
created a 'vicious cycle' of independence from the age prin- 
cipal of social status: economic individualism weakened 
paternal authority while the decline of the patriarchal 
family led many young men to rebel and seek their own means 
of livelihood. Bridewealth, therefore, has become largely 
the responsibility of the man wishing to marry, often even 
in first marriages which formerly would have been largely 
or entirely taken care of by the household head. 
In spite of this independence on the part of many young 
men, the family is usually involved in the arrangement of 
a first marriage for both a man and a woman. There is some 
evidence that this is changing with the popularization 
of romantic love and, especially in the urban environment, 
new opportunities for independent courtship, but individual- 
ism is not complete and parental consent in a first marriage 
remains crucial. 
In the traditional Songhay wedding the ceremony is 
arranged once both parties are in agreement and the bride- 
wealth has been paid by intermediaries of the prospective 
husband. An initial phase of the wedding, in which the 
groom and his friends simulate an attempt to kidnap the 
260 
future wife, takes place at noon. The assault is made with 
a great deal of noise and bravado while the parents of the 
girl oppose their entry into the house (a striking symbol 
of resistance to the girl's loss of virginity). In the 
afternoon of the same day, after the evening prayer, friends 
and invited guests arrive at the bride's home and are shown 
the gifts from her future partner. The f5taha is recited 
and the couple is wished a happy future. At night the wife 
is brought to the husband's home and they remain together 
in relative isolation for seven days before guests return 
to celebrate with food and dancing. Virginity in a girl 
is prized in a first marriage (though perhaps decreasingly 
common) and matrons of the villaqe traditionally inspect 
her bedclothes for stains. If these are not in evidence 
the bride is ridiculed with such comments as: horober dyara, 
t virgin of the big vagina' or ize keyna wey b6ri, 'little 
child old woman'. 
14 
The Wahhabis, following Muslim guidelines for marriage, 
avoid the complexities associated with the traditional cere- 
mony as well as the difficulties involved with amassing 
a bridewealth. The size and content of the gift to the 
bride depends upon agreemenr- between the prospective couple. 
It can be as simple as a goat or a piece of -jewelry. The 
father of the prospective bride is usually the first to 
be consulted about the proposed match. The Prospective 
14. Rouch, 1954: 57. 
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husband appears to have some freedom to select his wife 
buL his parents are still involved in marriage arrangements 
if they belong to the Wahhabi community; if not, an older 
relative or friend often becomes involved in the arrangements. 
The strict seclusion of women in iadical villages usually 
increases parental involvement in marriages because it all 
but eliminates opportunities for independent courtship. 
Whatever the way in which a man comes into contact with 
an eligible woman, whether through his father, or the bride's 
father, he has probably seen very little of her in the village 
and in some cases may never have seen her at all before 
marriage arrangements are initiated. If the suitor is taken 
seriously he is allowed to meet the girl privately, with 
her face revealed. The suitor and the potential bride must 
ultimately approve of one another before formal arrangements 
, ire made. 
Once the match is agreed to, the prospective husband 
and wife each choose a representative to act as mediator 
and two witnesses to the marriage. When the gift is presented 
to the bride and a brief ceremony in completed by the imam, 
the wedding is concluded. A sheep or goat may be slaughtered 
and a special meal prepared. 
together as husband and wife. 
After this the couple live 
There is no celebration com- 
parable Lo that of the traditional Songhay wedding. 
The strict seclusion of women, especially of younqer 
women, and their constant use of the veil or a concealing 
scarf outside the home act to retain some traditional values 
, ind customs with regard 
to marriage. Marriage Patterns 
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in Wahhabi villages support the contention that Islamic 
reform represents a return to tradition (though a modified 
one) rather than a destruction of it. Simplification of 
bridewealth requirements and festivities are an adaptation 
to the increasd poverty brought about by the drought while 
seclusion upholds the traditional values of virginity and 
parental authority in marriage. 
Funerals: Even in Songhay villages where many pagan elements 
of the religious life remain, such as the holle, cult and 
ancestor worship, the dead are interred following Muslim 
practices since Islam is considered by many to be the religion 
of the beyond. 
15 The body is washed by an alfa and wrapped 
in a white burial cloth and a straw mat. Women display 
their grief openly but do not accompany the corpse during 
burial. Men carry the body on a stretcher and stop before 
a mosque to pray before completing the burial. The body 
is placed in its 
Igrave 
with the head facing east towards 
Mecca. For seven days relatives and friends gather, around 
the house of the deceased. Widows generally do not remarry 
for five months and 15 days, though the length of this time 
may vary. 
16 Cemeteries in most areas are not the focus 
of any special attention except in the case of some noble 
families. In Gao-city there is a sepafate cemetery for 
the nobility where family members of the deceased sometimes 
make special prayers. In some traditional v, illages there 
15. Rouch, 1954: 57. 
16. ibid. 
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are local ancestor cults which are addressed to the first 
occupant of the soil or to a particularly influential distant 
ancestor but no special attention is paid to the graves of 
those whose memory remains closely with the living. 
Such practices as those associated with the ancestor 
cults are no longer widespread in the vicinity of Gao. The 
Wahhabis are opposed to the veneration of ancestors which 
is seen as a manifestation of 'polytheism'. To them, as 
to most 'orthodox' Muslims, death is a state of limbo, the 
grave a brief stopping place before the great re-awakening 
on the Day of Judqement. The emphasis on perfection in 
the details of Muslim worship is above all a preparation 
for paradise and a liberation from a world of suffering. 
X. EDUCATION 
Puritan reform movements, marked by an emphasis on 
scriptural sources as a blueprint for social and individual 
behaviour, require at least some degree of literacy among 
the laity in order to develop and endure. In one way or 
another the attributing to words of sacred power independent 
of their meaning must be overcome. Reformist leaders have 
attempted to bring the divine message closer to their fol- 
lowers in a number of ways. Most puritan reform movements 
develop an increase in organized preaching activity. This 
on its own does not go very far towards demystification 
of sacred texts. Even though its contents may be better 
understood, the Book still holds much of its aura of mystery. 
The literate man of religion, moreover, retains an elevated 
social position by virtue of his command over language and 
t. he written word. The ideal to which most puritan religions 
aspire--the equality of bel ievers- -becomes unattainable in 
practice. In the Wahhabiyya some of this reverence for those 
literate in the sacred language is evident, especially among 
the uneducated. 
The return to scriptural sources in Christian and Muslim 
reform movements is almost always accompanied by a drive 
toward literacy and the education of the laity. The ideals 
of egalitarianism and individual responsibility for moral 
action are usually seen to be best served when every believer 
has direct access to the sacred revelation. 
The most successful approaches to education in religious 
#-'6 (1 
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reform movements have been those that began with translation 
of the scriptures into vernacular languages in social contexts 
where lay literacy had, at least to some extent, been devel- 
oped and where texts were available through high-volume 
printing methods. The Reformation in Europe may be considered 
the most historically significant period in which scriptural 
translation was a key factor in motivating religious reform 
amongst the laity. William Tyndall, the first translator 
of an English bible after the invention of the press, was 
insPired by the words of Erasmus who said of his own Greek 
testament, "I would wish that the husbandman may sing parts 
of them at his plough. " 
i In the same period, Luther's trans- 
lations into German fed an enormous demand amongst a laity 
that was not skilled in scriptural or classical languages. 
2 
Biblical translation was thus an integral part of the puritan 
reform movements in Europe which were directed against both 
the corruption and incompetence of the clergy and the magic- 
ally oriented excesses of a large portion of the laity .3 
In Islam the Ahmadiyya is a movement which, in West 
Africa, directs itelf against such 'abuses' of the Quran 
as its use in the production and sale of amulets. The Ahmadis 
1. Greenslade, 1963: 142. 
2. ibid: 104. Sayce (in Greenslade) discusses some of the 
implications of the decision by the council of Trent to 
prohibit translation and uphold the authenticity of the 
vulgate in France. The penetration of scriptural translations 
into German and English can therefore be contrasted to the 
shallow effect of French translations which lacked uniformity. 
Also see Eisentein, 1968: 7-29. 
3. Thomas, 1971, provides a discussion of magic (including 
scriptural magic) similar to 'Islamic magic,, in Europe and 
its decline with freligious reform. 
were the first Muslims in West Africa to consider as a pri- 
ority the translation of the Quran into numerous languages 
and were the first to establish permanent schools combining 
religious and secular study. 4 
It is important to note, however, that within Islam 
in general the Ahmadi example is an exception. Islam has 
historically placed a much greater emphasis than has Christ- 
ianity on the scriptures remaining in an original sacred 
language. Translations of the Quran simply do not carry 
the same sacred value as the direct words of God in the 
original Arabic. 
Arabic is therefore the medium of religious education. 
If the meaning of the text is to be penetrated the worshipper 
must acquire a knowledge of the classical language. The 
Wahhabis in West Africa have uniformly directed much of 
their efforts for reform into Arabic education. 
The Wahhabiyya centred in Bamako has, ever since the 
establishment of the first Subbanu school in 1949, continued 
to establish centres of religious education. The Insitut, 
Islamique in Bamako has 1500 students, of which 300 are 
girls, and employs 25 teachers. Also recently established 
in Bamako are the Institut Islamique Narou Joliba and the 
Institut Kaled ben Abdul Aziz. 
5 Government documents indicate 
a similar development of formal Islamic centres in the larger 
towns throughout the country. 
6 In Segu, for example, al-Hajj 
Sa'ad Umar- Toure has established a large madrasa with an 
enrollment of several hundred pupils. Although he is not 
4. Fisher, 1963. 
5. Amselle, for, thcoming. 
6. Government of Mali, 1983-8,1. 
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a Wahhabi, his objective of Arabic comprehension and literacY 
and his modeling of the school on western teaching methods 
is shared with many of the Wahhabi reformists. 
7 
Without this drive towards religious awareness through 
Arabic education the objectives of Islamic reform would 
become lost. When the scriptural text is not understood 
by many ordinary believers, religious specialists become 
mediators between man and God, despite any injunctions to 
the contrary. The radical reform movement in Cao is faced 
with this problem, especially because a large portion of 
its adherents are illiterate. The leadership's effort to 
promote Arabic education are very determined but the demands 
of village life prevent many followers from reaching the 
level of religious knowledge they might desire. The leader- 
ship is therefore an important source of religious knowledge 
and an important focus for religion in village life. 
Traditional Quranic education. 
Revivals of Islamic learning before the advent of Wah- 
habism in West Africa have most often been stimulated and 
controlled by the Sufi brotherhoods, more specifically, 
by the specialized groups of clerics or the particular fami- 
lies which occupied positions of leadership in the brother- 
hoods. In general, it has been classes of learned specialists 
which contributed the most to Islamic learning. Although 
7. Brenner, 1982. 
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access to such groups of learned men was often nominally 
fopen', the predominant trend was towards a restriction 
of advanced knowledge to particular social groups such as * 
families or lineages. Some examples from the Sahel are 
the Kunta of Mauritania who, in the 19th century, restricted 
higher Islamic learning to boys of noble birth; 
8 the Tuareg 
among whom the ineslemen (meaning Muslims) form a distinct 
lineage dominated by holy men who have an important place 
in the wider social network for their role as mediators 
between rival lineages; 
9 
and the Fulani of Nigeria whose 
marakatun ilini, or schools of higher learning, tended to 
be restricted to noble families. Hiskett found that the 
well-reputed school of Babban Malami in Kano city had preserved 
its original style of teaching since its establishment during 
Usman dan Fodio's reform movement and that the position 
of teacher was inherited by 
original scholars. 
10 
descendants of the school's 
In West Africa the 'apprentice' of Islamic learning 
often attended schools run by scholars who were famous for 
their knowledge of particular works on law, exegesis and 
other subjects. Advanced learning, which usually was under- 
taken when the Quran was fully memorized, "involved the 
reading aloud of classical texts and the delivery of a stand- 
ard commentary. Students were required to learn both the 
original work and the commentary, and in certain cases the 
8. Stewart, 1973: 29. 
9. Trimingham, 1959: 11. 
10. Hiskett, 1973: 34. 
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chain of authorities from the first narrator or commentator 
down to the pupil's own teacher. "11 
This higher level of Islamic learning was undertaken 
only by those whose goal was to become a religious specialist. 
much more popular and widespread form of education has 
been the traditional Quran school. In Cao, as everywhere 
in Muslim Africa, there are numerous schools of this kind, 
most with only five to ten students, some with more than 
thirty. The goal of these schools is usually to provide 
essential religious training which consists of rote learning 
of sFiras of the Quran. Few parents of children in these 
schools aim to have their children continue to advanced 
levels of Islamic scholarship. In any case, few teachers 
are qualified to provide knowledge beyond scriptural memoriza- 
tion. Usually they begin teaching when friends or relatives 
request that their children begin training with them because 
of their perceived knowledge. Many children attend such 
schools (usually located in the teacher's compound or beside 
the street) early in the morning before attending the state 
French school, and again in the afternoon before sunset. 
Lessons in traditional Quran schools are begun with 
the letters of the alphabet being written on a smooth board 
by the teacher or an advanced student. This is repeated 
by the novice until the alphabet is memorized, then it is 
washed off and replaced with the f5taha, the opening sdra 
of the Quran, and after that, other sFiras which are gradually 
li. Hiskett, 1960: 118. 
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increased in length until, in seven to ten years for the 
dedicated pupil, the entire Quran is memorized. 
In the traditional Songhay villages surrounding Gao, 
the Quran schools are essentially the same. Children usually 
study the Quran with a local alfa. Village alfas are not 
formally 'paidt for their teaching activities but the children 
work in their gardens and do other household chores for 
them; there are also 'gifts' provided by parents when a 
child reaches particular levels of competence. 
Few traditional Songhay clerics have a comprehensive 
knowledge of Arabic or have a reputation which extends beyond 
their particular village or group of villages. Those who 
have recently become leaders in the Wahhabi movement of ten 
studied with Fulani mallams in the Gabero region or in Niger 
who had special reputations for learning. This indicates 
that a strong tradition of Islamic scholarship was lacking 
among the Songhay before the development of Wahhabism except 
in strong urban centres of learning such as Timbuktu and 
Jenne. 
In contrast to the 'closed' system of traditional higher 
learning or the limited intellectual scope of the elementary 
Quran schools, the modern trend in Islamic education is 
toward larqe schools which are 'open' in their system of 
recruitment and which offer, at the same time, 'advanced' 
religious knowledge. Thus they appeal especially to people 
in social groups who, though adhering to Islam, were to 
some extent excluded from the status-enhancing process of 
higher Islamic iearning. 
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Colonial and Post-colonial French education. 
The French colonial administration had an inconsistent 
attitude toward Islam, but in many regions of West Africa 
it seems clear that the effect of their presence was a reduc- 
tion in the quality of Islamic education through a hostility 
towards 'uncooperative' Muslim leaders. Such leaders were 
often qualified teachers and clerics and the proscription 
of their activities led to a reduction in the numbers and 
influence of the best Muslim scholars and institutions. 
Later, with the rise of African nationalism and independence 
movements, Quran schools languished and Quranic education 
lost its place as a major social responsibility and criterion 
of social mobility while western education advanced with 
its potential rewards in the drive towards modernization. 
12 
Over the past two decades, however, the socio-political 
rewards of western education have been seen by many to be 
unattainable and a return to Quranic education, both in 
the form of small, informal schools and larger, better organ- 
ized 'madrasas', has been evident. 13 Quranic education in 
madrasas run by the Wahhabiyya owe their success largely 
to the decline in influence of the traditional clerical 
groups and the subsequent failure of western education to 
bring about a new and successful social and economic order. 
The French colonial administration in West Africa did 
not establish schools in every corner of their territory, 
12. Kaba, 1976. 
13. Covernment of Mali, 1983-84. 
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but the effects of their educational system were neverthe- 
less strongly felt. Colonial education in French West Africa 
was consistent with the general aim of promoting western 
values. The central goal of education was to make the schools 
a medium for the transmission of French culture and 'civili- 
zation'. Secondarily, they were meant to "train local auxil- 
iaries, clerks, telephonists and so on, and to train skilled 
artisans. " 
14 The model for this enterprise was naturally 
the educational system of France. As Hiskett says, "the 
French set up a number of excellent schools, but their cur- 
riculums were almost entirely in French. In them pupils 
were given a French literary and scientific education that 
differed little from that qiven to children in France, but 
Arabic and other subjects on the Islamic curriculum were 
almost entirely neglected. " 
15 This was especially so after 
an educational reform in 1946 which reduced the adaptation 
of colonial schools to local conditions with the introduction 
of metropolitan classical curricula which aimed at assimila- 
ting students into French culture. The European orientation 
of education in French West Africa was so extreme that one 
of the phrases recited by biack students was, "nos ancestres 
les Gauloises 6taient blonds., '16 
Seeing the advantages of French education, Political 
and even religious leaders sent their children to school, 
thus creating a demand for the expansion of the system. 
14. Hiskett, 1984: 293. 
15. ibid. 
16. Jansen, 1979: 51. 
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As Kaba points out, however, "colonial education had an 
extremely high level of dropouts unwanted in the European 
sectors and distainful of their traditions. " 17 A general 
consequence of the operation of this educational system 
through the decades of French occupation was the creation 
of a society divided between a French speaking elite, largely 
or wholly assimilated into European culture, and a more 
disadvantaged, traditionally oriented sector of society 
that was largely Muslim. 
When the first independent government took power in 
Mali, an educational policy was introduced which had much 
the same effect as that implemented by the French. This 
socialist government, inspired by the ideal of an 'education 
de qualit6 et des masses', began a programme of educational 
r-eform intended, together with an economic five-year plan, 
to bring about agricultural modernization and prosperity. 
Recruitment on a massive scale took many students away from 
Quran schools and into government schools which were estab- 
lished throughout the country, even in some remote villages. 
By 1965 over 600 new 'schools' had been opened. With time, 
however, teaching standards lowered while examination require- 
ments remained the same and many students failed. Because 
of this a great many youths had up to 12 years of education 
but could neither continue their studies nor find work. 
This was, and remains, a generation which has not found 
17. Kaba, 1974: 155 
274 
a secure position in the modern world and which -has also 
largely lost touch with its traditional background. 
The second post-independence government, which came 
to power in 1968, inherited and maintained an infrastructure 
of schools and teachers as well as the problems of unemploy- 
ment and cultural disorientation. This regime has attempted 
to solve the problems created by widespread education with 
French curriculum through the introduction of 'ruralization', 
the goal of which is the social, cultural and economic inte- 
gration of students into both traditional society and the 
modern world. This is attempted through the introduction 
of curriculums, such as agricultural techniques and simple 
economics, that are seen as being more compatible with the 
rural backgrounds of many students. In some schools and 
villages literacy in local languages, which are transcribed 
in the latin alphabet, has also been introduced. Teaching 
and academic standards, however, are still low and French 
remains the official language of the administration and 
of education. 
In spite of the effort to change school curriculum 
to make it more compatible with the cultural backgrounds 
of rural students (an effort which is far from complete), 
national education aims to teach skills, principally literacy 
in French, which are not essential to a subsistence economy 
and which presuppose involvement with or in the national 
economy and administration. Even with more rural content 
in school curriculum, formal education in villages has dif- 
ficulty in orienting itself to the village economy and to 
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the basic skills required in rural life as efficiently as 
informal training, that is, education by 'doing', by contri- 
buting in a practical way to family or village prosperity. 
Attitudes in the villages to French language schools 
are ambivalent. There is, in some parents, a reluctance 
to introduce their children to what is often perceived 
to be an alien culture and language. This attitude has 
its parallel in the opinion of a Berber villager in Morocco, 
also faced with his children's participation in French lan- 
guage education, who exclaimed, "education in the skills 
of another culture unfits peasants for their future roles! "18 
The French language bureaucracy, however, is there 
to stay and some villagers are aware of the advantages to 
be had in educating children in the skills required to deal 
with the administration. Some also hope to have their chil- 
dren go farther, to become (if they dare aspire) a petit 
fonctionnaire. 
There are serious disadvantages to this ambition. 
Village schools only take students through the premier cycle, 
the f irst six years of their education; to continue to a 
level sufficient for employment in the administration the 
student must continue his studies in the town. Accomodation 
would have to be found, usually with kin. Children who 
continue their second cYcle studies in the town can almost 
be guaranteed to acquire values that are alien to village 
cul ture. They cannot, however, be guaranteed a salaried 
18. Maher, 1974: 77. 
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position when their studies are completed. Despite efforts 
to make the French language and elements of European culture 
compatible with rural life in Mali, the availability of 
opportunities remains inconsistent with the effort expended 
on the creation of a national French-speaking culture. 
The Malian government remains plagued with the problems 
that began to arise with the early expansion of French educa- 
tion in 1946. Many young people have been given the opportu- 
nity of education but relatively few from the countryside 
have achieved their higher ambitions. After spending years 
pursuing their education, many students are not able to 
find a place in the new society, while at the same time 
they have to some extent been drawn away from their tradi- 
tional culture. 
In this situation a puritan, individualistic variation 
of Islam has been able to absorb those who are alienated 
both from village life and from westernized African culture. 
Reformist Islam has been able to assimilate those who had 
become socially marginalized through education and economic 
change, while at the same time making use of western methods 
of teaching and organization. Colonna points out that in 
Algeria the development of Islamic reform in the 1920's 
and 30's was closely associated with the colonial mission 
to educate and 'civilize'. The reformists counteracted 
the danger of assimilation with a network of Islamic schools 
and cultural centres which resembled those of the French 
system. 
19 The French maxim 'civiliser sans d6classer, 
19. Colonna, 1975: 33-3.1. Also see Merad, 1967. 
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which pointed to an objective early in the colonial education 
effort in Algeria and later in West Africa, was never to 
be realized. Rather, it was reformist Islam that more suc- 
cessfully promoted 'civilization', which involved increased 
Arabic literacy and the ideals of social progress, without 
completely overturning the traditional social order. 
Wahhabi education in Gao. 
Wahhabism, in Gao shows a similar orientation towards 
education to that of the Islamic reform movements in West 
Africa as a whole, even though the Cao movement's direct 
contact with the southern towns of Mali where the first 
Wahhabi madrasas were established has been minimal. Like 
the first madrasas established in Kankan and Bamako by the 
Subbanu movement in the 1950's, the more recently established 
schools in the Gao region try to provide a systematic and 
comprehensive knowledge of Arabic and Islam using similar 
methods of education to those used in state schools. The 
stress placed on modern methods varies, as do the standards 
reached by students, but by training children in this way 
the masters of these schools try to avoid the negative effects 
of both western culture and restricted literacy. 
Throughout the regions of West Africa in which Islamic 
reform has flourished educational objectives have not been 
met with consistent success. Standards vary greatly between 
institutions claiming to be madrasas. Often they are estab- 
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lished under the initiative of religious communities or 
villages desirous of giving a religious education to their 
children with little or no control over the quality of instruc- 
tion. In some instances clerics who open such establishments 
are reputed to seek a livelihood not only from enrollment 
fees, but also from the supplementary income earned by stu- 
dents from work, begging or even theft. The Wahhabi madrasas 
in Cao do not appear to have been guilty of such excesses, 
although all of them probably have lower standards than 
the better organized schools in the southern towns of Mali. 
The moderate Wahhabis have established two madrasas: 
the Sabil al-Islam wa Dawatu Illaihi with about 85 students 
and the Medersa Islamique al-Mahdi Askia which has roughly 
230 students. 
The Sabil al-Islam school was established around 1976. 
It was converted from a large traditional home, typical 
of the Sahelian urban style, with mid-brick walls and window 
flaps and doors made from the metal of barrels, flattened 
and welded to a secure frame. There are five small makeshift 
classrooms, each with its own blackboard. Students sit 
on benches or empty, battered tins of ghi butter. Boys 
and girls share the same classrooms but the girls are nom- 
inally separated and sit at the back. 
The school is beset by financial difficulty. It was 
once financed by the Islamic academy in Benghazi, Libya, 
but such funding is illegal and payments were irregular. 
Much now depends upon donations administered by the AMUPI. 
Registration of a pupil at this school does not necessarily 
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cost anything if parents are Poor but a small amount, usually 
around 1000 francs CFA is normally given. 
Since there is little money to hire teaching assistants, 
or moniteurs, discipline and teaching standards are a problem 
in this school. Besides the part-time help of two moniteurs, 
the master (Mudarris) is often the only one present to take 
charge . Students in their fifth year are usually available 
to direct the lower level classes, but the younger students 
are often left to themselves until chaos prevails, at which 
time their noise brings a sharp reprimand and temporary 
order. When classes are set independently in motion, the 
master often sits in a narrow foyer between the first and 
second year classes where he can greet visitors, drink China 
green tea, and at the same time keep his ears open to the 
conduct of the beginners' classes. Discipline takes t'he 
form of harsh scoldings as well as cuffs and knuckle-rappings 
on the head. The children seem to be largely impervious 
to this rough treatment. When younger children cry or need 
comforting, however, they are usually treated with indulgence. 
In the first, second and third years much study time 
seems to be devoted to the recitation of the Arabic alphabet 
and simple sUras of the Quran. The selection to be recited 
is written on the blackboard. one child from the class, 
or an instructor, points to a letter, word or short sentence, 
reading it aloud; then the rest of the class repeats 'in 
unison' (the result is closer to a cacophany). 
Classes are usually from 9: 00 until noon and in the 
afternoon from 3: 00 to 5: 00. The daily schedule is followed 
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fairly precisely with a bell being sounded to mark the begin- 
ning and end of classes. 
The curriculum of the school is more varied than the 
exclusive emphasis on the Quran which is characteristic 
of traditional Quranic education. The Quran, however, is 
given a great deal of attention. Children learn the recita- 
tion of easy s0ras starting from the first year as soon 
as they have learned something of the Arabic alphabet. 
Passages of increasing difficulty are learned as the student 
progresses into higher 'grades'. In the second year, the 
meaning of Arabic words are introduced, as are the methods 
of Islamic worship such as ablutions and prayer. Much the 
same programme is continued into the third year. Towards 
the end of the third year and into the fourth year, the 
curriculum is more varied with the introduction of the ele- 
mentary principles of the traditions (hadith), jurisprudence 
(fiqh), commentary on the Quran (tafsIr), simple maths (has5b) 
and both Islamic and West African history (tariq) as well 
as a study of the teachings of 'Abd al-Wahhab. In the most 
advanced class, the fifth year, these topics are supplemented 
by dictation drills from spoken Arabic (im a 
The Medersa Islamique al-Mahdi Askia was also established 
in the mid-1970's. Increase in enrollment led to the opening 
of a new building in 1983 located in the outskirts of Gao 
where land is readily available. The approximately 50 stu- 
dents in the beginning year remain in the older building 
in Gao's 2nd quarter. The main financing for both school 
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buildings came from 'Umar Muhammad, a wealthy trader who 
I converted' to reformed Islam in the early '70's. 
In this school, too, parents pay little for students' 
enrollment and many of the expenses of the school's operation 
come from funds administered by the AMUPI. It seems, however, 
that this school has greater support from more wealthy reform- 
ists, such as 'Umar Muhammad. Evidence of this support 
can be found in the school's new building and a staff of 
one moniteur per class. Most of these moniteurs are 'gradu- 
ates' of the school who were unable to find any other work. 
Classes ideally start at 8: 00 a. m. and continue to 
12: 00 with a half-hour recess at 10: 00. After the mid- 
day resting time classes continue from 3: 00 to 5: 00. Because 
the school is several kilometers from town, many of the 
teachers and students arrive late. On one particular day, 
the first teachers arrived at 8: 30 and the last finally 
came at i1: 00 while one was absent without notice. 
In the first years students learn the Arabic alphabet 
and recitation of simple passages from the Quran. In the 
second year students already begin study of the teachings 
of 'Abd al-Wahhab as well as elementary jurisprudence (fiqh), 
the traditions (hadith) and maths (ýas. 5b). In the third 
year grammar (nahaw), Islamic history (tariq) and commentary 
(tafs1r) are added. This curriculum is continued into the 
fourth year. In the fifth and sixth years composition 
(insh5) and conversation (muh5dath) in Arabic are included. 
It is unlikely that the schedule in which all the curriculum 
for each year is includ%,! --d is strictly 
followed. Some subjects 
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are likely sacrificed because of lack of time. 
As in the madrasa Sabil al-Islam, this school has a 
discipline problem. Absenteeism and tardiness of instructors 
often leave children unsupervised. The youth of the moniteurs 
who conduct most of the classes makes it difficult for them 
to command the respect of the students. Children sometimes 
make a game out of seeing what they can get away with before 
being punished and instructors seem unused to being consistent 
in their application of discipline. 
The Madrasa Dar al-Salam al-Qur'an wa-l-Hadith (Dar 
al-Salam school of the Quran and Hadith), run by the radical 
Wahhabis in Dar al-Salam, represents a departure from the 
two madrasas in Cao and from other madrasas in West Africa. 
It is, first of all, the central school of a wider educational 
network. In other villages there are small 'schools' where 
children begin with the basics of their religious education 
such as the alphabet and recitation of simple passages from 
the Quran. These schools operate along similar lines to 
the pattern of traditional Quranic education. Usually after 
one or two years of learning in their home villages, students 
move to Dar al-Salam, to continue their training. Children 
who come to Dar al-Salam from villages where there is no 
primary level school often begin their first year of studies 
in the 'capital', though some are probably trained informally 
in their home villages and enter the madrasa at a higher 
level. 
Another feature that makes the school in Dar al-Salam 
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different from most other madrasas is the deqree to which 
children are integrated into a 'school community'. Students 
who come from other villages temporarily loose contact with 
their families. In this 'boarding school' system, control 
over the childrens' habits and values is easier than in an 
urban environment where the teachings of Islam vie with 
Western influences. In one of my visits to Dar al-Salam 
I tried to find out by means of a census the childrens' 
villages of origin. Seydu Idrissa asked that everyone write 
Dar al-Salam as their village, explaining that when children 
study there it is their only home, that they have no village 
and no family other than the school community. The school 
at Dar al-Salam has as one of its goals the complete integra- 
Lion of each pupil into an educational and religious com- 
mun i ty. 
Complete integration, however, is stressful for many 
children and some identity with the home village remains. 
Along the high water mark of the Niger there is a row of 
small 'houses' spaced far apart with no wall or fence to 
divide them or to give privacy, in which children from the 
same villages (those with primary Quran schools) live while 
pursuing their studies at Dar al-Salam. Each one-room, 
dirt floored building houses between 15 and 20 students. 
Children who come from villages without primary Quran schools 
eat and sleep in the compound of Seydu Idrissa. 
Finally, unlike most urban madrasas, the rural school 
in Dar al-Salam emphasizes the vi, -tue of work on the land. 
Cultivation of the earth is seen as the only way to pert-ect 
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one Is knowledge of Islam. This is largely a reaction against 
urban life and the career orientations of many people with 
French education. The village reformists have more in common 
with traditional Quran schools in this respect than with 
other Wahhabi groups. 
With children integrated into the school community 
and with their daily 'routines regulated around the ideals 
of the Wahhabi movement, discipline is not as much a problem 
in Dar al-Salam as it is in Gao's madrasas. Children are 
Laught obedience and deference to their elders. ", Phey are 
rarely seen at play. They seem to relax only when they 
are away from adult censorship, such as during the brief 
moments when they are on their way to perform a chore (drawing 
water, working in fields, etc. ) or on their way back from 
iLs completion. Football, the most popular recreation of 
boys in Gao, is forbidden, being considered representative 
of non-Islamic culture. 
Not every child in a radical Wahhabi village (except 
Dar al-Salam) necessarily pursues a religious education. 
In Berra, for example, the Wahhabi faction took over the 
main part of the village, including its government school. 
Some enrollment in the state primary school is demanded 
and a large portion of the village's children pursue a French 
education rather than attend the madrasa. There is a certain 
amount of give and take between the two systems. Each year 
in September a number of children ire 'recruited' for the 
village madrasa. In October the government recruitment 
-ice - 
is already committed takes p1l. if a child to attend 
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the madrasa, he is usually allowed to do so. Most children 
who go to Dar al-Salam, therefore, have never studied French. 
If students in the government school fail, however, they 
often take up Quranic studies, and some students profess 
to having failed purposefully so as to study in the madrasa. 
Parents pay for children to attend the school in Dar 
al-Salam with enough grain to feed the child for three months 
of the 8 month school year. Students work in fields and 
village gardens to provide the rest of their support. The 
labour of children in almost any village community is very 
important and the additional burden of supplying three months' 
provision places a restriction on many parents' ability 
to finance their child's religious education, despite their 
usually earnest desire to do so. That 150 boys attended 
the school in Dar al-Salam during a severe drought year 
says much for the esteem in which it is held. 
The labour of students is very important in village 
life. The daily routine revolves as much or more around 
chores--working in fields and gardens, carrying water, col- 
lecting firewood, feeding and herding livestock, etc--as 
around the schedule of the school. Students Provide much 
of their own maintenance by their work in village gardens 
and fields. The plots they work on are often owned by Seydu 
Idrissa or by teachers in the school; the largest gardens 
just outside the village are owned by Seydu Idrissa. Students 
are largely responsible for tilling the soil and irrigating, 
though Seydu Idrissa and the teachers occasionally throw 
themselves enthusiastically into such work. 
2p (I 
Students also help in the preparation of meals. Since 
the domestic routine is kept carefully hidden, it was difficult 
to observe exactly how the children from outside villages 
are fed, but students could often be seen heating their 
own breakfast and pounding grain--tasks that Songhay males 
are rarely seen to do except, perhaps, in the anonymity 
of the coastal towns during migration. It appears that 
a number of women in Dar al-Salam have the extra duty of 
preparing meals for the children. This task does not seem 
to be bUrdensome since they are helped in the pounding of 
grain and the duty is shared by a number of households. 
The school in Dar al-Salam is a long, rectangular build- 
ing made of mud-brick, with doors and window-flaps of corru- 
gated iron. It has three large rooms partitioned by half- 
walls to separate it into nine classes (sing. fasal). Black- 
boards, which only barely seem to serve the purpose, are 
made of tar smoothed over the walls. Students sit in rows 
of mats on the ground. 
From June to October the school is closed. as are govern- 
ment schools and other madrasas, and most children from 
outside villages return home where they can help during 
the busy agricultural season. Some older students, however, 
remain in Dar al-Salam to continue their studies. Besides 
this long vacation only the Muslim festivals of id al-fitr 
and id al-Kabir interrupt the weekly school schedule. 
Study in the school takes place in the morning when 
the routines of the early prayer, breakfast and the reading 
by the imam (Seydu Idrissa) are completed. There is no 
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school on Tuesdays, which are spent working on community 
projects, or on Fridays, the Muslim sabbath. 
There is no set time for classes to begin. When all 
is ready the word spreads quickly and the children assemble 
at the school. This usually takes place between 8: 00 and 
9: 00 a. m. Formal study in the school is normally completed 
for the day by noon. Of -ten there are chores to be done 
before the mid-day meal. There may be a rest period and 
then, if the day is not excessively hot (and sometimes even 
if it is), there are more chores throughout the afternoon. 
After the evening prayer and the final meal of the day some 
children recite and memorize the Quran by the light of kero- 
sene lanterns. Their voices can be heard late into the 
night, sometimes until the small hours of the morning. 
Often the older children who wake before dawn for the early 
morning prayer in the mosque are so exhausted they cannot 
raise themselves from the ground when performing their sajda, 
or prostration. When this happens they are shaken awake 
by someone nearby. 
In the school curriculum, great attention seems to 
be paid to the correct recitation of the Quran. Advanced 
students are able to recite almost any s5ra without looking 
at the text, even though they rarely do so without the book 
being open to the correct page. Starting in the third year, 
recitation is supplemented by other Islamic topics such 
as the traditions (hadith), jurisprudence (fiqh) and the 
Arabic language. including counting and simple mathematics. 
At this stage students also begin study of the teachings 
2RS 
of 'Abd al-Wahhab. 
The education of women is an important part of the 
rural Wahhabi educational system. In the Cao region, informal 
Quranic schools for women can probably be found in any radical 
Wahhabi village where a qualified female teacher is available. 
1n this respect the radical Wahhabiyya differs in practice 
from Gao-city's reformist community where adult women appear 
satisfied with a minimal knowledge of Islam and do not attend 
the madrasas. 
The womens' school in Dar al-Salam is attended by females 
of all ages. Classes are conducted in the compound of one 
of Seydu Idrissa's wives, located in the western edge of 
the village. Tall screens made of sticks tied together have 
been built around the entrance to prevent anyone from 'acci- 
dentally' peering in. In the central part of the village 
a more formal building for womens' studies was begun but 
it was abandoned when labour and resources were exhausted 
by the drought, leaving the walls only waist-high. 
In organization, the womens' madrasa is modeled on 
the boys' school, having nine levels. Almost half the stu- 
dents in the highest level also teach in the other classes. 
Some of these more accomplished women are wives of men who 
are literate in Arabic and have a prominent place in the 
community. The leader of the school, - knot-in by those who 
speak French as the 'marabout des femmes'--is a wife of 
Seydu ldrissa. 
Attendance appears to be informal, with women gathering 
at the closed compound where classes are held when they 
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have a break from domestic chores. While the reformist 
ideal may be the universal access to knowledge, the reality 
is that women study the Quran in much the same way as is done 
in traditional Quran schools, with an emphasis on rote learn- 
ing. There is little or no teaching of topics such as exegesis 
or jurisprudence and women do not attain literacy in Arabic. 
Learning to pronounce the Quran is seen as sufficient for 
women, though they are also instructed in the behaviour 
expected of them which will, so it is said, help them to 
follow the rules of Islam to please their husbands and properly 
bring up their children. Women are often considered to be 
superior in Quranic recitation to their husbands. The explana- 
tion given is that they have more time at home in which 
to study than do their husbands who work hard outside the home. 
Whether or not this is true I am unable to determine. 
The extent to which rote learning of the Quran and 
the importance of students' labour in Dar al-Salam have 
affected the level of literacy in the school is evident 
in a test of Arabic literacy conducted in the three boys' 
madrasas described above--that of the radical Wahhabis in 
Dar al-Salam and the two schools run by the moderates in Cao. 
The test consisted of six selections of written Arabic, 
each of which was accompanied by three questions intended 
to determine the student's comprehension of the text. The 
selections were of varying levels of difficulty and consisted 
20 
of two main styles: classical and modern. In presenting 
scores, the levels of difficulty are numbered as follows: 
20. Scribner and Cole use a similar test of literacy but 
theirs does not distinguish between the classsical and modern 
vocabularies (1981). 
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elementary; 2) intermediate, and 3) advanced. 
tions of ArabLc text included in the test-. were: 
Classical 
1) A passage from an Egyptian religious primer. 
2) SFira 98 of the Qur-ari. 
3) A selection froin the MuqaddiTnah by ibn Khaldun. 
Modern 
The selec- 
1) A passage froin a Jordanian elementary school primer. 
2) A selection from the Cairo newspaper, al-Ahrdm. 
3) A selection from the story al-Ayam by Ta Hussain. 
Each student-. in the three schools, e. xctz. -. pt-. those in 
the, beqinner's classes one and two, where none were I iterate, 
was given a col)v of the Lost as viell (is papec on. which to 
write answers. Students were allotý., ed as much time as they 
needed to complete the test arid were instructed to consider 
eiich pas-sage and to an-, swer all the questioris that, they could. 
Before starting, test materLais and writing implements were 
handed out and the procedure to be followed was explained 
until every student appeared to understand. Further explana- 
tions about the procedure were available at any time. Mon i- 
teurs helped in administering the 
The reliability of the results was compromised bý, a 
lack of constant supervision. Students who finished before 
most others could not be required to wa it and, in t-hei r 
excitement over, the proc(--, edings, could not be kept quiet. 
Towards the end of the test at the Mederso Islainique the 
students who were still writing had to be gat-. hered into 
one room and 'sentries' pLaced --3t the door and windows to 
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1 
Year 
of No. of Mean 
class pupils age 
,, %, I, adrasa Sabil al-Islam- (Gao) 
Classical 
2 
Modern 
2 
13 7.67 )6.33 0.67 2 35.67 
4 6 1 () 0 () - 77.67 27.6 7 
51 11 
1 
12.57 
1 1 
60.67 
1 
18.67 
1 
18.67 
11 
36 9-0 (-) 
1 
15 - 00 
-. 1 
Madrasa Islamique (Gao) 
Year 
of No. of Mean 
class pupils age 
Classical Modern 
3 
, -3 24 13 . 36 17.33 57 2 3.67 1.33 
4 24 13.87 39.00 2' .67 ý 3.3, lo 2.67 
8 13.43 46.00 11 . 67 
6 7 15.14 76.33 62.00 . 19 
Madrasa al-Qur'an wa-1-Hadith (Dar al-Salam) 
Year Classical Modern of No. of Mean 
class pupils age 12123 
3 24 9. '75 
4 34 11. 24.67 Il 9 
1-) 36 12. M 
6 36 17.34 24.00 19.33 3.67 12.00 6.33 2.67 
7 18 15-89 81.33 31.33 3.67 )1 .33 15.67 10. I'l 
8 15 17.33 73.33 40.00 17.67 55- 67 40.00 13.13 
9 10 20.20 
1 1 
96.67 '76.67 30.00 96.67 8 6.67 40.00 
Table 5. *-s of Resul . the test of Arabic 
literacy. 
(scores are presented as the percentaqe of the class average) 
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keep those who had finished fT-OM running and jumping in 
and out of the classroom. The boys froat the fourth year 
in the madrasa Sabil. al-islan, made use of a side door to 
flee before the test was administered. Oniv Llie more demu-Le 
girls, in the class remained. In Dar al-Salam, on the other 
hand, students were generally more disciplined and problems 
of noise arid wild excitement were noý experienced. Tristead, 
the problem was that the school's leaders restricted outside 
supervision of their students as they wrote, and the incidence 
of (well behaved) copying and sharina of informaLion thus 
seems to have been higher thar. in the other schools. Th i: -; 
restriction OTI re-I iabi Ii ty gave the school in Dar al -Salam 
an advantage over the, other sc-hools, but it was an advantage. 
t, h, iL did not give them a higher comparative re-sult. 
The schooi showing the besL re,. --ults was the madrasa 
S, lbil al-IsIdm. Here a inin-iniii level of IlLeracy wds achieved 
in the t-hird year ind rr: miained more or less the same. for, 
the fourth arid fifth year students. Thiý, leveling off at 
low level is possibly due to týhe addition of curriculum 
in more. advanced classes and a correspondin(j]-y decreased 
emphasis on learning Arabic. The higher scores in comparýson 
with the other schools may be due to smaller clisses and 
a more direct participilt. jon of the . -Chool 
's master in the 
teaching process at the bc-airining levei. 
In the Meder-sa Islamiclue -, -31-Mahdi Askia, ' similar 
teveling of f occurs at the third vear wi th a very sl ight 
improvement in the fifth year. me gain mado by sixth year 
students is likeiv due to the fact that, this is the only 
. 
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class taught by the masioter of the school, a more qua iifi ed 
teacher than the moniteurs. 
The school in Dar al-Salam the lowest -scores showed L' 
for the years in which a comparison is possible uJth the 
other schools. This may at first appear unusual considering 
the better discipline and the seriousness with whi, ---h literacy 
arid r-eliqious knowledge are taken. For the villacle. students, 
however, the advantage of this seriousness is cancelled 
ou".. by the difficulty of living conditions, the early emphasis 
on rote learning and, most importantly, the comparatively 
short time each day given to formal Lessons in the school. 
[_Jt(ýrýicy does not t. ruly begin until the sixth year, the 
beqinning of the 'second cycle' in which a )<nowLedge of 
Uie Arabic lanquage becomes more important. 
It is [nterestirig to note that in aii three- madrasas 
t. -he scores tor passages in classical Arabic are qerierally 
higher th,. -in those in modern Arabic. The exceptions are 
the 8th and 9L. h year classes in Dar al-Salam where the scores 
are about even. This suggests that students first attain 
comprehension in classical Arabic or with writings that 
have a specific, religiously-oriented vocabulary. Only 
later do they learn other language styles, such as newspaper 
articles, as they absorb the wider vocabulary that comes 
with 3dvanced study. 
In spite of the difficulties involved in administ. er-ing 
the test it is safe to conclude that sLudenUs in Dar al-Saiam 
acquire literary much later than in the other schools', but 
a higher level of literacy could ultimately he achieved 
because of the availabiliLy of more advanced studies--nine 
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years as opposed to five or six. In the long term, therefore, 
the school in Dar al-Salam may have more 'graduates' that 
are literate in Arabic than the other madrasas. 
The school in Dar al-Salam, however, does not have 
a large number of 'graduates. It has taken most of the 
time since its establishment to train the students and teach- 
ers who are now 'advanced' in their knowledge. No former 
students of the school have, as of yet, continued their 
studies abroad. Assuming, rather generously, that fifty 
students or former students of the school are able to under- 
stand much of the religious literature that they come across, 
it is safe to say that only a small minority of the movement's 
followers have any comprehensive knowledge of Arabic. 
Older men with literate skills in Arabic are therefore 
the main channel through which religious knowledge is dis- 
seminated. They hold the key to salvation through their 
access to the moral precepts and sacred commands of Islam. 
In this respect they hold a similar position to the 'ulam5 
in other parts of the Muslim world. That which is unusual 
in the context of the radical Wahhabis of Gao is the fact 
that the formation of this literate elite is both recent 
and sudden. Religious knowledge had at no other time pene- 
trated as deeply into the social life of the villages. 
Seydu Idrissa is seen as the ultimate source of this new 
understanding. it is principally for this reason that, 
in a time of crisis when Islamic rigour had become a vehicle 
for salvation, the ideal of equality was contradicted and 
the leader was capable of being perceived as a 'prophet'. 
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The government response to Islamic education. 
Most madrasas are, at least to some extent, influenced 
by western methods of education, but at the same time many 
reformist teachers are opposed to the national school system, 
associating it with secularization and the acceptance of 
non-Islamic values. There is, in Mali, a tension between 
the more radical exponents of Arabic education, who see 
themselves as upholding a reformed Muslim 'tradition', and 
the government which sees itself as preparing the way for 
modernization and 'national salvation'. Formal education 
has proven to be a powerful tool of socialization and the 
struggle for control of education is often part of a wider 
struggle for control of cultural transmission and national 
identity. 
It has been impossible for the Malian government to 
ignore the rising demand for Islamic education during the 
past several decades, both in traditional Quran schools 
and in madrasas of varying standards. To some extent there 
has been a positive official response to this demand, as 
in the creation of the Lyc6e Franco-Arabe in Timbuctu. The 
traditional Quran schools and madrasas, however, have increased 
in number dramatically over the last several decades, largely 
out of range of government supervision or control. This 
has occurred principally because of a widespread realization 
that government education does not necessarily lead to paid 
employment while at the same time potentially threatens 
the survival 'of traditional culture. The recrudescence 
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of Islamic education in all its r-orms represents a strength- 
ening of what are perceived to be traditional values. 
This increase in the popularity of Quran schools and 
madrasas is a problem for the government for several reasons. 
in a recently released document entitled Nedersa au Mali, 
of f iclais in the Inspection de I'Education Fondamental com- 
plain that the increased enrollment in Islamic schools poses 
a threat to government education because it takes away stu- 
dents from the public system and at the same time decreases 
general education standards. As one official put it, the 
popularity of Islamic schools "a tendance a faire de l'obscur- 
entisme un system.,, 21 
Another concern on the part of the government is that 
the madrasas, if left out of official control, can become 
tools of foreign influence in an international drive to 
expand puritan Islam. The Inspecteur de I'Education Fonda- 
mental in Bourem, who has probably had first-hand experience 
wit. h Gao-Style Wahhabism, favours the traditional marabout 
over the master of a madrasa: 
Si le marabout est un bon musulman qui m6ne un 
combat solitaire dans le seul but de r6pandre 
la lecture du Coran, le maitre de la medersa est, 
lui, affIli6 a une secte expansioniste fortement 
structur6e dont les actions d6bordent largement 
les limites de notre pays. Le programme de la 
medersa 2 
Iaisse aisement devenir le but de son 
action. ", 
The Malian government seems to have begun to show serious 
21. Government of Mali, 1983-84: 10. 
22. ibid. 
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interest in the problem of Islamic education in the late 
1970's. In 1981 the Ministere de l'Interieur carried out 
a census of Quran schools throughout the country and in 
April, 1982 the Conseil des Ministres decided to place the 
administration of madrasas in the hands of the Minist6re 
de I'Education Nationale. At the same time it decided to 
place madrasas under the same regulations and control as 
the '6coles laiques'. Thus, in order to be defined as a 
madrasa and to receive official permission to operate, Islamic 
schools were required to make an application and to meet-, 
government standards, the most important new requirement 
being the introduction of French as a language of instruction 
which was to be given equal standing to Arabic. 
In 1983 this policy was accepted by the Commission 
Restreinte, an advisory council under the direction of the 
Ministdre de 1'Education Nationale. The stated goal of 
this commission was to educate "musulmans eclarees, des 
citoyens cA part, entier en un mot, des producteurs et non 
des masses aveuglement et dangereusement fanatis6es, exploit- 
ables et surecrollt. 
23 This commission aimed to avoid the 
exclusive emphasis on Arabic in madrasas which it viewed 
as preventing the economic, social and cultural integration 
of students into the nation. This integration, it was thought, 
could be largely achieved with the equal participation of 
French and Arabic in the madrasas. The method proposed 
to accomplish this was a legal separation of madrasas and 
Quran schools and an official recognition only of madrasas 
23. Government of Mali, 1983-84: 54. 
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that meet government criteria. 
The census conducted by the Minist&re de I'Int6rieur 
in 1981 showed that four madrasas were operating in the 
region of Gao. This probably included only the most visible 
schools in Gao, Bourem. and Ansongo, while schools in the. 
%,, illages were overlooked. A survey implemented by the 
Minist6re de I'Education Nationale in 1983, after, the imple- 
mentation of new legislation, showed no madrasas for the 
region of Gao. In essence, the madrasas of 1981 were legi- 
slated out of existence during the subsequent two years, 
becoming 'Quran schools' instead. 
The administrative control of madrasas represents the 
qovernmentlis intention to promote a national identity based 
on a common language, French, and to control foreign involve- 
ment. in the education process. Thus, even madrasas that 
did not receive official recognition were pressured to into- 
duce French instruction to their curriculums. At least 
one school in Gao made an attempt to do so, but due to a 
limited budget and disputes between the French and Arabic 
instructors, the experiment did not last, and official recog- 
nition was not forthcoming. As this example shows, the 
tension between the goals of the government and those of 
many Muslim reformists has no indication of being resolved 
in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
In the introduction to this work I called into question 
the way in which a number of authors have dealt with, or 
neglected to deal with, Islam in the rural setting of French 
West Africa. Griaule, the founder of a tradition in French 
ethnography, stressed the richness and eloquence of the 
cosmology and ritual of the Dogon while leaving us uninformed 
as to the wider social and cultural networks in which they 
were situated. Dieterlen, in her studies of the Bambara, 
and Rouch, in his studies of the Songhay, have equally 
underestimated the actual and potential strength of Islam 
in the village context. 
Such an underestimation of Islam is also evident in 
most of the more general analyses of 'black' Islam. Here 
we often find, in one form or another, a distinction between 
the religion of agriculturalists and that of nomads and 
city dwellers. The former, it is assumed, have less attach- 
ment to monotheistic religion because of the nature of 
their economy and its effect upon their outlook on life, 
their 'mentality', their 'mind'. 
In presenting the Gao Wahliabiyya in the context of 
this literature I intended to show both that the Islamization 
of African 'peasants' has been undervalued and that in 
recent decades in some areas it has undergone change in 
the direction of 'siniplif ication' arid 'purification' .I 
will once more take up this discussion with the evaluation of 
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a more recent debate between Robin Horton and Humphrey Fisher 
concerning the nature of, and mechanisms behind, African fcon- 
version'. The material presented on the Gao Wahhabiyya is 
particularly applicable to this debate since the central issue 
is the pri-macy of indigenous religions and cosmologies in 
the process of conversion to the world religions, Islam and 
Christianity, in the African setting. The exposition and 
critique of this debate will then provide the background for, 
a summary of the directions which religious change has taken 
and the forces behind this change in the different expressions 
of reform that we find in the Gao reqion. 
Horton, presenting what he calls the 'intellectual is"t 
theory of conversion' begins by outlining the pre-conversion 
cosmology or, in his words, the 't.,,, tpical traditional cosmo- 
logy, The essential feature of this system of thought, 
which he claims is basic to nearly all pre-Islamic and 
pre-Christian African religions, Ls a two-tiered arrangement 
of 'unobservables' (again Horton's term): Ilesser spirits, 
the focus of religious thought and ritual activity, are seen 
to be concerned with the welfare of the local community 
and its environment, while the supreme being, a vague and 
abstract entity, controls the world as a whole, including 
its lesser spirits, but is far more uncontrol lable and 
unapproachable through ritual techniques than Local deities. 
In trying to demonstrate the minimal place Of Islam 
and Christianity in conversion to monotheism-- -their Place 
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as . catalysts' rather than Primary factors--Horton asks 
us to imagine a situation in which the traditional cosmology 
becomes deprived of its microcosmic underpinning of the 
local community and becomes overwhelmed by the modern forces 
of international commerce and the nation state without 
the simultaneous presence of Islam or Christianity. Horton's 
response to this exercise is to claim that even without 
missionary influence, African religions would be led to 
a monotheistic cosmology under the impact of an expansion 
of the social environment: 
As more and more people become involved in social 
life beyond the confines of their various micro- 
cosms, they begin to evolve a mor, -, ii code for the 
governance of this wider life. Since the supreme 
being is already defined as the arbiter of every- 
thing that transcends the boundaries of the 
microcism, he is seen as underpinning this univer- 
salist moral code. 
' 
Horton is careful to add that cosmological change is rarely 
immediate and total but is more commonly a matter of shifts 
in emphasis from the worship of lesser spirits to the worship 
of the supreme being. The individual who participates in 
this process of religious change can be placed on a continuum 
between traditional cosmology and universalist monotheism, 
his position on this continuum depending largely upon the 
degree of his exposure to a wide, 'impersonal' sociai 
environment. 
1. Horton, 1971: 102. 
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... there is [sic] an infinite number of potential 
positions between traditional religious life and 
the full-blooded monolatric cult of a morally 
concerned supreme being. The particular position 
taken up by the individual will depend largely 
to the degree to which, in his own personal life, 
the boundaries of the microcosm have ceased to 
confine him. Thus if he continues to live in 
his own local community, engaged in an occupation 
such as farming, the greater part of his religious 
life is still likely to be taken up by the cult 
of the lesser spirits... If he continues to live 
in his own community, but engages in a 'modern' 
occupation like keeping a hardware store which 
is more highly integrated with the economy of 
the macrocosm, the cult of the spirits will be 
a little less important to him, and the cult of 
the supreme being a little more important. Finally 
if he goes to work outside his own community, 
as well as engaging in a 'modern' occupation, 
Lhe CUIL Of the lesser spirits is likeýy to be 
overshadowed by that of the supreme being. 
Horton's central point, then, is that Christianity and Islam 
tiave acted only as catalysts in the development of monothe- 
istic religion in Africa. Their acceptance "is due as much 
to the development of t. he traditional cosmology in response 
to other factors of the modern situation as it is to the 
activities of the missionaries.,, 
3 
i sher 
4 
responds to Horton's thesis with the central 
criticism that it does not account for the important results 
of Africa's response to Islam. Fisher holds that in the 
case of Islam a momentum has been established, throuqh MLISIiM 
missionary effort, which goes beyond the mere adaPtation 
of indigenous conceptions of il supreme deity. In presentinq 
this ided Fisher postulates a three-stage schema of the 
T 
development of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa: 1) Lhe Quarantine 
stage occurred where small grOUPS Of Muslims, usually traders, 
2. Horton, 1971: 103. 
3. Ibid. Horton's emphasis. 
4. Fisher, 1973. 
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professed monotheism in areas dominated by pagan religions, 
with neither conceptual system significantly influencing 
the other. 2) 'Mixing' describes the stage in which monola- 
tric ideas diffuse from the original carriers and become 
at least partially accepted by the pagan population, but 
with many traditional customs maintained in the process. 
Reform occurrs where a small group of holy men attempt 
to convert the 'mixers' to a 'pure' version of the faith. 
For Fisher the most decisive religious change--that which 
defies explanation by Hortons intellectualist theory--is 
the reformist movement from weak adherence to marked sincerity 
arid religious piety. In describing this general movement 
he accepts the term 'Juggernaut', a compelling and unstoppable 
force that drives the faithful to extremes of religious 
fanaticism. 7 
Horton presents a defense of his original thesis with 
8 
a more detailed consideration of Islam. He too posits a 
three-fold schema, the first two stages of which he describes 
as patterns of Islamization rather than historical periods. 
1) Non-militant Islam: The first Muslims in West Africa 
were travellers from the Maghreb who were primarily concerned 
with trans-Saharan trade rather than proselytization. Thus 
the Islam they implanted was essentially non-militant. In 
this stage subsistenCe farmers were the least influenced 
by Islam (they remained bound to the microcosm) while, in 
varying degrees which depend upon experience in the 'macro- 
cosmic P social environment, greater committment was manifested 
7. Fisher, 1985. 
8. Horton, 1975. 
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by the rulers of state capitals, members of the commercial 
communities of various states, Fulani pastoralists and Islamic 
scholars and holy men. 2) Militant Islam: In the jih5ds 
and other reform movements of the 17th 18th and 19th centu- 
ries a prominent role was nearly always taken by merchants 
and pastoralists who, according to Horton, were exposed 
to a wider environment which induced them to adhere more 
firmly to the worship of a unique deity. The iih5d leaders 
were all committed to an international order in opposition 
to the parochial tendencies of the traditional leadership. k, 
3) Modern times: In the colonial and post-colonial period 
an acceleration of the progress of Islam is evident. This 
is a response to colonial rule and its sequels which replaced 
numerous relatively small political bodies with centralized 
units. In a key phrase whLch summarizes the African response 
to recent social change Horton writes: "It was predictable 
that they wou-Ld move toward a rich elaboration of the doctrine 
of the supreme being who underpinned the macrocosm into 
which they were being thrown. " 
9 
Let us now consider this debate in the light of the 
example of the Songhay Wahhabiyya. If we follow t-11he pattern 
of Horton's use of historical and ethnographic material 
in our own consideration of the Songhay we wouid not be 
led to expect the situation described in this study: a 
radical movement among Muslim villagers with moderation 
being the key feature of their, urban counterparts. We wou Id 
9 
. Horton, 1975: 3K,. 
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rather expect the reverse: radical, 'enthusiastic' town 
dwellers promoting a 'legalistic, Islam and moderate or 
'luke-warm' villagers who practice a non-scholarly blend 
of Islamic and ancestral customs. T 1--ooking more closely 
at the rural milieu we see communities principally concerned 
with economic and social activities within the 'microcosm' 
with wider experience being derived from links with the 
nearby town, from participation in the wider political pro- 
cesses and, most importantly, from the migration of men 
to coastal cities. The majority of Songhay villagers, however, 
especially women, have not gone far beyond the confines 
of the village, at least not far enough to be in accord 
with the intellectualist theory of conversion. 
Where has the theory gone wrong? It is, firstly, 
psychologistic, describing the individual as placing himself 
on a continuum between traditional cosmology and monotheism 
in accordance with the degree of his exposure to a wider 
social world. It is important, however, to recognise that 
conversion can take place in situations in which social 
groups retain some measure of coherency. In the Songhay 
villages political alliances were the clearest example 
of social units that encouraged, or opposed, collective 
conversion. Village leaders--imams, chiefs and inale members 
of traditionally influential families, were often brought 
under pressure to make a clear stand for or against the 
tpurification' of the religion. Their own family members 
and allies were thus mutually involved in a leader's decision 
to support one camp or the other. 
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Direct exposure to a wider environment was not a neces- 
sary condition of 'conversion' in the village setLing. 
Those who had greater contact with reformist ideas through 
temporary migration or Pilgrimage, once committed to prosely- 
tization, were able to influence those more bound to the 
local community. The rapid acceleration of Islamic reformism 
iii the villages did not, however, result in a smooth transi- 
tion from one system of cosmology to another. The social 
pressures demanding religious conformity are greater in 
the rural than in the urban environment so that the introduc- 
tion of an alternative religious or conceptual system led 
to conflicting allegiances, heated controversy and community 
division. 
Secondly, Horton is correct to isolate 'modern times'-- 
the period of' colonialism and post-independence governments-- 
as an important historical phase in the development of the 
monotheistic religions in Africa, separable front the preceed- 
ing current of events above all by the development of large 
political units; but the social dislocation resulting From 
this change is under-emphasized in favour of the expansion 
of social horizons afforded by rapid communication, transport, 
trade, the growth of cities, etc. Considering more carefully, 
as we have done, some of the local effects of political 
centralization--the removal of political and economic auto- 
nomy--we see that village communities are themselves being 
altered by modern conditions. It is not simPlY that the 
rural folk are being thrown into the 'macrocosm'; the 'macro- 
cosm' is also throwing itself onto the rural folk. 
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It is important to underscore the impact of colonial 
and post-colonial Politics in effacing the autonomy of local 
leadership and in imposing an economic system which encouraged 
migration to cities together with the simulltaneous division 
of family property and the reduction in the authority of 
elder males. The changes resulting from modern political 
and economic conditions have created a situation in which 
the reformist message could not only be more easily communi- 
cated to Songhay villagers, but could also be anchored to 
a social organization which facilitated cooperation within 
and between communities and encouraged semi-independent 
political activites which challenged the national government. 
final observation applies equally to Horton's and 
Fisher's dpproach to conversion. Fisher is, I believe, 
largely correct in stressing the independent momentum of 
monotheistic religions, particularly in the contemporary 
SitUdtion. He places his emphasis, (perhaps too much empha- 
sis) on ideological influences--the appreciation of Islamic 
or Christian civilizations as superior, more powerful- 
in accounting for the dissolution of traditional religions. 
But when we come to consider the appeal or impact of 'Civili- 
zations' on rural African communities why take for granted 
the unwavering continuity of a religious cosmology? We 
should d1so stress Uhe impact of secularism, an important 
' -osmolog%p' ingredient in the European c 
Weber has argued that. protestant Christianity, with 
its stress on the inpenetrable supreme being, was an essential 
part of the concepLual and ethical structures of moderil 
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society in the early development of capitalism; but this 
association between religion and economy was not permanent 
and we see very little evidence of scriptural piety in the 
political and economic operation of European society. Horton 
appears to invert Weber's argument by stressing the import- 
ance of modern political and economic structures in the 
development of monotheism. He does so, however, without 
recognizing that contemporary western society is no longer 
inextricably bound with a religious cosmology and can be 
considered an agent of secularism in Africa perhaps more 
than an agent of monotheism. It is not at all clear that 
those exposed to 'modern times', of which the imposition 
of European values and technology is a central feature, 
would inevitably elaborate the doctrine of the supreme being 
to 'fit' with this experience. This observation compels 
us to conside. r the place of secularism in the religious 
evolution of sub-Sdharan Africa. 
Before outlining an alternative model of the directions 
of religious change in Lhe rural African setting I shall 
summarize some of the features of 'modern times' that have not 
been adequately developed in the Horton-Fisher debate. 
The Songhay, like other societies in which dniMiSM 
has been a central ingredient in the religious complex, 
have undergone a process of cultural modification wh.,. ich 
began with the impact of French colonialism and which far 
outstrips, both in pace and in scope. the influence of the 
I egalitarian' colonialism, so to speak, of pre-colonial Islam. 
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At the most basic level it should be stressed that 
Islam is no longer the sole 'civilization' modifying the 
cultural landscape. As everywhere in the 'Third World', 
westernism has become a major force acting directly upon 
the values and practices of Songhay society. Teachers 
and other government workers as well as the advanced students 
or 6volu6es who have been given higher education either 
in Africa or in Europe, are most often imbued with western 
values and goals in life. 
In the villages, however, the cultural impact of the 
west is not as strong as one might at first assume. The 
Songhay have a remarkable capacity for social adaptation 
and some have been given dramatic introductions to the 
western lifestyle which little altered Lheir outlook on 
life upon return to their home villages. During the Second 
World War, for example. Songhay men were sometimes recruited 
to fight on French soil and then returned home. The French 
they learned was eventually forgotten and only bitter memor- 
ies remained of the experience. (An old veteran of this 
sort once asked me if the Germans were still a menace in 
Europe. ) Today much of this resilience remains in the 
villages but European culture has made greater inroads 
through education in the French language. Many children 
especially those who pursue second cycle studies in the 
town, are influenced through their education by aspects- 
of 'popular culture' such as music, dress and, as some 
members of the older generation will point out. sexual 
AML - 
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liberalism. 
Besides the influence of western 'culture, the nature 
of Islamic penetration has changea in the 20th century. 
Improved transportation and communication have greatly 
increased the availability of contact with Muslim centres 
of higher learning. To study in Medina or simply to perform 
the pilgrimage is no longer as ambitious or risky an under- 
taking as in the days when pilgrims travelled by foot. 
Visits from Arab delegates to West Africa are also common 
and, for those travelling to Bamako, the embassies of 
Middle Eastern countries are another source of news and 
views from the Arab world. But it is the corpus of Africans 
who have been to the Middle East and been inspired by its 
- impact upon religious culture which has had the greates"k, 
local culture, just as westernized Africans are more effec- 
tive than Europeans themselves in transmitting westernism. 
Schools such as the Dar al-Hadith in Medina were instru- 
mental in providing African pilgrims with the grounding 
in Arabic and religious knowledge required to establistj 
missionary efforts in their native regions. Among the 
Songhay, such students and pilgrims were also influential 
in the migrant communities in Ghana. 
The impact of western culture as well as a reinvi- 
gourated influence from the Pliddle East have combined to 
create a complex range of cul. tural fiel. ds in contemporary 
Songhay society. To simplify the web of cultural influences 
we can isolate their most extreme expressions, the 'Pure 
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types', to use Weber's term, which may be called 'mixed 
Islam', 'westernism' and 'reformed Islam'. 
1) Mixed Islam: refers to the local traditional religious 
complex which combines animist practices, the worship of 
jinn, ancestors, holle spirits, etc., with a 'corrupted' 
(from the reformists' point of view) form of Islam based 
on '-Islamic magic' (for example, sand divination or amulets 
using passages from the Quran) and 'maraboutism'. 
2) Westernism: is the term given to the values and attitudes 
of Africans strongly influenced by western culture. Most 
of these are government employees or students whose education 
has given them a skeptical attitude toward local 'super- 
stitions' and a distant or 'negiectful' attitude to mono- 
theistic religion. Those who are politically involved 
might be described as 'secular nationalists' who see redemp- 
tion in terms of concrete policies and actions on the part 
of national and local government raLher than in terms of 
religious participation and sacred laws. 
3) Reformed Islam: can be described as the reform movement 
which seeks to put into practice the rules and guidelines 
of the Quran and hadith, which seeks, in short, to restore 
the 'golden age' of Tslam. It is, therefore, a part of 
the cultural field which is based upon a limited sacred 
literature (if one excludes exegesis and other comment- 
aries). 
Few Songhay, in fact, follow with great consistency 
any one of these cultural patterns. Most, in the Gao area 
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at least, fall somewhere between two such patterns and 
only very rarely combine influences from all three sources. 
There are, therefore. continua or ranges of variation between 
the extreme poles of cult. ural expression. Change, rang i ng 
in speed and profundity from minor shifts in outlook to 
full 'conversions', occurs among individuals and groups 
along these continua. the main directions of which can be 
outlined diagra. matically as follows: 
Vl', ES TERNIS r-I 
F, TIXED 
-I- I SLAM 
)t- 
REFORMED 
ISL AM 
Figure 5. Directions of cultural change. 
A) Ilixed Islam to westernism: Social change in this, direction 
occurs principally through western education but is made 
more permanent by economic and political oppor tunities 
for which this education is required. ýýostern cu I ture, 
and education per se would have very I ittle socia l impact 
313 
if they were not associated with employment in the public 
sector or, at a higher level, with Political power. Exposure 
to western values through education does not necessarily 
lead to full-blown 'europeanization' but the impact of 
written culture, combined with the possibility that it 
may bring economic prosperity and social influence, often 
make life in a village or a traditionally oriented urban 
community, to one exposed to such 'higher' ideals, seem 
'backward'. It is difficult to recover the values of an 
oral culture once the goals associated with viestern culture 
have been accepted. The frequently mentioned 'loss of 
self', 'disenchantment', I anomie', I alienation', and so 
on, of those who are educated but without employment stems 
from their having accepted many of the values and aspirations 
of the western educated elite without being able to realize 
them. 
B) Westernism to reformed Islam: Many personal histories 
of influential, and not so influential, Muslim reformers 
shows them to have once been strongly influenced by western 
culture, having worked during the colonial period in -some 
capacity for the French administration or, after independ- 
ence, having worked as petty officials, or sometimes just 
aspiring to be petty officials. For those living 'between 
two cultures', whose expectations and aspirations are not 
met, whose experience on the margins of western civilization 
is marked by a prevailing 'loss of identity', a solution is 
often found in adherence to Islam. Unlike Christianity 
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(which has made virtually no progress in the Cao area), 
Islam has the appeal of being perceived as an important 
part of African life and traditions. Unlike local belief 
I systems based upon a tsyncretist' re. Ligion, Islam can be 
seen as being progressive. To be a Musllm one does not 
need to put aside the experience of living in a literate 
civilization. The attitude of many reformers who oppose 
the 'superstitious' practices of Sufism and paganism is 
one in which Islam is perceived to be able to implement 
and account for we-,,, -, tern science and technology-- indeed the 
Quran is often seen as having anticipated many such discover- 
ies and inventions--without adopting western secularism 
or the beliefs of Christianity. PuriLan Islamic reform 
which strives to imitate the model of the early faith may 
be one of the only ways for Muslims to cope with changes 
introduced by western society while retaining religious 
integrity. Western education, as much as compromise with 
I pagan' practices but in a different way, brings about inevi- 
table deviations from the orthodox model of Muslim practice. 
It introduces many concepts which those interpreting Muslim 
law according to 'the letter' find unacceptable. The reformed 
faith, on the other hand, offers a more precise model by 
which new ideas and practices can be accepted or rejected, 
by which the ideals of social progress through improved living 
conditions can be implemented without any Perceived sacrifice 
of religious or cultural integrity. 
C) Mixed Islam to reformed Islam (and back): It is the Prob- 
lem of a movement f rom a 'syncret"i st'* rel ig 
iu. us COMr"L ex 10a 
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unitarian, scriptural approach to Islam among the Songhay 
with which this paper is centrally concerned. This change 
has occurred in two directions. Some young members of the 
reformist community, had been given a French language education. 
in a few cases they had spent twelve years in government 
schools but had been unable to find work. Here they arrived 
at their commitment to Islamic reform by initially moving 
in the direction of westernization, then by undergoing a 
change in values which led to acceptance of reformed Islam. 
Most of those in the villages who 'converted' to the 
Wahhabiyya, however, had been brought up in a social context 
in which 'mixed Islam' was prevalent. The laity of the radical 
reform movement is for the most part illiterate and accustomed 
only to following the seasonal cycles of a subsistence economy 
or, for those exposed to urban life through migrant labour, 
to traditional occupations such as petty trade and various 
forms of manual labour which do not lead to much exposure 
to western culture. 
For most Wahhabis 'conversion' is too strong a word 
to describe their change in religious orientation. Formal 
conversion for those given Muslim names is unnecessary. The 
Wahhabis themselves perceive change as being from laxity 
and ignorance to rigour and enlightenment. They see themselves 
as having always been Muslims, albeit misguided ones earlier 
in life, even though, in the case of the radicals, their 
rivals whose approach to reliqion is of the same degree of 
misguidedness are referred to as 'infidels'. 
The fact that reform is seen as occurring within a wider 
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Muslim tradition makes it Possible for those who are disaffected 
with the Wahhabiyya to justifY moving back into the tradi- 
tionalist community. Those who left the reform movement often 
decided (with a few reservations) that the old way was not 
such a bad way after all. Their religious outlook had changed 
several times without any feeling that they had denied faith 
or tradition. Many who were initially swept up in the enthusiasm 
for reform later moved away from the radical Wahhabiyya when 
they saw the full implications of family and community division, 
and in the process moved back toward the 'mixed Islam' they 
had once observed. The return to 'syncretism'. however, is 
usually only partial. Many who are not open advocates of 
Islamic reform remain influenced by it in their practice of 
the fai th. 
While individuals and families sometimes left the Wahhab- 
iyya, especially at the time of crisis when COMMUnities first 
divided, the movement as a whole has resisted any dilution 
of its religious principles or any overall movement back toward 
f syncretism f. More political participation is evident but this 
is a change in strategy rather than in belief or in the convic- 
tion with which belief is held. 'Routinization' of charisma, 
Weber has pointed out, occurs principally during the first 
significant change of leadership in a movement, usually through 
the problem of succession posed by the death of the charismatic 
leader. 10 The radical Wahhabiyya has not yet reached this 
stage in the evolution of social movements. Seydu Idrissa, 
venerated for his uncompromising approach to religion and 
10-Cf. Weber, 1978: 246-254 and Bendix, 1977: 305-306. 
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for the suffering he endured in Pursuing his convictions, 
js still the principal guiding hand Of the movement. Change, 
possibly in the form of a reintegration of communities or 
at least improved relations between them, is waiting in the 
wings with leaders like Zacharia Ture. 
There are practical reasons for the continuation of 
inflexibility and intolerance in the radical Wahhabiyya. Perhaps 
the most obvious is the set of rules which fully inteqrates 
the follower into the religious community. The requirement 
for men to pray in the mosque when in the villaqe, the prohibi- 
tion on praying alone when travelling or working away from 
the village, and the restrictions stemming from the seclusion 
of women all serve to keep the believer tied closely to the 
community and to prevent any manifestations of doubt from 
emerging without an immediate counteraction. 
Religious education, less dramatically, acts to maintain 
the ideals of the movement. Literacy and education, features 
of almost all scriptually based reform movements, are often 
overlooked by scholars in favour of such gripping phenomena 
as messianic enthusiasm and violence. But it is crucial to 
consider the attitude toward scriptures and the ways in which 
literacy is developed in order to understand the means by 
which a prophetic message is transmitted and maintained. Given 
the fact that Islam among the Songhay, as among almost all 
West African societies, was traditionally orally transmitted, 
through memorization rather than comprehension, the task of 
promoting reform was a formidable one. Seydu Idrissa's campaign 
for religious education was begun by org, anizing d group of 
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'missionaries' who travelled to the villages to preach in 
the Songhay language. Schools were soon started and the small 
but expanding group of men who became literate in Arabic formed 
an important group Of village leaders and 'assistants'. Even 
though the goal of widespread literacy in Arabic has not yet 
been achieved, the presence of a literate minority is vital 
for the transmission of the sacred message and for the mainten- 
ance of a high level of enthusiasm for the ideals of reform. 
That which I have outlined so far is the cultural back- 
ground of the reform movement, the systems of beliefs and values 
acting in Songhay society, their appeal in different sectors 
of the population and the directions in which changes in outlook 
between these cultural systems took place. This does not 
give us a complete explanation of the social origins of Islamic 
reform. How can we explain the fact that the missionary effort 
was successful among the Songhay, that the reformist message 
did not simply fall upon the deaf ears of a people content 
to continue in their traditional practices but rather was 
taken up and responded to by several thousand villagers who 
formed a surprisingly unified movement? The social conditions 
in which Wahhabism was accepted were not new when the reform 
movement began but stem largely from the economic and political 
effects of French colonialism which have continued without 
any significant change of direction through the period of 
independence. 
The breakdown of the extended family--the weakening of 
patriarchal domination and of the rigid system of ranking 
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based on the order of birth--was associated with economic 
diversification which gave junior family members the possibility 
to attain positions of relative independence. But when using 
words such as 'dissolution' or 'disintegration' to describe 
the evolution of family relationships it is easy to convey 
the impression of an atomized society, of rampant individualism 
and of uniform rivalry and antagonism between kin. The fact 
is that kinship remains a fundamentally important force in 
Songhay society. Sibling groups often remain close-knit, 
feelings toward the mother often remain affectionate and feel- 
ings toward the father marked by respect. Such bonds that 
remain, however, cannot be counted on, being based as much 
on personal rapport and affection as upon social imperatives. 
Wahhabism to a large extent replaces the support and 
imperatives of the family with those of the religious community. 
This is especially true of the radicals. Deference and obedi- 
ence to one's elders are inherent features of many social 
relationships; help in times of crisis, or even during the 
normal course of events as in sowing and harvesting, is often 
provided by the reformist community throuqh appeal to its 
leadership. Such features and functions, which once had a 
more secure place in the patriarchally dominated family unit, 
are now part of the appeal of reformist Islam. 
Migration played a dual role in the development of the 
Wahhabiyya among the Songhay. Firstly, it was the key to 
the development of economic independence which released many 
Young men from ties with their elders. 
Migration was, there- 
fore, closely associated with the weakening of the family 
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structure centred upon the patriarch. Secondly, at a time 
when migration had become an established economic pattern, 
Islam developed as the basis Of community identity in a setting 
where the immigrant workers were largely without family support 
and were living in an urban environment which they perceived 
to be fundamentally hostile. The experience of living in 
closed religious communities in the zongos of Ghana was an 
important prelude to the development of Wahhabism in Cao, 
not only in giving many Songhay men the sense of a new commit- 
ment to Islam, but also in giving them the experience of 
being insulated from the surrounding animist and Christian 
influence, in developing a boundary between the 'believers' 
and the 'i6fidels' which we see repeated in a different context 
in Cao. 
Some of the most important benefits of membership in 
the Wahhabiyya are derived from the fact that reformist communi- 
ties exist in both the northern villages, the sources of migra- 
tion, and in the southern cities, the destinations of migrants. 
Links between the two sets of religious communities are informal, 
occurring more through the movement of migrants themselves 
than through involvement from the leadership. The fact remains, 
however, that these communities share a common committment 
to reformed Islam and a common system of rules in the organiza- 
tion of their followers. A member of the reform movement 
who travels to Ghana is given access to a support structure 
which can help him in practical matters. such as visas, lodging 
and employment, and which provides an emotional umbrella, 
a protection from the shock and disequilibrium that arises 
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from being a 'stranger' in the urban environment. 
Political change during the past century is another factor 
which has contributed to the organizational appeal of the 
Wahhabiyya. In pre-colonial times the chief, though not always 
loved, was at least respected. With the elimination from 
power by the French authorities of 'undesireable' leaders 
and the participation of those who remained as mediators between 
the villages and the administration, the chief became more 
commonly despised. The adjudicating role of chiefs decrease&as 
most decision-making power was taken out of their hands but, 
with the colonial power structure behind them their opportuni- 
ties for exercising tyranny increased. With independence 
the chief essentially became a petty official acting as a 
liason betwen the commandant de cercle arid the village. Margin- 
alization, which many Songhay are acutely aware of, is a product 
of political centralization, beginning with colonial rule and 
culminating in the independent nation., a development 
which deprived many groups of effective local leadership. This 
situation was one in which Islamic reform could Promote a 
popular village leadership, one that was capable of being 
perceived as oriented toward local interests in Opposition 
to domination by rulers from the south. 
The weakening of family ties, migration, political margin- 
alization, these are key ingredients in the transformation 
of' Songhay society in which the traditional religious complex 
shifted its spiritual emphasis in many villages in the direc- 
tion of a puritan, scriptually-based version of Islam. There 
is a temptation to add to these factors the impact of environ- 
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mentai disaster. Is it more than mere coincidence that the 
Wahhabiyya made rapid progress at a time when the people of the 
Sahel were suffering from the effects of drought and famine? 
The drought does seem to have decreased adherence to traditional 
religious practices and created a more widespread acceptance 
of the all-powerful God as a mover of events. In the case 
of the Wahhabiyya, however, we should not place too much 
emphasis on environmental disaster as a 'causel of the reform 
movement. Drought had occurred at other times in Songhay 
history without bringing with it any similar social response. 
Today, moreover, continuing harsh conditions have kept the 
movement from becoming economically prosperous and from imple- 
menting many of the leadership's plans to change living condi- 
tions in the villages. 
Given the environmental and social conditions in which 
religious reform in Gao emerged some readers might find it 
surprising that we do not find a greater emphasis on millenarian 
eschatology. Did not Musa Aminu in the late 1940's declare 
himself to be the mahdy and announce the imminent arrival 
of the Day of Judgement? If drought and its consequent suffer- 
ing are seen as a punishment or a trial from God why is this 
not considered a Sign that Cod is about to punish the , illvi- 
dels' and bring the believers to a final victory? In truth, 
this kind of belief may have been present at the beginning of 
the radical movement when Seydu Idrissa considered an armed 
revolt, but ultimately this course of action was seen as unten- 
able. Realism prevailed over inspired suicide. 
In this element of realism we find a basic similarity 
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with the Mouride brotherhood of Senegal. O'Brien, in his 
analysis of the Mourides, finds that the religious organization 
was instrumental in effecting adjustment to the changes brought 
about by the introduction during colonial rule of cash crop 
agriculture into peasant society. The Mouride brotherhood, 
with its emphasis on the submission of followers to a shaikh, 
provided economic security in times of hardship, largely through 
a revitalization of the agricultural economy. 
The brotherhood responded to the needs of the follow- 
ers in rejecting either violent revolt or fantasy 
withdrawal, and in turning to more positive tasks-- 
providing the organization which made it possible 
to acýt more effectively within the economic and 
political framework of French colonial rule. Psycho- 
logical reassurance was indeed offered by Mouride 
beliefs (the promise of paradise, in particular), 
but the decisive appeal seemsýpo have been organiza- 
tional rather than doctrinal. ' 
In the case of Songhay Wahhabism, the marginality brought 
about by state formation and the insecurities of long distance 
migration are the main factors to which the religious organiza- 
tion responds. In addition, the Wahhabiyya, like the Mouride 
brotherhood, may provide a measure of security in the face 
of drought, famine and disease--a greater measure of security, 
at least, than that provided solely by individual households 
or by state and international relief programmes. Here too 
the decisive appeal of religious reform is organizational. 
There is a certain irony in the fact that despite the 
strong ideological opposition between the reformists and the 
11-O'Brien, 1971: 289. 
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brotherhoods there is a basic similarity between them which 
arises from the need for leadership and organization in trans- 
mitting and maintaining the religious message. In areas where 
the Sufi brotherhoods are strong theY have sometimes served 
as carriers of puritan Islam, principally because they possessed 
the leadership structure necessary for the development and 
dissemination of scripturalist reform. Among the Songhay, 
a strongly anti-Sufi movement has come to resemble its 'enemy' 
through the development of a centralized leadership and through 
many of the functions of its organization. 
In submerging the follower in an organization which defines 
itself largely through deference to a central leadership, 
the radical reform movement risks contradicting the ideal 
of salvation through individual merit. The structure of leader- 
ship in the Wahhabiyya must, on the surface at least, appear 
consistent with religious belief. The prohibition on worship- 
ping beings other than God applies especially to the worship 
of men, yet it is common for followers to venerate reformist 
leaders. The attempt to prevent this contradiction from arising 
is made by stressing the greater knowledge of the men at the 
top. Their wisdom is derived through access to the Book and 
obedience to them is therefore justified. In the Mouride 
case, as in most other Suf i brotherhoods, the shaikh is a 
two-way mediator between man and God. He can give blessings 
through a transference of sacred power, or baraka, and he 
can give promises of salvation. In the Wahhabi case, doctrin- 
ally at least, the alfa is only a mediator between the will 
of God and the acLion of man. The literate guide is the bearer 
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of sacred knowledge but the key to salvation is embodied in 
the word, not in the man. Paradise is not guaranteed. it 
is up to the believer to use this sacred knowledge, to obey 
the divine command. 
In considering the moderate style of reform found prin- 
cipally in the urban setting it would be overstating the case 
to suggest that a dramatic shift had taken place from f syncre- 
tism'to reformed Islam. The degree of religious change required 
in this context was less than that which the radicals demanded 
of themselves. In the case of the moderate Wahhabiyya an 
educated clerisy was better established than in the villages 
before the reform movement beqan. Wahhabism fit into a pre- 
existing religious structure and comparatively few changes 
in outlook or orientation to life were demanded of the follower. 
Style of dress and method of prayer--the outward signs of 
religious adherence--are the most important definitve features 
of a moderate reformist. Associated with a more relaxed approach 
to change is a decentralized system of organization character- 
ized more by ties of friendship and loyalty than by ties of 
deference or obedience. 
The most advertised difference between the moderate and 
radical Wahhabis is in their approach to religious change. 
The radicals are inflexible, uncompromising, proud to distinguish 
themselves, the 'true believers' from those who are less careful 
or punctilious in their observance of the faith. Moderates 
point out the need for change, especially in such outward 
aspects of the religion as the style of prayer (which is no 
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longer the subject of great controversy) or the wearing of 
amulets, but they are usually careful to emphasize the uni- 
versality of Islam. The moderates, then, stress the unity of 
the faith; the radical stress the need for perfection in order 
to be included in it. 
In the urban context reformed Islam is not, strictly 
speaking, a religion of the oppressed. Traders and shopkeepers 
are most commonly adherents of reform but we also find crafts- 
men (carpenters, masons, etc. ) and minor civil servants. For 
these people Islam has the appeal of being a world religion 
with a greater emphasis on the international community of 
believers and on a more universalized salvation than that 
found in the inward-turning animist cults or the more exclusive 
radicals. 
Largely owing to contrasts in the social, particularly 
economic, backgrounds of the moderate and radical reformists, 
we find further dissimilarity in the structure and functions 
of their systems of organization. The urban moderates are 
only loosely tied together in a religious community. Members 
occupy different places on a status hierarchy but this is 
not linked to a general structure of command and obedience. 
The most essential social links are based upon loyalty and 
friendship between those who often must cooperate or trust 
one another in their commercial endeavors. This is in contrast 
to the structuring of radical Wahhabis into a federation of 
villages which acknowledges both a central leadership and, 
in spite of the ideal of equality between believers in the 
sPiritual sense, a ranking of members within individual communi- 
ties. 
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A difference between the moderate and radical styles 
of reform which has the greatest implications for the future 
is in their relationship with the state. The moderates have 
sought a modus vivendi with the national government through 
agreement to participate in the state controlled Association 
Malien pour l'Unit6 et le Progr6s de I'Islam. Such participa- 
tion is seen as a compromise, not what the moderate reformists 
might want (which is an independent organization) but an improve- 
ment over the situation in which all Muslim associations are 
banned. 
The radicals refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
a religious association controlled by a 'secular' government. 
Their ambition is to promote unitarian Islam, not through 
cooperation with 'non-Muslims', but through the independent 
propagation of their ideals. Political participation for 
the radicals is more a channel for defiance than for integration 
into the state. 
The government, for its part, seeks to make uniform state 
control over Islamic associations, which it has accomplished 
in the AMUPI, and over religious education, which it is trying 
to do through restrictions on private schools. It is in the 
latter objective that there is the greatest Potential for 
change in the status of Gao's reformists. It is a striking 
fact that all Muslim reformists in the Gao region have resisted 
the government's efforts to control Islamic education in madrasas. 
Even the moderates look upon government control as a threat, 
as leading to potential compromise with their religious princi- 
ples. Elsewhere in Mali, however, we find a greater acceptance 
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of a diversified curriculum, which usually includes teaching 
of the French language, the most important requirement for' 
official recognition of religious schools. This is principally 
because many reformists elsewhere in the country have perceived 
the practical advantages of a diversified education. Knowledge 
of Arabic and Islam alone does not provide security in a system 
in which urban employment increasingly requires other skills. 
in Cao, on the other hand, religious education is precisely 
what is demanded. The persistence of religious conservativism 
in private education is associated with political marginality 
and resistance on the part of religious groups to participate 
in the state system. 
If the Malian government decides to assert control over 
Gao's madrasas the reformists will face a vital decision: 
acquiesence or defiance. The outcome of this situation of 
potential conflict between the state and the reformists will 
probably be a process of mutual modification. The state, 
in making government control of education easier to swallow, 
will provide the sugar coating of compromise in other areas 
of Muslim interest, for example, in a closer identification 
of the state with Islam and a greater tolerance of the reformist's 
activities in their campaign for religious change. The reform- 
ists, on the other hand, perceiving this tolerance, might 
be less likely to isolate the state as a target fo-. civil 
disobedience or political opposition. A probable outcome 
of state control of Islamic education would be a de-radicaliza- 
tion of the radical Wahhabiyya and a more uniform national 
distribution of scriptural Islam. 
F UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY 
CA Pl,,? 3P,, 
ID(GE 
BIBLJOCRAPHY 
Abitbol, Michael (ed. ) 
1982 Tombouctou au Milieu du xvjjj Si6cle. Paris: 
G-P Maisonneuve et Larose. 
Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. 
1965 The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern 
World. Oxford University Press. 
Adomako-Sarfoh, J. 
1974 'The Effects of the Expulsion of Migrant 
Workers on Ghana's Economy with Particular 
Reference to the Cocoa Industry. ' in Samir 
Amin and Daryll Forde (eds. ) Modern Migration 
in West Africa. Oxford University Press. 
Alexandre, Pierre. 
1970 'A West African Islamic Movement; Hama.. I 
ism 
in French West Africa', Ln R. I. Rotberq and 
A. A. Mazrui (eds. ) Protest and Power in Black 
Africa. Oxford University Press. 
Amin, Samir and Daryll Forde (eds. ) 
1974 Modern Migration in West AfrLca. Oxford 
University Press. 
Amselle, Jean-Loup. 
1977 Les Ný, >qociants de la Savane. Paris: tMitions 
anthropos. 
Amselle, Jean-Loup. 
1985 'Le Wahhabisme 
B. Jerusrewski 
d6fricheurs de 
Quebec. 
A Bamako (1945-85)' in 
and J-L Triaud (eds. ) Les 
I'Islam en Afrique Occidentale. 
Ba, 'Amüdou 1980 Vie et Ensignement de Tierno Bokar. Paris: 
Aditions de Seuil. 
Bagayogo, Issaka. 
1975 Structures socio-economiques du Songhoi pre- 
Colonial. Diplome de 1'ý, cole des Hautes 
. kludes en Sciences Sociales, 
Paris. 1ý I- 
Barkun, Michael. 
1974 Disaster and the Millennium. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Bendix, Reinhard. 
1960 Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. London: 
Heinemann. 
329 
661 
330 
Bisilliat, j. 
1967 'La Notion de LaRkal. dans la Culture Djerma- 
'IN ,. )onghai, ' Psychopathologie Africaine. Vol. III, 
no. 2. 
Boulnois, J. and Boubou Hama. 
1954 L'empire de. Gao. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve. 
Brenner, Louis. 
1982 'The Cultural Jihad: al-Hajj Sa'ad Umar Toure 
and Islamic Educational Reform in Mali, ' 
unpublished paper for the conference on 
'Political Crises on the West African Islamic 
Frontier', ', ->OAS. 
Brenner, Louis. 
1984 [Vest African Sufi. London: C. Hurst & Company. 
Brown, Godfrey N. and Mervyn Hiskett (eds. ). 
1975 Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical 
Africa. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Cardaire, Marcel ; 1954 'L Islam et le terroir africain', Etudes 
Soudaniennes. Vol. 11: 1-184. 
Cohen, Abner. 
L909 Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Cohen, Ronald. 
1971 Dominance and Defiance; A Study of Marital 
instability in an Islamic African Society. 
American Anthropological Association. 
Colonna, Fanny. 
1975 Instituteurs alg6riens, 1883-1939. Algiers: 
Office des Publications Universitaires. 
Commandant de Cercle, Gao. 
1956 Elements d6mographiques succincts: Repartit. -on de la population par races. Unpublished document. 
Crowder, Michael. 
1968 West Africa Under Colonial Rule. London: 
Hutchison. 
Decraene, Philippe. 
1980 Le Mali. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. 
Deyoko, Abkoulaye. 
1975 Disparites r(->gionales en matiöre de politique 
scol. aire au Mali. Thi-, se de Maitrise, Uni- 
versit6 de Paris 1- Sorbonne. 
331 
Dieterlen, Germaine. 
1951 Essai Sur la Religion Bambara. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Dupuis-Yakouba. 
1921 Industries et Principales professions des 
habitants de la region de Tombouktou. Paris: 
Larose. 
Eisenstein. Elizabeth L. 
1981 'Some conjectures about the impact of printing 
on western society and thought: a preliminary 
repor+%.., -in 
Harvey J. Graff (ed. ). Literacy 
and Social Development in the West. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
1929 Leyden: E. J. Brill Ltd. 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 
1949 The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford University 
Press. 
Fallers, L. A. 
19 57 'Some Determinants of Marriage Stability 
in Busoga: A Reformulation of Gluckman's 
Hypothesis, ' Africa. 27: 106-123. 
is er, Humphrey. 
1963 Ahmadiyya; A Study in Contemporary 
-Islam 
on the West African Coast. Oxford University 
Press. 
Fisher, Humphrey. 
1973 'Conversion Reconsidered; Some Historical 
Aspects of Religious Conversion in Black 
Africa, ' Africa. 48: 27-40 
Fisher, Humphrey. 
1985 'The Juggernaut's Appologia; Conversion to 
Islam in Black Africa, ' Africa. 55: 153- 
193. 
Friedland, William H. and Carl G. Rosberg (eds. ). 
1964 African Socialism. Stanford University Press. 
Froelich, J. C. 
1962 Les Musulmanes de I'Afrique Noire. P'Iris: 
Editions de I'Orante. 
Gallais, Jean. 
1975 Pasteurs et Paysans du Gourma. Paris: Editions 
du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 
ah., 
332 
Gallais, Jean (ed. ). 
1977 Strategies Pastorales et Agricoles des Sahel- 
iens Durant la S6cheresse, 1969-1974. Paris: 
Centre d'Etudes de G6ographie Tropicale, 
C. N. R. S. 
Gellner, Ernest. 
1969 Saints of the Atlas. London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson. 
Gellner, Ernest. 
1981 Iluslim Society. Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbal, Jean-Marie. 
1984 Guerisseurs et magiciens du Sahel. Paris: 
Editions A. M. M6taili6. 
Goody, Jack (ed. ). 
1968 Literacy in Traditional Societies. Cambridge 
Universitv Press. 
Goody, Jack and Ian Watt. 
1963 'The Consequences of Literacy', in Jack Goody 
(ed. ) Literacy in Traditional Societies. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gouilly, Alphonse. 
1952 L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale FranQaise. 
Paris: Mitions Larose. 
Government of Mali. 
1-983-84 Medersa au Mali. Unpublished report; Bamako. 
Graff, Harvey J. (ed. ). 
1981 Literacy and Social Development in the West. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Greenberg, Joseph. 
1946 The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese ReLLgion. 
-in Lublisher. New York: J. J. August D 
Greenslade, S. L. (ed. ). 
1963 The Cambridge History of the Bible.. Cambridge- 
University Press. 
Criaule, Marcel. 
1932 'Mission Dakar-Djibouti; Rapport C6n6ral, ' 
Unpublished report; Mus6e de 1Homme, Paris. 
Griaule, Marcel. 
1939 Dieu d'Fau; entre. tiens ave-c Ogo Vetnmd 16. 
pa I-i . ": Lcs 
tditions du Ch6ne. 
333 
Grundy, Kenneth W. 
1964 'Mali the Prospects of "Planned Socialism"', 
in William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg 
(eds. ). African Socialism. Stanford UniversitY 
Press. 
Guillaume, Alfred. 
1966 (1924) The Traditions of Islam. Oxford University 
Press. 
Habib, John S. 
1978 Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam. Leiden: 
E. J. Brill. 
Hiskett, Mervyn. 
1960 'Problems of Religious Education in Muslim 
Communities in Africa', Oversea Education. 
Vol. XXXII, no. 3: 117-126. 
Hiskett, Mervyn. 
1973 The Sword of Truth: The Life and Times of 
the Shehu Usuman dan Fodio. Oxford University 
Press. 
Hiskett, Plervyn. 
1980 '"The Community 
It Rejectors": 
Mysticism in 
Re f erence to 
Language Stu( 
of Grace" and its Opponents the 
a Debate about Theology and 
Muslim West Africa with Special 
its Hausa Expression', African 
lies. no. XVII: 99-140 
Hiskett, Mervyn. 
1984 The Development of Islam in West Africa. 
London: Longman. 
Hodgkin, Thomas and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau. 
1964 'Mali' in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg 
(eds. ), Political Parties and National Inte- 
gration in Tropical Africa. University of 
Califormia Press. 
Horton, Robin. 
1971 'African Conversion', Africa. Vol. XLI, no. 2: 
85-108. 
Horton, Robin. 
f Conversion', Africa. 1975 'On the Rationality 0 
Vol 45, nos. 3 and 4: 219-235 and 373-399. 
Hunwick, J-0. 
and the State in the Songhay Empire 1966 'Religion 
in I. M. Lewis (ed. ), Islam in 1464-1591'.. 
TroPical Africa. London: Hutchinson. 
Ibn Khaldun (Franz Rosenthal, trans. ). 
1967 The Muqaddimah. Princeton University Press. 
33,1 
Ibn Sulaiman, -,, iluhammad. 
1976 Mubadi al-Islam. Medina. 
Jamin, Jean. 
1984 'Aux Origines du Mus&e de I'Homme: '1a mission 
ethnographique et linquistique Dakar-Djibouti', 
Cahiers Ethnologiques. no. 5. 
Jansen, G. H. 
1979 Militant Islam. New York: Harper & Row. 
Jerusrewski, B. and J-L Triaud (eds. ). 
1985 Les d6fricheurs de I'Islam en Afrique Occidentale. 
Quebec. 
Johnson, R. W. 
1975 'Educational Progress and Retroquession in 
Guinea (1900-43)', in Godf-rey N. Brown and 
Mervyn Hiskett (eds. ), Conflict and Harmony 
in Education in Tropical Africa. London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Kaba, Lasine. 
1974 The 11)'ahhabitjya; Islamic retorm and Politics 
in French West Africa. NorthwesLern University 
Puess. 
Kaba, Lasine. 
Politics of Qu ra ni Education among 1976 'The 
, 'ýIusim Traders 
in the ý%'(, ster-n '--; ud(in: The 
Subbanu Experience', Revue Canadierme. d'8tudes 
Af ricaine..,.. Vol. 10, no. 3: 409-111. 
Kati, Mahmud. (O. Houdas and M. Delafosse trans. ). 
il)13 Ta'rikh al-Fattash. Paris: Ernest Leroux. 
Kessler, Cl ive. 
1978 Islam and Politics in a Malay State. Cornell 
'ý'niversity Press. 
Khoury, Adel-Theodor. 
1983 Tendances et courants de I'Islam irabe contempo- 
7.1tin ich: -i Id. r,? i n. Vol 2. Groncv; ( 
Laoust, Henri. 
1939 F.,; sai sur les Doctrines Sociales ef Politiques 
de T, iki-d-Din Ahmad B. TaimiYa. Cairo: 
Insti'Lut I'u, inluais d'Arcti6ologie Orientile. 
Last. Murv, iv- 
19 67 Ow Sokoto Caliphate. London: Lonqman's 
335 
Lettens, Dirk. 
1971 Mystagogie et mystification; evaluation de 
l'oeuvre de Marcel Griaule. Brussels. 
Lewis, I. M. 
1962 Marriage and the Family in Northern Somaliland. 
East African Studies, no. 15. 
Lewis, I. M. (ed. ). 
1966 Islam in Tropical Africa. London: Hutchinson. 
de Lusiqnan, Guy. 
1969 French-Speaking Africa Since Independence. 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 
Maher, Vanessa. 
1974 Women and Property in Morocco. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Martin, B. C. 
1976 Muslim Brotherhoods in Ninteenth-Century 
Africa. Cambridge University Press. 
Marty, Andre. 
1985 Crise rurale en milieu nord-Sahelien et 
recherche cooperative. Th6se pour doctorat 
d'Etat, Universit6 FranQois Rabelais, Tours. 
Marty, Paul. 
1920 8tudes sur 1'IsIam et les Tribus du Soudan. 
Vol. 2. Paris: 8ditions Ernest Leroux. 
Merad, Ali. 
1967 Le r6formisme musulman en Alg6rie de 1925 
a 1940. Paris: Mouton. 
Miner, Horace. 
1953 The Primitive City of Timbuctoo. Princeton 
University Press. 
Monteil, Vincent. 
1964 1, 'Islam noir. Paris: editions du Seuil. 
Niezen, R. W. 
1983 Literacy and Prophetism; a Comparative Study 
of the Sacred Value of Writing. M Phi 1. 
Thesis, University of Cambridge. 
Norris, H. T. 
1975 The Tuaregs; Their Islamic LegacY and its 
Diffusion in the Sahel. Warminster: Ar is 
& Phillips Ltd. 
336 
O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise. 
1971 The Mourides of Senegal; The Political and 
Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood. 
Oxford University Press. 
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 
1969 Syst6me des Relations 8conomiques et Sociales 
chez les Wogo (Niger). Paris: Institut 
d'Ethnologie. 
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 
1982 Concepts et conceptions songhay-zarma. Paris: 
Nubia. 
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 
1984 Les soci6t6s songhay-zarma. Paris: Karthala. 
Paden, John N. 
1973 Religion and Political Culture in Kano. 
University of California Press. 
Philby, H. St. J. B. 
1930 Arabia. London: Ernest Benn Limited. 
Prost, le 11. Andr6. 
195,1 '"\otes sur les Songhay', Bulletin de I'Institut 
Francais d'Afrique Noire. (IFAN) Dakar, 
Vol. XVI: 167-213. 
Quandt, WiIiiam B. 
Pý81 Saudi Arabia in the 1980's. Washington, D. C: 
The Brookings institution. 
La Rennaissance de l'Islam. 
1986 'Notre appel A la jeunesse Islamique du monde 
entier', unpublished letter, Bamako. 
Robinson, David. 
1985 The Holy Iýar of Umar Tall. Oxford University 
Press. 
Rotberg, R. I. and A. A. Mazrui (eds. ). 
1970 Protest and Power in Black Africa. Oxford 
University Press. 
Rouch, Jean. 
1953 Contribution a I'histoire des Songhay. m6m. 
de I'IFAN, no 29: 139-259. 
Rouch, Jean. 
1954 Les Songhay. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. 
Rouch, Jean. 
1956 Migrations au Ghana' , Journal de la Soci6t6 des africanistes. V01 XXVI: 3-196. 
Me" 
337 
Rouch, Jean. 
1960 
Saad, Elias N. 
1983 
La religion et la magie Songhay. Par i s: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 
Social History of Timbuktu: The Role of 
Muslim Scholars and Notables. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schildkrout, E. 
1974 'Islam and Politics in Ghana: An Analysis 
of Disputes over the Kumasi Central Mosque', 
American Museum of Nat. Hist. Anthropological 
Papers. 52 (2): 113-137. 
Schildkrout, E. 
1978 People of the Zongo. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Scribner, Sylvia and Michael Cole. 
1981 The Psychology of Literacy. Harvard University 
Press. 
Sidikou, Arouna Hamidou. 
1977 'La straL&gie adapLive et ses limites des 
Zarma de Zarmaganda (R6publique du Niger) 
face A la s6cheresse actuelle (1965-76)t, 
in Jean Gallais (ed. ), Strat6gies Pastorales 
et Agricoles des Saheliens Durant Ia S6cheresse 
1966-74. Paris: Centre d'Etudes de Geographie 
Tropicale, C. N. R. S. 
Sivan, Emmanuel. 
1985 Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern 
Politics. Yale University Press. 
Sm i th, M. G. 
1959 'The Hausa System of Social Status, Africa. 
Vol. XXIX, no. 3: 239-252. 
Smith, Margaret. 
1984 (1928) Rabi'a the Mystic and her Fellow Saints 
in Islam. Cambridge University Press. 
Stewart. C. C. 
1973 Lslam and the Social Order in Mauritania. 
Oxford University Press. 
Thomas, Keith. 
1971 Religion and the Decline of Magic. London: 
Penguin Books. 
338 
Triaud, Jean-Louis. 
1982 'L'Islam et 1'1ýtat au Niger', Le ýlo is en 
Afrique. no's. 192 and 193. 
Triad, Jean-Louis. 
1986 'Abd al-Rahman I'Africain (1908-1957), pionnier 
et precurseur du wahhabisme au Mali', in 
Olivier Carr6 and Paul Dumont (eds. ). 
Radicalismes Islamiques. Vol. 2. Paris: 
HarmaLtan. 
Triminqham, J. Spencer. 
1959 Islam in West Africa. Oxford University 
Press. 
Wane, Yaya. 
197/1 'Ceerno Muhamadu Sayid Baa ou le soufisme 
int6gral de Madiina Gunaas (S6n6gal)', Cahiers 
1, XIV: 671-698. d'I"tudes Africaines. 
t, Weber, Max (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. ). 
19-16 From Max Weber; Essays in SociologY. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Weber-, Max. (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds. ). 
I ()'/ ký Economy and Society. VOL I. University 
of Cilifornia Press. 
Wilks, Ivor. 
1 1) 6 ('ý 
CHEAM (Centre 
Modernes. ) 
'The Transmission of Islamic Learning in 
the Western Sudan', in J. R. Goody (ed. ), 
Literacy in Traditional Societies. Cambridge 
Uni, v-ersity Press. 
des Hautes Etudes sur I'Afrique et I'Asie 
Beyries, gouverneur. 
1958 L'Islam au Soudan Francais. 
Chailley, Marcel. 
1959 Notes sur l'Islam au Soudan. Doc. no. 3171. 
Delmond, Paul. 
1947 Dori, Ville Peuhle. Doc. no. 1282. 
Loysance, M. A. 
n. d. L'Islam et les survivances de I'animisme 
dans la subdivision centrale de Niamey. 
Doc. no. 2.190. 
339 
Regular publications: 
Jamana: Revue Culturelle Malien. Nos. 4,6,7, and 8. 
I 
 
CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
Attention is drawn to the fact that the 
copyright of this dissertation rests with its author. 
This copy of the dissertation has been supplied 
on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with 
0 
its author. In accordance with the Law of Copyright 
no information derived from the dissertation or 
quotation from it may be published without full 
acknowledgement of the source being made nor any 
substantial extract from the dissertation published 
without the author's written consent. 
